

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - AUXILIARY PWR FMEA NO 05-6N-2072-IM-2 REV: 02/11

ASSEMBLY : AFT LCA 1,2,3
P/N RI : MC477-0261-0002
P/N VENDOR:
QUANTITY : 6
: SIX, TWO/APU
:

	VEHICLE	102	103	104	10
EFFECTIVITY:		X	X	X	X
PHASE(S):		PL X	LO X	OO X	DO X LS X

CRIT. FUNC: 1R
CRIT. HDW: 3

PREPARED BY: DES T NGUYEN
REL T KIMURA
QE W R HIGGINS

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PAS
APPROVED BY: *[Signature]* 2-19-97
SSM *[Signature]* 4/1/01
REL *[Signature]* 2-13-92
QE *[Signature]* 2-20-92

APPROVED BY (NASA):
SSM *[Signature]* 4/1/01
REL *[Signature]* 9/10/00
QE *[Signature]* 2/11/00

EPDC Reliability *[Signature]* 4/1/00
EPAC SSM *[Signature]* 4/1/00

ITEM:
CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER, HDC TYPE 1 - IMPROVED AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (IAPU) 1, 2, AND 3 GAS GENERATOR/FUEL PUMP HEATERS (A AND B) POWER CIRCUIT

FUNCTION:
UPON GSE COMMAND FROM MDM LA1, POWER IS PROVIDED TO THE APU G2 GENERATOR/FUEL PUMP HEATER (A OR B).
54V76A121AR(J1-15), (J1-22);
55V76A122AR(J1-15), (J1-22);
56V76A123AR(J1-15), (J1-22)

FAILURE MODE:
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, FAILS "ON", FAILS TO TURN "OFF"

CAUSE(S):
PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
PROCESSING ANOMALY, THERMAL STRESS

EFFECT(S) ON:
(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY EFFECT:

(A) DEGRADATION OF REDUNDANCY AGAINST INADVERTENT POWERING OF HEATERS
(B,C,D) NO EFFECT - FIRST FAILURE
(E) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER FOUR OTHER FAILURES (TWO PREFLIGHT TO-ESSENTIAL BUS DIODES FAIL SHORT WHICH ENERGIZES THE PREFLIGHT TEST BUS THERMOSTAT CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED, AND OVERTEMPERATURE THERMOSTAT CONTACT FAIL CLOSED) POWERING HEATER CONTINUOUSLY CAUSING FUEL DECOMPOSITION AND POSSIBLE FUEL SYSTEM RUPTURE.

FAILS "B" SCREEN BECAUSE FIRST FAILURE NOT DETECTABLE SINCE THE PREFLIGHT TEST BUS IS NOT POWERED DURING FLIGHT UNLESS REQUIRED BY FLIGHT RULE 9-41

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SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - AUXILIARY PWR FMEA NO 05-6N-2072-IM-2 REV: 02/13

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A-D) DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE

REFER TO APPENDIX B, ITEM NO. 1 - HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER

(B) TEST

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST - APU 1/2/3 FUEL PUMP AND GAS GENERATOR HEA
CIRCUIT TESTS PERFORMED DURING ORBITER MAINTENANCE DOWN PERIOD (OMDP).

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

NONE