

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - COMM. & TRACK. FMEA NO 05-6PK-20260 -2 REV: 12/9/87

ASSEMBLY : PNL A7A1						CRIT. FUNC: 2
P/N RI : MC452-0061-7172						CRIT. HDW: 2
P/N VENDOR:		VEHICLE	102	103	104	
QUANTITY : 1		EFFECTIVITY:	X	X	X	
: ONE		PHASE(S):	PL	LO	OC X DC	LS
:						

PREPARED BY:		REDUNDANCY SCREEN:	A-	B-	C-
DES <i>[Signature]</i>	R DAVIS	APPROVED BY:			
REL <i>[Signature]</i>	M ALVAREZ	DES <i>[Signature]</i> 12/17/87	SSM	APPROVED BY (NASA):	
QE	J COURSEN	REL <i>[Signature]</i> 12-18-87	REL <i>[Signature]</i>		
		QE <i>[Signature]</i>	QE <i>[Signature]</i>		

SSM *[Signature]* 1-21-88

ITEM:
SWITCH, PUSH-BUTTON, ILLUMINATED, AFT BAY VIDEO INPUT.

FUNCTION:
PROVIDES A SIGNAL TO THE REMOTE CONTROL UNIT (RCU) WHICH ENABLES TO AFT BAY VIDEO INPUT (CAMERA-C). J6V71A7A1S29.

FAILURE MODE:
FAILS CLOSED, PREMATURE CLOSURE, CONTACT-TO-CONTACT SHORT, SHORT TO GROUND.

CAUSE(S):
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PROCESSING ANOMALY, PERIODIC PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE.

EFFECT(S) ON:
(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE
(A, B) LOSS OF PANEL CONTROL FOR THE AFT VIDEO.
(C) LOSS OF MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
(D) NO EFFECT.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:
(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE
(A, B, C, D) REFER TO APPENDIX A, ITEM #1, PUSH-BUTTON SWITCH.
(B) TEST
GROUND TURNAROUND TEST - VERIFY TV CAMERA SELECTION FROM THE D&C PANEL. PERFORMED TO SUPPORT FLIGHT MANIFEST.
(E) OPERATIONAL USE
WHERE POSSIBLE, PROCEDURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED SO THEY CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT CCTV.