

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE**NUMBER: 03-1-0114 -X****SUBSYSTEM NAME:** MAIN PROPULSION**REVISION:** 2 02/21/01**PART DATA**

PART NAME	PART NUMBER
VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMBER
LRU : LINE ASSEMBLY BOEING	V070-415752

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

LINE ASSEMBLY, LOW PRESSURE PNEUMATIC HELIUM, FROM PNEUMATIC REGULATOR (PR4) TO THE REGULATOR OUTLET CHECK VALVE (CV8) AND INCLUDES THE LINE TO THE RELIEF VALVE (RV4). THE LINE ASSEMBLY CONSISTS OF A SPECIAL MANIFOLD, DYNATUBE FITTINGS, UNIONS, SEALS, AND TUBE SEGMENTS.

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS:**QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS:** 1**FUNCTION:**

PROVIDES THE FLOW PATH FOR HELIUM FROM THE REGULATOR (PR4) TO THE REGULATOR OUTLET CHECK VALVE (CV8) IN THE PNEUMATIC SUPPLY SYSTEM. THE LINE INCORPORATES A CONNECTION FOR THE RELIEF VALVE (RV4), RELIEF VALVE SENSE LINE, AND A PRESSURE TRANSDUCER PORT.

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SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

LRU: PNEUMATIC REG OUT SUPPLY LINE ASSEMBLY

CRITICALITY OF THIS

ITEM NAME: PNEUMATIC REG OUT SUPPLY LINE ASSEMBLY

FAILURE MODE: 1/1

FAILURE MODE:

RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.

MISSION PHASE:

LO LIFT-OFF
DO DE-ORBIT

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102 COLUMBIA
103 DISCOVERY
104 ATLANTIS
105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

MATERIAL DEFECT, FATIGUE, DEFECTIVE BRAZE JOINTS, DAMAGED/DEFECTIVE JOINT SEALS

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

A) N/A
B) N/A
C) N/A

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

DURING ASCENT, THE PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY MAY BE LOST. ESCAPING HELIUM MAY OVERPRESSURIZE THE AFT COMPARTMENT.

WHEN THE CROSSOVER VALVE (LV10) OPENS AT MECO, THE PNEUMATIC HELIUM DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WILL BE FED FROM THE LEFT ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY. WHEN THE E1 AND E3 INTERCONNECT "OUT" VALVES OPEN AT MECO PLUS 20 SECONDS, THE ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLIES WILL LEAK THROUGH THE FAILED LINE.

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STORED HELIUM PRESSURE IN THE ACCUMULATOR LEG SHOULD BE ADEQUATE TO OPERATE THE LO2 PREVALVES AT MECO. LOSS OF HELIUM MAY PREVENT OPERATION OF VALVES FOR MPS DUMP.

PURGE OF AFT COMPARTMENT AND LH2/LO2 SYSTEMS WOULD DEPEND SOLELY ON THE LEFT ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM RESIDUALS.

DURING ENTRY, VENT DOORS ARE CLOSED TO PREVENT INGESTION OF RCS AND APU GASES. RUPTURE DURING THE TIME PERIOD THAT THE VENT DOORS ARE CLOSED MAY RESULT IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF AFT COMPARTMENT. VENT DOORS ARE OPENED WHEN VEHICLE VELOCITY DROPS BELOW 2400 FT/SEC.

EXCESSIVE HELIUM LEAKAGE WILL BE DETECTABLE USING HAZARDOUS GAS DETECTION SYSTEM (HGDS).

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):
SAME AS A.

(C) MISSION:
ON GROUND, POSSIBLE LAUNCH SCRUB DUE TO LCC VIOLATION.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:
NONE.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:
DESIGNED TO A MINIMUM FACTOR OF SAFETY OF 2.0 PROOF AND 4.0 BURST. THE MECHANICAL FITTINGS (DYNATUBE) ARE MANUFACTURED FROM INCONEL 718 WITH TUBE ENDS THAT ARE NICKEL PLATED. THE TUBE SEGMENTS ARE MANUFACTURED FROM 304L CRES 1/4 INCH DIAMETER BY 0.020 INCH WALL THICKNESS AND 3/4 INCH DIAMETER BY 0.028 INCH WALL THICKNESS. THE SPECIAL MANIFOLD (ME273-0194-1001) HAS A DYNATUBE FITTING THAT CONNECTS TO A CHECK VALVE, TWO NICKEL PLATED TUBE ENDS, AND TWO BOSSES. ONE BOSS CONNECTS TO A TRANSDUCER AND THE OTHER CONNECTS TO A RELIEF VALVE SENSE LINE.

