PRINT DATE: 04/11/98

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- NON-CIL HARDWARE
NUMBER:M5-6SS-0908 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: ISS DOCKING SYSTEM

REVISION: 0 02/27/98

PART DATA

	PART NAME VENDOR NAME	PART NUMBER VENDOR NUMBER
LRU	:MID POWER CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1	VO70-764400
LRU	:MID POWER CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2	VO70-764430
SRU	:GENERAL PURPOSE RELAY	MC455-0129-0004

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:
GENERAL PURPOSE RELAY, 25 AMP - EXTERNAL AIRLOCK DOCKING BASE HEATER POWER, VESTIBULE, ZONES 1, 2, AND 3

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: 40V76A25A3K6
40V76A26A3K6

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 2
(TWO)

FUNCTION:
CONNECTS MAIN A(B) POWER TO THE DOCKING BASE HEATER CIRCUITS.

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS: 1) VS70-640109, SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - AIRLOCK ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM

PRINT DATE: 04/11/98

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEA -- NON-CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: M5-6SS-0908-01

REVISION#: 0 02/27/98

SUBSYSTEM NAME: ISS DOCKING SYSTEM
LRU: MID PCA 1(2)
ITEM NAME: GENERAL PURPOSE RELAY

CRITICALITY OF THIS FAILURE MODE: 1R3

FAILURE MODE:
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY OPENS, FAILS TO TRANSFER

MISSION PHASE: OO ON-ORBIT

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:
103 DISCOVERY
104 ATLANTIS
105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:
A) PIECE PART FAILURE, B) CONTAMINATION, C) VIBRATION, D) MECHANICAL SHOCK, E) PROCESSING ANOMALY, F) THERMAL STRESS

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

CRITICALITY 1R2 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY (AVIONICS ONLY)? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN
A) PASS
B) PASS
C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:
A)

B)

C)

METHOD OF FAULT DETECTION:
REVIEW OF HEATER CIRCUIT TELEMETRY DATA

MASTER MEAS. LIST NUMBERS: V64T0133A
V64T0134A

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CORRECTING ACTION: MANUAL

CORRECTING ACTION DESCRIPTION:
CREW WILL ACTIVATE REDUNDANT HEATER CIRCUIT.

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:
LOSS OF POWER TO ONE HEATER CIRCUIT IN EACH ZONE.

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):
FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT. REDUNDANT HEATER CIRCUITS IN EACH ZONE CONTROL TEMPERATURE WITHIN LIMITS.

(C) MISSION:
FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):
FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER TWO FAILURES:
1) RELAY FAILS OPEN - LOSS OF POWER TO ONE HEATER CIRCUIT IN EACH ZONE. REDUNDANT HEATER CIRCUITS CONTROL TEMPERATURE WITHIN LIMITS.
2) RELAY OF REDUNDANT HEATER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN - LOSS OF POWER TO ALL HEATER CIRCUITS. POTENTIAL CONDENSATION ON EXTERNAL AIRLOCK WALLS RESULTS IN EXCESSIVE WATER IN EXTERNAL AIRLOCK. WATER MIGRATION TO KEEL AREA COULD RENDER RUSSIAN AVIONICS INOPERATIVE AFTER DOCKING, RESULTING IN LOSS OF NOMINAL AND PYROTECHNIC UNDOCKING CAPABILITY.

DESIGN CRITICALITY (PRIOR TO DOWNGRADE, DESCRIBED IN (F)): 1R2

(F) RATIONALE FOR CRITICALITY DOWNGRADE:
WORKAROUNDS ARE AVAILABLE TO MITIGATE THE RISK. THEREFORE, CRITICALITY IS DOWNGRADED FROM 1R2 TO 1R3.

AFTER THE SECOND FAILURE, THE CREW WOULD PERFORM EVA TO REMOVE 96 BOLTS FROM THE DOCKING BASE TO CIRCUMVENT THE WORST CASE "DESIGN CRITICALITY" EFFECT. IF UNABLE TO PERFORM EVA (THIRD FAILURE), POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ALL UNDOCKING CAPABILITY.

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- NON-CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: M5-6SS-0908-01

- TIME FRAME -

TIME FROM FAILURE TO CRITICAL EFFECT: DAYS

TIME FROM FAILURE OCCURRENCE TO DETECTION: HOURS

TIME FROM DETECTION TO COMPLETED CORRECTING ACTION: HOURS

IS TIME REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT CORRECTING ACTION LESS THAN TIME TO EFFECT?
YES

RATIONALE FOR TIME TO CORRECTING ACTION VS TIME TO EFFECT:
AFTER THE SECOND FAILURE, THE CREW CAN PERFORM EVA TO REMOVE 96 BOLTS FROM THE DOCKING BASE TO UNDOCK.

HAZARD REPORT NUMBER(S): ORBI 401

HAZARD(S) DESCRIPTION:
INABILITY TO SAFELY SEPARATE ORBITER FROM A MATED ELEMENT

- APPROVALS -

SS&PAE	: T. K. KIMURA	: J. Kimura 4-13-98
DESIGN ENGINEERING	: C. J. ARROYO	: