

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE**NUMBER:03-1-0218 -X****SUBSYSTEM NAME:** MAIN PROPULSION**REVISION:** 2 08/07/00**PART DATA**

	PART NAME	PART NUMBER
	VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMBER
LRU	:HIGH PRESSURE THREE WAY SOLENOID VALVE, NC TYPE 1	MC284-0404-0041, -0051
	UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE - NSLD	13110-5, -6

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

VALVE, SOLENOID, NORMALLY CLOSED 3-WAY 3/8 INCH. LH2 FEED DISCONNECT CONTROL. CLOSING SOLENOID.

VALVE WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AND MANUFACTURED BY WRIGHT COMPONENTS (NOW PERKIN ELMER) BUT IS NOW MANUFACTURED BY UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE-NSLD AS AN ALTERNATE PRODUCTION AGENCY.

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: LV49**QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS:** 1**FUNCTION:**

CONTROLS PNEUMATIC PRESSURE TO CLOSE THE 17" LH2 FEED DISCONNECT (PD2). THE SOLENOID MUST DEACTUATE TO ALLOW THE DISCONNECT ACTUATOR TO VENT WHEN THE DISCONNECT IS OPENED. OPENING SOLENOID (LV48) (REFERENCE FMEA/ CIL 03-1-0217) MUST DEACTUATE TO ALLOW VALVE TO CLOSE.

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEA -- CIL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: 03-1-0218-01

REVISION#: 2 08/07/00

SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

LRU: LH2 17" DISCONNECT CLOSE SOLENOID (LV49)

CRITICALITY OF THIS

ITEM NAME: LH2 17" DISCONNECT CLOSE SOLENOID (LV49)

FAILURE MODE: 1R2

FAILURE MODE:

FAILS TO ACTUATE (DISCONNECT VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE, REFERENCE FMEA/CIL 03-1-0407-06) WHEN DISCONNECT VALVE IS COMMANDED CLOSED. FOR ET SEPARATION.

MISSION PHASE:

PL PRE-LAUNCH
LO LIFT-OFF

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102 COLUMBIA
103 DISCOVERY
104 ATLANTIS
105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BINDING, ELECTRICAL SOLENOID FAILURE, INLET FILTER CLOGGED

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

A) PASS
B) PASS
C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

PASSES SCREEN B BECAUSE THERE IS SUFFICIENT TIME (3.8 SECS) TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE TWO METHODS (PNEUMATIC AND MECHANICAL) FOR CLOSING THE DISCONNECT VALVE. EITHER OF THE CLOSURE METHODS WILL ACTIVATE THE CLOSED DISCONNECT VALVE POSITION INDICATOR WHEN THE FLAPPER IS CLOSED.

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0218-01**

LH2 17-INCH DISCONNECT VALVE CAN NOT BE CLOSED PNEUMATICALLY. VALVE WILL AUTOMATICALLY BE CLOSED (MECHANICALLY) DURING THE UMBILICAL RETRACT.

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

SAME AS A.

(C) MISSION:

NO EFFECT.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

SAME AS C.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

CASE 1:

1R/2 2 SUCCESS PATHS. TIME FRAME - POST MECO THROUGH ET SEPARATION

- 1) DISCONNECT CLOSING SOLENOID (LV49) FAILS TO ACTUATE.
- 2) FAILURE OF MECHANICAL BACKUP MODE.

RESULTS IN THE FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO CLOSE. VEHICLE SOFTWARE WILL INHIBIT ET STRUCTURAL SEPARATION SINCE BOTH DISCONNECT CLOSED SWITCHES WILL PROPERLY INDICATE ORBITER FLAPPER FAILURE TO CLOSE. FOR NOMINAL, ATO, AND AOA MISSIONS ET SEPARATION IS DELAYED FOR SIX MINUTES TO VENT RESIDUAL PROPELLANT THROUGH FAILED DISCONNECT. THIS IS TO PREVENT ORB/ET RECONTACT DUE TO PROPULSIVE VENTING AT SEPARATION. POSSIBLE TILE AND DOOR DAMAGE AT THE ORB/ET UMBILICAL AREA DUE TO CRYO EXPOSURE. FOR RTLS, TAL, AND MISSIONS WHERE OMS BURN CANNOT BE DELAYED ET STRUCTURAL SEPARATION IS NOT DELAYED AND ET/ORB RECONTACT IS LIKELY. ALSO RESULTS IN LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY DURING MANIFOLD REPRESS CAUSING POSSIBLE LOSS OF AFT COMPARTMENT PURGE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

CASE 2:

1R/2 2 SUCCESS PATHS. TIME FRAME - LOADING/PRELAUNCH.

