

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - COMM. & TRACK. FMEA NO 05-6PK-20201 -1 REV:12/9/87

ASSEMBLY : PNL R15
 P/N RI : MC454-0026-2010
 P/N VENDOR:
 QUANTITY : 1
 : ONE

VEHICLE	102	103	104
EFFECTIVITY:	X	X	X
PHASE(S):	PL LO	CO X DC	LS

CRIT. FUNC: 2
 CRIT. HDW: 2

REUNDANCY SCREEN: A- B- C-
 PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY: APPROVED BY (NASA):
 DES *RD* R DAVIS DES *[Signature]* 12/17/87 SSM *[Signature]*
 REL *MA* M ALVAREZ REL *[Signature]* 12-18-87 REL *[Signature]*
 QE J COURSEN QE *[Signature]* 12-18-87 QE *[Signature]*
 55M MB Line 1-2-88

ITEM:
 CIRCUIT BREAKER CB52, STSD FWD CAMERA HEATER POWER (STSD MANIPULATOR ARM).

FUNCTION:
 PROVIDES +28VDC OVERCURRENT PROTECTION FROM MAIN BUS A TO STSD FWD CAMERA HEATER. 32V73A15CB52.

FAILURE MODE:
 FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT, FAILS TO CLOSE.

CAUSE(S):
 VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PROCESSING ANOMALY, STRUCTURAL FAILURE.

EFFECT(S) ON:
 (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE
 (A,B) LOSS OF POWER TO STSD FWD CAMERA HEATER .
 (C) LOSS OF CRITICAL VIDEO COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
 (D) NO EFFECT.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:
 (A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE
 (A,B,C,D) REFER TO APPENDIX D, ITEM #1, CIRCUIT BREAKER.
 (B) TEST
 GROUND TURNAROUND TEST - VERIFIES CCTV PAYLOAD BAY MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO. PERFORMED WHEN FLIGHT MANIFEST REQUIRES USE OF MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO.

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(E) OPERATIONAL USE
WHERE POSSIBLE, PROCEDURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED SO THEY CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED
WITHOUT CCTV.