

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPE&C - COMM. & TRACK. FMEA NO 08-6PK-20118 -1 REV: 12/9/87

ASSEMBLY : PNL R15  
 P/N RI : MC454-0026-20J0  
 P/N VENDOR:  
 QUANTITY : 1  
 : ONE

	VEHICLE	102	103	104
EFFECTIVITY:	X	X	X	
PHASE(S):	PL	LO	CO X CO	LS

PREPARED BY:		REDUNDANCY SCREEN:	A-	B-	C-
DES <i>AE</i>	R DAVIS	APPROVED BY:	APPROVED BY (NASA):		
REL <i>MA</i>	M ALVAREZ	DES <i>[Signature]</i>	SSM <i>[Signature]</i>		
QE	J COURSEN	REL <i>[Signature]</i>	REL <i>[Signature]</i>		
		QE <i>[Signature]</i>	QE <i>[Signature]</i>	SSM/MA/Jan 1-21-88	

ITEM:  
 CIRCUIT BREAKER CB45, PORT AFT CAMERA AND PAN/TILT UNIT POWER (EVA/HEEL

FUNCTION:  
 PROVIDES +28VDC OVERCURRENT PROTECTION FROM MAIN BUS C TO PORT AFT CAMERA AND PAN/TILT UNIT. 32V73A15CB45.

FAILURE MODE:  
 FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT, FAILS TO CLOSE.

CAUSE(S):  
 VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PROCESSING ANOMALY, STRUCTURAL FAILURE.

EFFECT(S) ON:  
 (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE  
 (A, B) LOSS OF POWER TO PORT AFT CAMERA AND PAN/TILT UNIT.  
 (C) LOSS OF CRITICAL VIDEO COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.  
 (D) NO EFFECT.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:  
 (A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE  
 (A, B, C, D) REFER TO APPENDIX O, ITEM #1, CIRCUIT BREAKER.

(B) TEST  
 GROUND TURNAROUND TEST- VERIFIES CCTV PAYLOAD BAY MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO. PERFORMED WHEN FLIGHT MANIFEST REQUIRES USE OF MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE  
 WHERE POSSIBLE, PROCEDURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED SO THEY CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT CCTV.