

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE

NUMBER: 03-1-0215 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

REVISION: 2 08/08/00

PART DATA

	PART NAME	PART NUMBER
	VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMBER
LRU	:LH2 4" DISCONNECT OPENING, 3-WAY SOLENOID VALVE, TYPE 2 UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE - NSLD	MC284-0404-0032, -0042 13111-5, -6

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

VALVE, SOLENOID, NORMALLY CLOSED, 3-WAY, 1/4 INCH. LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT CONTROL. OPENING.

VALVE WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AND MANUFACTURED BY WRIGHT COMPONENTS (NOW PERKIN ELMER) BUT IS NOW MANUFACTURED BY UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE-NSLD AS AN ALTERNATE PRODUCTION AGENCY.

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: LV50

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 1

FUNCTION:

CONTROLS PNEUMATIC PRESSURE TO OPEN THE 4" LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3). THE OPEN SOLENOID (LV50) MUST DEACTUATE TO ALLOW THE DISCONNECT ACTUATOR TO VENT SO THE DISCONNECT CAN BE CLOSED. CLOSING SOLENOID (LV51) (REFERENCE FMEA/CIL 03-1-0216) MUST DEACTUATE TO ALLOW VALVE TO OPEN. THE DISCONNECT IS COMMANDED OPEN PRIOR TO ENGINE CONDITIONING AND COMMANDED CLOSED UPON ENGINE SHUTDOWN.

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEA -- CIL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: 03-1-0215-05

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LRU: LH2 4" DISC OPEN SOLENOID VALVE (LV50)

CRITICALITY OF THIS

ITEM NAME: LH2 4" DISC OPEN SOLENOID VALVE (LV50)

FAILURE MODE: 1R3

FAILURE MODE:

PREMATURE DEACTUATION (RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, REFERENCE FMEA/CIL 03-1-0405-02) CAUSING ACTUATOR OPENING SIDE TO VENT PRIOR TO ORBITER/ET UMBILICAL SEPARATION.

MISSION PHASE: PL PRE-LAUNCH
LO LIFT-OFF

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY: 102 COLUMBIA
103 DISCOVERY
104 ATLANTIS
105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

ELECTRICAL SOLENOID FAILURE, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN A) PASS
B) FAIL
C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

FAILS B SCREEN BECAUSE SOLENOID VALVES DO NOT HAVE POSITION INDICATORS.

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

LOSS OF REDUNDANCY ONLY. FAILURE RESULTS IN VENTING OF ACTUATOR OPENING PRESSURE. THE DISCONNECT VALVE IS BISTABLE WITH NEITHER SOLENOID PRESSURE APPLIED AND WILL REMAIN IN ITS LAST COMMANDED POSITION DUE TO ORBITER LATCH

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0215-05**

AND ET LEVER CONTACT. OPENING PRESSURE IS NOMINALLY APPLIED FOR LOADING, DETANKING, AND ENGINE OPERATION.

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

SAME AS A.

(C) MISSION:

NO EFFECT. VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

SAME AS C.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

1R/3 3 SUCCESS PATHS. TIME FRAME - ASCENT.

- 1) PREMATURE DEACTUATION OF DISCONNECT OPENING SOLENOID (LV50).
- 2) PREMATURE ACTUATION OF DISCONNECT CLOSING SOLENOID (LV51).
- 3) RECIRCULATION MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE (RV7) FAILS TO RELIEVE.

RESULTS IN RUPTURE OF THE RECIRCULATION SYSTEM. LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS DUE TO ADJACENT COMPONENT EXPOSURE TO CRYOGENICS. POSSIBLE AFT COMPARTMENT OVERPRESSURIZATION AND FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.

ALSO RESULTS IN LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY DURING MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION CAUSING LOSS OF AFT COMPARTMENT PURGE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:

VALVE IS DESIGNED FOR A PRESSURE FACTOR OF SAFETY OF 2.0 PROOF, 4.0 BURST. THE CLOSURE DEVICE IS A 430 CRES BALL ACTING UPON EITHER OF TWO VESPEL SEATS. THE VALVE FEATURES A BALANCED LOAD ON THE BALL BY APPLYING INLET PRESSURE (750 PSIG NOMINAL) DIRECTLY TO THE BALL AT THE INLET SEAT AND INDIRECTLY (VIA A BELLOWS) THROUGH THE VENT SEAT. THE BELLOWS IS ASSISTED BY A SPRING, THE FORCE OF WHICH INSURES THE BALL IS HELD SECURELY AGAINST THE INLET SEAT WHEN THE SOLENOID IS DEENERGIZED. UPON BEING ENERGIZED THE SOLENOID DEVELOPS THE FORCE TO OVERCOME THE SPRING LOAD AND SEATS THE BALL ONTO THE VENT SEAT TO ALLOW HELIUM FLOW. TOTAL POPPET MOVEMENT (STROKE) IS LESS THAN 0.040 INCH.

