

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - COMM. & TRACK. FMEA NO 05-6PK-20116 -1 REV: 12/9/87

ASSEMBLY : PNL R15  
 P/N RE : MC454-0026-2030  
 P/N VENDOR:  
 QUANTITY : 1  
 : ONE

VEHICLE	102	103	104
EFFECTIVITY:	X	X	X
PHASE(S):	PL	LO	OO X DO LS

REUNDANCY SCREEN: A- B- C-  
 PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY: APPROVED BY (NASA):  
 DES <sup>100</sup> R DAVIS DES [Signature] 12/17/87 SSM [Signature]  
 REL [Signature] M ALVAREZ REL [Signature] 12-19-87 REL [Signature]  
 QE J COURSEY QE [Signature] 12-19-87 QE [Signature]  
 SSM M B [Signature] 1-21-88

ITEM:  
 CIRCUIT BREAKER CB40, PORT FWD BAY CAMERA HEATER.

FUNCTION:  
 PROVIDES +28VDC OVERCURRENT PROTECTION FROM MAIN BUS B TO PORT FWD BAY CAMERA HEATER. 32V73A15CB40.

FAILURE MODE:  
 FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT, FAILS TO CLOSE.

CAUSE(S):  
 VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PROCESSING ANOMALY, STRUCTURAL FAILURE.

EFFECT(S) ON:  
 (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE  
 (A,B) LOSS OF VIDEO FROM PORT FWD BAY CAMERA.  
 (C) LOSS OF CRITICAL VIDEO COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.  
 (D) NO EFFECT.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:  
 (A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE  
 (A,B,C,D) REFER TO APPENDIX D, ITEM #1, CIRCUIT BREAKER.  
 (B) TEST  
 GROUND TURNAROUND TEST - VERIFIES CCTV PAYLOAD BAY MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO. PERFORMED WHEN FLIGHT MANIFEST REQUIRES USE OF MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO.  
 (E) OPERATIONAL USE  
 WHERE POSSIBLE, PROCEDURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED SO THEY CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT CCTV.