

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL FMEA NO 06-1C -0390 -1 REV:08/23  
ASSEMBLY : FREON THERMAL LOOP CRIT. FUNC:  
P/N RI : V070-634460,465, CRIT. HDW:  
P/N VENDOR: 470 AND 475 VEHICLE 102 103 104  
QUANTITY : 2 EFFECTIVITY: X X X  
: TWO SETS (ONE FOR EACH PHASE(S): PL LO X OO X DO X LS  
: F-21 LOOP)

PREPARED BY: DES O. TRAN *OT* APPROVED BY: *[Signature]* REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-PASS C-PA  
REL D. RISING *DR* DES *[Signature]* APPROVED BY (NASA): SSM *[Signature]*  
QE W. SMITH *WS* REL *[Signature]* REL *[Signature]*  
QE *[Signature]* QE *[Signature]*

ITEM:

LINES AND FITTINGS AND O<sub>2</sub> RESTRICTOR.

FUNCTION:

PROVIDE FOR FLOW OF FREON 21 THROUGH THE ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL  
SUBSYSTEM AND PROVIDES HEAT TO CRYOGENIC LINE TO ENSURE GASEOUS O<sub>2</sub> AT  
RESTRICTOR.

FAILURE MODE:

EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, FREON 21.

CAUSE(S):

MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION.

EFFECT(S) ON:

(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE

(A, B) LOSS OF FREON FROM ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP FOR VEHICLE COOLING.

(C) POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION. EARLY MISSION TERMINATION FOR LOSS OF  
COOLANT LOOP.

(D) SECOND ASSOCIATED FAILURE (LOSS OF REDUNDANT FREON COOLANT LOOP) W  
CAUSE LOSS OF ALL VEHICLE COOLING AND MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHIC:

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A) DESIGN

DESIGN SAFETY FACTOR. PROOF PRESSURE FACTOR OF 2.0 & BURST PRESSURE  
FACTOR OF 4.0 FOR LINES. PROOF PRESSURE FACTOR OF 1.5 & BURST PRESSURE  
OF 2.0 FOR COMPONENTS. LINE WALL THICKNESS OF 0.0016 INCHES. THE  
MATERIAL IS STAINLESS STEEL, WHICH IS COMPATIBLE WITH FREON 21.

(B) TEST

QUALIFICATION TEST - QUALIFICATION TESTED FOR A 100 MISSION LIFE.  
VIBRATION TESTED AT 0.3 G<sup>2</sup>/HZ FOR 84 MIN/AXIS. SHOCK TESTED AT +/- 20  
PER AXIS.

**SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER**

**SUBSYSTEM : ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL FMEA NO 06-1C -0390 -1 REV:08/29/8**

**ACCEPTANCE TEST - COMPONENTS LEAK TESTED IN ACCEPTANCE SYSTEM CHECKOUT WILL VERIFY SYSTEM INTEGRITY, BY USING VEHICLE INSTRUMENTATION. SYSTEM IS PROOF PRESSURE TESTED & LEAK TESTED AFTER INSTALLATION.**

**ONRSD - FCL'S ARE LEAK CHECKED PRIOR TO EACH FLIGHT. FLUID USE CONTROLLED TO SE-S-0073.**

**(C) INSPECTION**

**RECEIVING INSPECTION**

**MATERIAL AND PROCESS CERTIFICATIONS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.**

**CONTAMINATION CONTROL**

**PERIODICALLY ANALYZE SYSTEM FLUID SAMPLES FOR CONTAMINATION. CORROSION PROTECTION PER MAC608-301 IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.**

**ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION**

**MANUFACTURING, INSTALLATION AND ASSEMBLY OPERATIONS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. TORQUE AND THREADED FASTENER ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.**

**CRITICAL PROCESSES**

**BRAZING AND ELECTRICAL BONDING ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.**

**NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION**

**X-RAY IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.**

**TESTING**

**ATP IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.**

**HANDLING/PACKAGING**

**HANDLING AND PACKAGING REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.**

**(D) FAILURE HISTORY**

**NO FAILURE HISTORY.**

**(E) OPERATIONAL USE**

**ON-BOARD ALARMS, FREON INLET PRESSURE AND ACCUMULATOR QUANTITIES WILL INDICATE HARDWARE FAILURE. FREON PUMP WILL BE TURNED OFF AND LOSS OF ON FREON LOOP POWERDOWN WILL BE PERFORMED. ENTRY AT NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.**