PREMATURE DEACTUATION MEANS THE FORCE HOLDING THE VALVE BALL TO THE VENT SEAT HAS BEEN REMOVED. MECHANICALLY, THE ONLY VALVE PARTS INVOLVED ARE THE SOLENOID PLUNGER, THE SOLENOID STOP, AND TWO PUSHRODS. THE PLUNGER AND STOP ARE MASSIVE BY COMPARISON TO THE PUSHRODS, AND ARE BOTH OF 430 CRES. THE PUSHRODS ARE ALIGNED IN SERIES WITHIN THE STOP. THE PUSHRODS ARE MADE OF

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0215-05**

CRES AND CARRY ONLY AXIAL LOADS. IF THE RODS WERE TO FAIL STRUCTURALLY, THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO PERFORM THEIR FUNCTION BECAUSE THEY ARE TOTALLY CONTAINED IN THE STOP (THE ROD OD IS 0.125 INCH AND THE STOP ID IS 0.126 INCH). THE ROD, IN CONTACT WITH THE BALL, IS GUIDED BY THE SOLENOID STOP FOR OVER 28% OF ITS LENGTH.

THE ONLY OTHER APPARENT WAY TO ACHIEVE PREMATURE DEACTUATION WOULD BE BY STRUCTURAL DAMAGE SUCH THAT A LEAK WOULD BE CREATED OF SUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO VENT THE VALVE ACTUATION PORT THROUGH THE VENT PORT. WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF BALL DISINTEGRATION, NO INTERNAL STRUCTURAL FAILURE WILL CAUSE PREMATURE DEACTUATION BECAUSE THE FAILURE POINT IS DOWNSTREAM OF THE ACTUATION PORT.

IF A VALVE COMPONENT SHOULD FAIL STRUCTURALLY, IT WOULD NOT DISINTEGRATE AND DISAPPEAR. THE FAILURE WOULD CREATE A FLOW PATH FROM THE HIGH PRESSURE SIDE OF THE VALVE TO THE VENT AND SOMEWHERE IN THAT PATH THE FLOW WILL CHOKE. UPSTREAM OF THAT CHOKING POINT (INCLUDING THE ACTUATION PORT), THE PRESSURE WILL REMAIN ABOVE 400 PSIA. THIS RATIONALE ALSO APPLIES TO SEAT AND SEAL DAMAGE. THE BALL IS MADE FROM 430 CRES.

THE SOLENOID STRUCTURE IS CONSTRUCTED OF CRES AND IS EB WELDED. THE COIL IS VACUUM IMPREGNATED (POTTED). THE UNIT IS PRESSURE AND LEAK TESTED AT THE MAJOR ASSEMBLY POINTS.

THE -0032, -0042 CONFIGURATION SOLENOID VALVES ARE IDENTICAL TO THE -0012 CONFIGURATION WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ADDING THE FILTER (10 MICRON NOMINAL, 25 MICRON ABSOLUTE) IN THE VENT PORT OF THE SOLENOID VALVE AND REDESIGN OF THE VENT PORT CHECK VALVE. THIS FILTER WAS ADDED TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION AND METALLIC PARTICLES GENERATED DURING THE REMOVAL OF THE VENT PORT CHECK VALVE DURING OMRSD LEAKAGE MEASUREMENTS FROM ENTERING THE SOLENOID VALVE.

THE VENT PORT CHECK VALVE WAS REDESIGNED TO PREVENT THE POPPET FROM BEING EJECTED DUE TO SHEARING OF THE RETAINING NUT THREAD. A PIN WAS ADDED TO THE CHECK VALVE HOUSING, WHICH RETAINS THE POPPET WITHIN THE CHECK VALVE HOUSING. A NEW ALUMINUM NUT, WHICH PROVIDE A MINIMUM ENGAGEMENT OF THREE THREADS, WAS UTILIZED TO INCREASE RELIABILITY.

(B) TEST:

ATP

AMBIENT TEMPERATURE TESTS:

PROOF PRESSURE (1560 PSIG); EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (850 PSIG); ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND RESPONSE; INTERNAL LEAKAGE (740 PSIG, ENERGIZED AND DEENERGIZED).

REDUCED TEMPERATURE TESTS (-160 DEG F):

ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND RESPONSE; INTERNAL LEAKAGE

ELECTRICAL BONDING TESTS

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0215-05**

SOLENOID SUBASSEMBLY TESTS:
ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS; ENCLOSURE LEAKAGE (ONE ATMOSPHERE).

