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PRINT DATE: 08/28/89

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

NUMBER: GO-AA-202000-00-002-01

SUBSYSTEM: GALLILEO RPM TANK MONITOR

REVISION# 1 89/08/25

ITEM NAME: TOGGLE SWITCH, 2P3P

CRITICALITY OF THIS
FAILURE MODE: 1S

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- FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH FAILS OPEN, ONE OR MORE POLES

 - MISSION PHASE:
LS LANDING SAFING

 - VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY: 104 ATLANTIS STS-34

 - CAUSE:
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS

 - CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? N

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- REDUNDANCY SCREEN A) N/A
 - B) N/A
 - C) N/A

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

- A)
- B)
- C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

- (A) SUBSYSTEM:
SYSTEM FAILS TO FUNCTION. POSSIBLE UNDETECTED RUNAWAY TANK OVERPRESSURE

- (B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):
POSSIBLE TANK RUPTURE, FIRE/EXPLOSION.

- (C) MISSION:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE GALILEO/IUS PAYLOAD.

- (D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):
POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE ORBITER, POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE.

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- (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:
LOSS OF SYSTEM FUNCTIONS. POSSIBLE UNDETECTED RUNAWAY TANK OVERPRESSURE
TANK RUPTURE, POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION, POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE ORBITER,
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE.

- DISPOSITION RATIONALE -

(A) DESIGN

THE SWITCH IS AN MS25307-212. THE DESIGN IS EXTREMELY WELL PROVEN AND RELIABLE.

(B) TEST

ACCEPTANCE TEST SPECIFICATION IS APPROVED BY QUALITY ASSURANCE AND VERIFIES SWITCH PERFORMANCE.

(C) INSPECTION

THE SWITCHES ARE INSPECTED FOR WEIGHT, WORKMANSHIP, FINISH, DIMENSIONS, CONSTRUCTION, CLEANINESS, IDENTIFICATION MARKING AND CERTIFIED MATERIALS AND PROCESSES. ACCEPTANCE TEST PROCEDURE ARE APPROVED BY QUALITY ASSURANCE.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY

NO GENERIC FAILURES

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

CONTINGENCY ONLY IN THE EVENT OF ABORT WITH THE GALILEO ON BOARD. THE SWITCH IS USED APPLY POWER TO THE SYSTEM OF INTEREST (1 TANK AT A TIME). AN AVIALABLE BATTERY BACK WILL BE AVAILABLE AT THE ABORT SITE.

- APPROVALS -

RELIABILITY ENGINEERING:	W. R. MARLOWE	:	<u>W. R. Marlowe</u>
DESIGN ENGINEERING	: L. COLEMAN	:	<u>L. Coleman</u>
QUALITY ENGINEERING	: C. ROLLINS	:	<u>C. Rollins</u>
NASA RELIABILITY	:	:	<u>[Signature]</u>
NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER	:	:	<u>[Signature]</u>
NASA QUALITY ASSURANCE	:	:	<u>[Signature]</u>