

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : SPD&C - COMM. & TRACK. FMEA NO 05-6PK-20112 -1 REV:12/9/87

ASSEMBLY : PNL R15
P/N RI : MC354-0026-2030
P/N VENDOR:
QUANTITY : 1
: ONE
: 1

VEHICLE	102	103	104
EFFECTIVITY:	X	X	X
PHASE(S):	PL	LD	OO X DO LS

CRIT. FUNC: 2
CRIT. HDW: 2

PREPARED BY: DES *ABK* R DAVIS
REL *MA* M ALVAREZ
QE J COURSEN

REUNDANCY SCREEN: A- B- C-
APPROVED BY: DES *[Signature]* 12/17/87
REL *[Signature]* 12-18-87
QE *[Signature]*

APPROVED BY (NASA):
SSM *[Signature]*
REL *[Signature]*
QE RT *[Signature]* 12/21/87

53 m NA June 12, 1988

ITEM:
CIRCUIT BREAKER CB34, STBD AFT BAY CAMERA AND PAN/TILT POWER.

FUNCTION:
PROVIDES +38VDC OVERCURRENT PROTECTION FROM MAIN BUS A TO STBD AFT CAMERA AND PAN/TILT UNIT. 32V73A15CB34.

FAILURE MODE:
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT, FAILS TO CLOSE.

CAUSE(S):
VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PROCESSING ANOMALY, STRUCTURAL FAILURE.

EFFECT(S) ON:
(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE
(A,B) LOSS OF POWER TO STBD AFT CAMERA AND PAN/TILT UNIT.
(C) LOSS OF CRITICAL VIDEO COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
(D) NO EFFECT.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:
(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE
(A,B,C,D) REFER TO APPENDIX D, ITEM #1, CIRCUIT BREAKER.

(B) TEST
GROUND TURNAROUND TEST - VERIFIES CCTV PAYLOAD BAY MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO. PERFORMED WHEN FLIGHT MANIFEST REQUIRES USE OF MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE
WHERE POSSIBLE, PROCEDURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED SO THEY CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT CCTV.