

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - COMM. & TRACK. FMEA NO 05-6PK-20113 -1 REV: 12/9/87

ASSEMBLY : PNL R15  
 P/N RI : MC54-0026-2030  
 P/N VENDOR:  
 QUANTITY : 1  
 : ONE

VEHICLE	102	103	104
EFFECTIVITY:	X	X	X
PHASE(S):	PL	LO	CO X DO LS

CRIT. FUNC: 2  
 CRIT. HDW: 2

PREPARED BY: DES REL QE  
 APPROVED BY: DES REL QE  
 REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A- B- C-  
 APPROVED BY (NASA): SSM REL QE

R DAVIS  
 M ALVAREZ  
 J COURSEN

*[Signatures and dates]*  
 15-18-87  
 1-21-88

ITEM:  
 CIRCUIT BREAKER CB35, STBD AFT BAY CAMERA HEATER POWER.

FUNCTION:  
 PROVIDES +28VDC OVERCURRENT PROTECTION FROM MAIN BUS A TO STBD AFT B CAMERA HEATER. 32V73A15CB35.

FAILURE MODE:  
 FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT, FAILS TO CLOSE.

CAUSE(S):  
 VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PROCESS ANOMALY, STRUCTURAL FAILURE.

EFFECT(S) ON:  
 (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE

(A, B) LOSS OF VIDEO FROM THE AFT BAY CAMERA.  
 (C) LOSS OF CRITICAL VIDEO COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.  
 (D) NO EFFECT.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:  
 (A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A, B, C, D) REFER TO APPENDIX D, ITEM #1, CIRCUIT BREAKER.

(B) TEST  
 GROUND TURNAROUND TEST - VERIFIES CCTV PAYLOAD BAY MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO. PERFORMED WHEN FLIGHT MANIFEST REQUIRES USE OF MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE  
 WHERE POSSIBLE, PROCEDURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED SO THEY CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT CCTV.