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PRINT DATE: 01/13/94

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CRITICAL HARDWARE

NUMBER: 05-6N-2043-X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: EPD&C - AUXILIARY POWER UNIT

REVISION:

2

01/14/94

PART NAME VENDOR NAME

PART NUMBER VENDOR NUMBER

LRU

: PANEL A12

V070-730365

SRU

: FUSE

ME451-0018-0100

PART DATA

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

FUSE (1 AMP) - AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) HÉATERS, LUBE OIL LINE 1, 2, AND 3 POWER CIRCUITS

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: 36V73A12FB

36V73A12F25 36V73A12F32

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 3

THREE (1 PER APU)

FUNCTION:

PROVIDES OVERLOAD PROTECTION IN THE CONTROLLOGIC CIRCUITS FOR APUILUBE OIL LINE HEATERS.

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FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) - CRITICAL FAILURE MODE NUMBER: 05-6N-2043-01

REVISION#

01/13/94

SUBSYSTEM NAME: EPD&C - AUXILIARY POWER UNIT

LRU: PANEL-A12 **ITEM NAME: FUSE**

CRITICALITY OF THIS

FAILURE MODE: 2R3

FAILURE MODE:

FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT

MISSION PHASE:

00

ON-ORBIT

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY: 102 COLUMBIA

109 DISCOVERY 104 ATLANTIS 105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK. PROCESSING ANOMALY, THERMAL STRESS

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

A) PASS

B) FAIL

C) PASS

PASS/FAIL HATIONALE:

A)

FIRST FAILURE NOT DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT DUE TO THE PARALLEL REDUNDANCY OF CONTROL POWER SOURCES FOR THE LUBE OIL LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUITS.

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS .

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF REDUNDANT COMMAND TO HDC TYPE 3 OR 4 CIRCUIT DRIVER.

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

NO EFFECT - FIRST FAILURE. REDUNDANT CIRCUIT WILL OPERATE TO ENERGIZE THE SAME HEATER.

(C) MISSION:

NO EFFECT - FIRST FAILURE

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

NO EFFECT - FIRST FAILURE

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FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) — CRITICAL FAILURE MODE NUMBER: 05-6N-2043-01

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

LOSS OF MISSION AFTER ONE OTHER FAILURE (RESISTOR FAILED OPEN) WHERE BOTH LUBE OIL LINE HEATERS TO SAME APU CANNOT BE ENERGIZED. ABORT DECISION REQUIRED.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:

REFER TO APPENDIX D. ITEM NO. 4 - FUSE, PLUG-IN TYPE

(B) TEST:

RÉFER TO APPENDIX D. !TEM NO. 4 - FUSE, PLUG-IN TYPE

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST - APU 1/2/3 LUBE OIL HEATER CIRCUIT TESTS.

PERFORMED EVERY OMOP OR AFTER CIG RETEST.

(C) INSPECTION:

REFER TO APPENDIX D, ITEM NO. 4 - FUSE, PLUG-IN TYPE

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

RÉFER TO APPENDIX D. ITEM NO. 4 - FUSE, PLUG-IN TYPE

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

PERFORM ON-ORBIT THERMAL CONDITIONING TO MAINTAIN LUBE OIL TEMPERATURE.

- APPROVALS -

= 1/2c/44

EDITORIALLY APPROVED

EDITORIALLY APPROVED

TECHNICAL APPROVAL

: Al

: JSC

: VIA CR