

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EP06C - COMM. & TRACK. FMEA NO 05-6PK-20117 -1 REV: 12/9/87

ASSEMBLY : PNL R15
 P/N RI : MC454-0026-2030
 P/N VENDOR:
 QUANTITY : 1
 : ONE

	VEHICLE	102	103	104
EFFECTIVITY:		X	X	X
PHASE(S):	PL	LO	OO X DO	ES

PREPARED BY: DES 1182 R DAVIS
 REL Md. M ALVAREZ
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REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A- B- C-
 APPROVED BY: DES [Signature] 12/11/87
 REL [Signature] 2-18-87
 CE [Signature]

APPROVED BY (NASA):
 SSM [Signature]
 REL [Signature]
 CE [Signature]

SSM in B Para 1-21-88

ITEM:
 CIRCUIT BREAKER CB41, PORT FWD BAY PAN/TILT HEATER.

FUNCTION:
 PROVIDES +28VDC OVERCURRENT PROTECTION FROM MAIN BUS B TO PORT FWD BAY PAN TILT HEATER. 32V73A15CB41.

FAILURE MODE:
 FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT, FAILS TO CLOSE.

CAUSE(S):
 VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PROCESSING ANOMALY, STRUCTURAL FAILURE.

EFFECT(S) ON:
 (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE
 (A, B) WORST CASE - LOSS OF PAN/TILT CONTROL.
 (C) LOSS OF ABILITY TO POSITION CAMERA PROPERLY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
 (D) NO EFFECT.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:
 (A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE
 (A, B, C, D) REFER TO APPENDIX D, ITEM #1, CIRCUIT BREAKER.
 (B) TEST
 GROUND TURNAROUND TEST - VERIFIES CCTV PAYLOAD BAY MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO. PERFORMED WHEN FLIGHT MANIFEST REQUIRES USE OF MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO.
 (E) OPERATIONAL USE
 WHERE POSSIBLE, PROCEDURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED SO THEY CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT CCTV.