CERTIFICATION

TWO UNITS -

PORT AND FITTING TORQUE

SALT FOG EXPOSURE FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS

AMBIENT VIBRATION TESTS: TOTAL 13.1 HOURS BOTH AXES FOR TWO VIBRATION LEVELS PLUS TRANSIENT VIBRATION SWEEP - RUN WITH ONE UNIT ENERGIZED AND ONE DEENERGIZED - FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND LEAKAGE CHECKS

HANDLING SHOCK TEST

ENERGIZED AND DEENERGIZED FLOW TESTS

FIFTY HOUR CONTINUOUS CURRENT TEST AT 130 DEG F

AMBIENT TEMPERATURE ENDURANCE (4500 CYCLES FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS); 130 DEG F ENDURANCE (500 CYCLES FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS); OPERATION CYCLES (REPEATED 20 TIMES); REPEAT OF AMBIENT TEMPERATURE ENDURANCE ; -160 DEG F ENDURANCE (500 CYCLES FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS)

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION

BURST PRESSURE (3400 PSIG)

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

(C) INSPECTION:

RECEIVING INSPECTION

RAW MATERIALS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION FOR MATERIAL AND PROCESSES CERTIFICATION. BODY HOUSING BAR STOCK IS ULTRASONICALLY INSPECTED.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

CLEANLINESS LEVEL VERIFIED TO 100A. CORROSION PROTECTION IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

10X MAGNIFICATION EXAMINATION OF ALL DETAIL PARTS FOR BURRS, DAMAGE AND CORROSION IS MADE PRIOR TO ASSEMBLY. ALL DETAIL PARTS ARE INSPECTED FOR DIMENSIONS. CRITICAL SURFACE FINISHES ARE INSPECTED USING A COMPARATOR AT 10X MAGNIFICATION. OTHER SURFACE FINISHES ARE INSPECTED AND VERIFIED WITH A PROFILOMETER. TORQUES ARE VERIFIED TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH DRAWING

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0215-05**

REQUIREMENTS. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS ARE INCLUDED IN THE ASSEMBLY PROCEDURE.

CRITICAL PROCESS

WELDING, HEAT TREATMENT AND PARTS PASSIVATION VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. POTTING OF SOLDER CUPS, ELECTRICAL WIRE STRIPPING, AND SOLDERING OF CONNECTORS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. CHROME PLATING AND DRY FILM LUBRICATION ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION

WELDS VISUALLY EXAMINED & VERIFIED BY X-RAY AND DYE PENETRANT INSPECTIONS. THE SOLENOID ASSEMBLY IS SUBJECTED TO LEAKAGE VERIFICATION USING RADIOACTIVE TRACER TECHNIQUES. SOME VALVE BODIES WERE SUBJECTED TO 10X MAGNIFICATION INSPECTION ONLY. OTHER VALVE BODIES WERE SUBJECTED TO EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION, IN ADDITION TO 10X MAGNIFICATION. THE REMAINING VALVE BODIES WERE SUBJECTED TO 10X MAGNIFICATION, ETCH AND DYE PENETRANT INSPECTIONS. REFURBISHED VALVE BODIES WERE SUBJECTED TO 40X MAGNIFICATION INSPECTION. BELLOWS ASSEMBLY IS PROOF PRESSURE TESTED AND LEAK CHECKED.

TESTING

ATP VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

HANDLING/PACKAGING

HANDLING, PACKAGING, STORAGE AND SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

AN ELECTRICAL SHORT DUE TO INCORRECT ALIGNMENT OF SOLDER CUPS (PINS "A" AND "C") WAS DETECTED AT THE PALMDALE FACILITY (CAR AC2687). THE CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN WAS THE ADDITION OF HEAT SHRINK TUBING TO ISOLATE THE SOLDER CUPS AND THE ADDITION OF AN INSPECTION POINT AFTER POTTING.

A NUMBER OF ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS WERE BROKEN AT NSTL DUE TO EXCESSIVE PHYSICAL FORCE APPLIED TO THE CONNECTOR BY TECHNICIANS WORKING IN THE CONFINED AREA (CAR'S AB1813, AB1613, AND AB1208). CORRECTIVE ACTION RESULTED IN THE INSTALLATION OF PROTECTIVE COVERS TO PREVENT CONNECTOR DAMAGE IN HIGH TRAFFIC AREA. ALSO, CONNECTORS WERE WELDED TO THE VALVE BODY IN LIEU OF SOLDERING.

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURE, FLIGHT FAILURE, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATABASE.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

NO CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.

- APPROVALS -

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0215-05**

S&R ENGINEERING	: W.P. MUSTY	:S/ W. P. MUSTY
S&R ENGINEERING ITM	: P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN	:S/ P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN
DESIGN ENGINEERING	: MIKE FISCHER	:S/ MIKE FISCHER
MPS SUBSYSTEM MGR.	: TIM REITH	:S/ TIM REITH
MOD	: BILL LANE	:S/ BILL LANE
USA SAM	: MIKE SNYDER	:S/ MIKE SNYDER
USA ORBITER ELEMENT	: SUZANNE LITTLE	:S/ SUZANNE LITTLE
NASA SR&QA	: ERICH BASS	:S/ ERICH BASS