

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM :EPD&C - COMM. & TRACK. FMEA NO 05-6PK-20219 -2 REV:12/9/87

ASSEMBLY :PNL A7A1
P/N RI :ME452-0102-7301
P/N VENDOR:
QUANTITY :1
:ONE

	VEHICLE	102	103	104
EFFECTIVITY:	X	X	X	
PHASE(S):	PL	LO	OO X DC	LS

CRIT. FUNC: 2
CRIT. HDW: 2

PREPARED BY: DES *M.A.* R DAVIS
REL M ALVAREZ
QE J COURSEN

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A- B- C-
APPROVED BY: DES *[Signature]* 12/17/87
REL *[Signature]* 12-13-87
QE *[Signature]*

APPROVED BY (NASA):
SSM *[Signature]*
REL *[Signature]*
QE *[Signature]* 12-21-88

ITEM:
SWITCH, TOGGLE, DPDT, KEEL TV CAMERA POWER, POSITIONS ARE ON-OFF.

FUNCTION:
THE ON POSITION ENABLES POWER TO THE KEEL TV CAMERA. THE OFF POSITION
DISABLES POWER (STHD RMS WRIST/ELBOW). 36V73A7A1531.

FAILURE MODE:
FAILS CLOSED, PREMATURE CLOSED, SHORT TO GROUND, CONTACT TO CONTACT
SHORT.

CAUSE(S):
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PROCESSING ANOMALY, PIECE
PART FAILURE.

EFFECT(S) ON:
(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE

(A) LOSS OF PANEL POWER CONTROL FOR THE KEEL TV CAMERA.

(B) WORST CASE - SHORT TO GROUND OF EITHER OF THE 2 POWER SIDE CONTACT
(1,4) THIS OPENS CB51 AND REMOVES ALL POWER TO THE CAMERA.

(C) POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF CRITICAL VIDEO.

(D) NO EFFECT

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:
(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A, B, C, D) REFER TO APPENDIX A, ITEM #1, TOGGLE SWITCH.

(B) TEST
GROUND TURNAROUND TEST - VERIFY KEEL TV CAMERA SELECTION FROM THE
D & C PANEL. PERFORMED TO SUPPORT FLIGHT MANIFEST.