SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : LANDING/DECELERATION-LGC FMEA NO 02-1A -016 -1 REV:09/19/88

ASSEMBLY :MAIN LANDING GEAR (MLG) CRIT. FUNC: P/N RI :V070-510001 CRIT. HDW: P/N VENDOR:

VEHICLE 103 102 104 OUANTITY : 8 EFFECTIVITY: X Х X

:4 LH PHASE(S): PL LO 00 DO LS X

:4 RH

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: **A**-B-PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY:

APPROVED BY (NASA): SSM (Auticle Carple) REL & AZ (Day La, L. DES DES R. A. GORDON REL J. S. MULLEN REL Res Open

QE W. J. SMITH QE

ITEM:

MAIN LANDING GEAR FITTING ASSEMBLIES, DRAG BRACE AND STRUT TRUNNIONS

FUNCTION:

VEHICLE TO LANDING GEAR STRUT & DRAG BRACE ATTACH ASSY.

FAILURE MODE:

STRUCTURAL: FAILURE

CAUSE(S):

OVERLOAD, DEFECTIVE PART/MATERIAL.

EFFECT(S) ON:

- (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE
- (A) LOSS OF LOAD CARRYING CAPABILITY.

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- (B) DAMAGE TO VEHICLE STRUCTURE.
- (C,D) PROBABLE LOSS OF MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO GEAR COLLAPSE.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A) DESIGN

THE FITTINGS ARE DESIGNED TO OPERATE FOR 400 CYCLES WITHOUT STRUCTURAL DEGRADATION. DESIGNED TO A MINIMUM FACTOR OF SAFETY OF 1.4 WITH STANDAF MATERIAL ALLOWABLES. MATERIALS USED ARE NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO CORROSION DURING EXPOSURE TO EXPECTED ORBITER ENVIRONMENTS.

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(B) TEST

QUALIFICATION TEST: THE FITTINGS WERE CERTIFIED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE MLG MECHANISM INSTALLATION (LANDING GEAR OPERATION) - 32 CYCLES OF THE LANDING GEAR DURING ALT, 15 DEVELOPMENT CYCLES AND 353 QUALIFICATI LIFE CYCLES FOR A TOTAL OF 400 CYCLES. (THE LANDING GEAR WAS CYCLED F UP AND LOCKE TO DOWN AND LOCKED EACH TIME).

HIGH TEMP TESTS; 3 CYCLES AT 140 DEG P

COLD TEMP TESTS; 3 CYCLES AT -25 DEG F TO -40 DEG F

OMRSD: MLG WHEELWELL DETAIL INTERNAL INSPECTION; MAIN GEAR STRUT TRUNNION FITTINGS AND DRAG BRACE FITTINGS ARE INSPECTED FOR EVIDENCE O STRUCTURAL DEGRADATION.

FREQUENCY: NINTH FLIGHT OF EVERY VEHICLE AND EVERY EIGHTH FLIGHT THEREAFTER.

(C) INSPECTION

ENVIRONMENTS:

RECEIVING INSPECTION
RECEIVING INSPECTION VERIFIES MATERIAL AND PROCESS CERTIFICATIONS.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL
CLEANLINESS AND CORROSION PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

MATERIAL USED FOR FABRICATION VERIFIED BY INSPECTION ON MANUFACTURING ORDERS. MACHINE TOLERANCES PER DRAWING AND MACHINING SPECIFICATION. INSTALLATION OF BEARING PER BEARING INSTALLATION SPECIFICATION, TOOL AT REQUIRED, VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. TRUNNION ASSEMBLY COMPLETE PER DRAWING AND APPLICABLE SPECIFICATIONS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION ON MANUFACTURING ORDERS.

CRITICAL PROCESSES
HEAT TREATING VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION
FLUORESCENT PENETRANT INSPECTION REQUIRED AND VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

TESTING ACCEPTANCE TESTING IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

PACKAGING/HANDLING HANDLING AND PACKAGING REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

- (D) FAILURE HISTORY NONE.
- (E) OPERATIONAL USE NONE.