

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - COMM. & TRACK. FMEA NO 05-6PK-20229 -2 REV: 12/9/87

ASSEMBLY : PNL A7A1					
P/N RI : MC452-0061-7173					
P/N VENDOR:					
QUANTITY : 1	VEHICLE	102	103	104	
: ONE	EFFECTIVITY:	X	X	X	
:	PHASE(S) :	PL	LC	CO X DO	LS
:					

PREPARED BY:		REUNDANCY SCREEN:	A-	B-	C-
DES <i>MR</i>	R DAVIS	APPROVED BY:			
REL <i>MR</i>	M ALVAREZ	DES <i>[Signature]</i> 12/17/87	SSM	APPROVED BY (NASA):	
QE	J COURSEN	REL <i>[Signature]</i> 12-18-87	REL <i>[Signature]</i>		
		QE <i>[Signature]</i>	QE <i>[Signature]</i>		

SSM *[Signature]* 1-21-88

ITEM:  
SWITCH, PUSH-BUTTON, ILLUMINATED, FWD STBD TV CAMERA (PNL NAME: RMS STBD).

FUNCTION:  
PROVIDES A SIGNAL TO THE REMOTE CONTROL UNIT (RCU) WHICH ENABLES THE FWD STBD TV CAMERA (RMS STBD) INPUT TO THE VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT (VSU). 36V73A7A1S30.

FAILURE MODE:  
FAILS CLOSED, PREMATURE CLOSURE, CONTACT-TO-CONTACT SHORT, SHORT TO GROUND.

CAUSE(S):  
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PROCESSING ANOMALY, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE.

EFFECT(S) ON:  
(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE  
(A,B) LOSS OF PANEL CONTROL FOR THE FWD STBD VIDEO.  
(C) LOSS OF MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.  
(D) NO EFFECT.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:  
(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE  
(A,B,C,D) REFER TO APPENDIX A, ITEM #3, PUSH-BUTTON SWITCH.  
(B) TEST  
GROUND TURNAROUND TEST - VERIFY TV CAMERA SELECTION FROM THE D&C PANEL. PERFORMED TO SUPPORT FLIGHT MANIFEST.