THE DYNATUBE FITTINGS ARE CONNECTED TO THE COMPONENTS USING UNIONS MADE OF INCONEL 718 (ME273-0115) AND METALLIC BOSS SEALS (ME261-0033 TYPE III) FABRICATED FROM A286 CORROSION RESISTANT STEEL THAT IS COATED WITH K-6 NICKEL-LEAD. THE

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TUBE SEGMENTS AND FITTINGS ARE CONNECTED TOGETHER BY INDUCTION BRAZING USING A CRES UNION AND A BRAZE ALLOY PREFORM (81.5 AU, 16.5 CU, 2 NI). THE ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL BRAZE ALLOY WAS SELECTED BECAUSE OF ITS LOWER BRAZING TEMPERATURE REQUIREMENT THAN THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, AIDING IN THE PREVENTION OF EXCESSIVE GRAIN GROWTH AND REDUCING EROSION OF TUBE ENDS.

(B) TEST:

ATP

THE LINE ASSEMBLY IS PROOF PRESSURE TESTED TO 1500 PSIG AND LEAK CHECKED AT 750 PSIG DURING PANEL ASSEMBLY ACCEPTANCE TEST.

CERTIFICATION

CERTIFICATION OF THE TUBING INSTALLATION WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL PER THE "ORBITER TUBING VERIFICATION PLAN SD75-SH-205".

THE 304L CRES TUBING WAS CERTIFIED FOR THE APOLLO PROPULSION SYSTEMS, THE F5E, A-9, C130A, 707, 727, AND 737 AIRCRAFT. THE TUBING WAS QUALIFIED BY SIMILARITY AND BY ANALYSIS FOR ORBITER USAGE EXCEPT FOR FLEXURE FATIGUE AND RANDOM VIBRATION FOR THE LONG-LIFE ORBITER REQUIREMENTS. DATA FROM THE MISSION DUTY CYCLES CONDUCTED ON MPTA WERE ALSO USED TO CERTIFY TUBING INSTALLATIONS.

304L CRES TUBING WITH DYNATUBE FITTINGS AND SEALS WAS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATION TESTS:

PROOF PRESSURE
TWO TIMES OPERATING PRESSURE

EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
AT 1.5 TIMES OPERATING PRESSURE
1X10⁻⁶ SCCS MAX

IMPULSE FATIGUE (200,000 CYCLES)

FLEXURE FATIGUE (10 MILLION FLEXURE CYCLES)

VIBRATION (7 UNITS)
45 MINUTES AT 0.4 G²/HZ
30 MINUTES AT 0.7 G²/HZ
10 MINUTES AT 0.2 G²/HZ

BURST TEST
FOUR TIMES OPERATING PRESSURE

OMRSD
ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

(C) INSPECTION:

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RECEIVING INSPECTION

ALL DETAIL HARDWARE IS VERIFIED INDIVIDUALLY, BY INSPECTION, AT DETAIL LEVEL ON MANUFACTURING ORDERS, WITH ALL PROCESSES INCORPORATED. RAW MATERIALS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION FOR MATERIAL AND PROCESS CERTIFICATION.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

CLEANLINESS LEVEL IS VERIFIED TO 100A. CORROSION PROTECTION IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

PARTS PROTECTION FROM DAMAGE AND CONTAMINATION IS VERIFIED. COMPONENTS ARE INSPECTED VISUALLY, DIMENSIONALLY, AND INCREMENTALLY DURING FABRICATION. AXIAL ALIGNMENT OF DYNATUBE FITTINGS AND TUBING IS VERIFIED. TORQUES AND SEALING SURFACES ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. LUBRICATION OF ALL THREADED FLUID FITTING COUPLINGS IS VERIFIED. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS ARE INCLUDED IN THE ASSEMBLY PROCEDURES.

CRITICAL PROCESSES

ELECTRICAL BONDING AND PARTS PASSIVATION ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. INDUCTION BRAZING IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION

RADIOGRAPHIC INSPECTION OF INDUCTION BRAZED JOINTS IS VERIFIED.

TESTING

ATP IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

HANDLING/PACKAGING

PACKAGING FOR SHIPMENT IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURE, FLIGHT FAILURE, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATABASE.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

PNEUMATIC TANK, REGULATOR, AND ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE ARE ON S/M ALERT FDA SYSTEM AND THE BFS SYSTEM SUMMARY DISPLAY. THIS ALLOWS THE FLIGHT CREW TO RESPOND TO A PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM LEAK INDEPENDENT OF GROUND CONTROL.

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S&R ENGINEERING	: W.P. MUSTY	:/S/ W. P. MUSTY
S&R ENGINEERING ITM	: P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN	:/S/ P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN
DESIGN ENGINEERING	: LEE DURHAM	:/S/ LEE DURHAM
MPS SUBSYSTEM MGR.	: TIM REITH	:/S/ TIM REITH
MOD	: JEFF MUSLER	:/S/ JEFF MUSLER
USA SAM	: MIKE SNYDER	:/S/ MIKE SNYDER
USA ORBITER ELEMENT	: SUZANNE LITTLE	:/S/ SUZANNE LITTLE
NASA SR&QA	: BILL PRINCE	:/S/ BILL PRINCE