- 1) LEAKAGE/FIRE REQUIRING ISOLATION OF THE EXTERNAL TANK BY CLOSING OF THE 17" DISCONNECT.
- 2) 17" DISCONNECT CLOSING SOLENOID FAILS TO ACTUATE.

RESULTS IN FAILURE TO ISOLATE THE EXTERNAL TANK AND PROPELLANTS FROM FIRE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0218-01**

VALVE IS DESIGNED FOR A PRESSURE FACTOR OF SAFETY OF 2.0 PROOF, 4.0 BURST. THE CLOSURE DEVICE IS A 430 CRES BALL ACTING UPON EITHER OF TWO VESPEL SEATS. THE VALVE FEATURES A BALANCED LOAD ON THE BALL BY APPLYING INLET PRESSURE (750 PSIG NOMINAL) DIRECTLY TO THE BALL AT THE INLET SEAT AND INDIRECTLY (VIA A BELLOWS) THROUGH THE VENT SEAT. THE BELLOWS IS ASSISTED BY A SPRING, THE FORCE OF WHICH INSURES THE BALL IS HELD SECURELY AGAINST THE INLET SEAT WHEN THE SOLENOID IS DEENERGIZED. UPON BEING ENERGIZED THE SOLENOID DEVELOPS THE FORCE TO OVERCOME THE SPRING LOAD AND SEATS THE BALL ONTO THE VENT SEAT TO ALLOW HELIUM FLOW. TOTAL POPPET MOVEMENT (STROKE) IS LESS THAN 0.040 INCH.

TO FAIL TO ACTUATE MEANS THE FORCE TO MOVE THE BALL TO THE VENT SEAT IS NOT DELIVERED TO THE BALL. THE VALVE PARTS INVOLVED ARE THE SOLENOID, THE SOLENOID PLUNGER, THE SOLENOID STOP, TWO PUSHRODS AND A SPRING. THE PUSHRODS ARE ALIGNED IN SERIES, SEPARATED BY THE SPRING FOR CHATTER PREVENTION. THE PUSHRODS ARE MADE OF CRES AND CARRY ONLY AXIAL LOADS. IF THE RODS WERE TO FAIL STRUCTURALLY, THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO PERFORM THEIR FUNCTION BECAUSE THEY ARE TOTALLY CONTAINED IN THE STOP (THE ROD OD IS 0.125 INCH AND THE STOP ID IS 0.126 INCH). THE ROD, IN CONTACT WITH THE BALL, IS GUIDED BY THE SOLENOID STOP FOR OVER 28% OF ITS LENGTH.

BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE TOLERANCES IN THE SOLENOID ASSEMBLY, BINDING DUE TO CONTAMINATION IS A DESIGN CONCERN. TO PRECLUDE BURRS, THE SOLENOID BORE IS HONED. TO PREVENT BINDING, THE PLUNGER IS COATED WITH A DRY-FILM LUBRICANT. THE STOP IS MADE OF A MUCH HARDER MATERIAL THAN EITHER OF THE PUSHRODS TO PREVENT GALLING, AND THE PUSHROD SPRING NOT ONLY CONTROLS CHATTER, BUT REDUCES THE POTENTIAL FOR FRETTING.

CLOGGING OF THE 20 MICRON NOMINAL, 40 MICRON ABSOLUTE, RATED INLET FILTER IS PROTECTED AGAINST BY THE USE OF MULTI-FILTERED HELIUM IN THE ORBITER PNEUMATICS SYSTEM. THE HELIUM IS FILTERED BY THE GROUND SYSTEM BEFORE PRESSURIZING THE VEHICLE PNEUMATICS BOTTLE. IT IS AGAIN FILTERED (25 MICRONS, ABSOLUTE) BEFORE IT ENTERS THE VALVE ACTUATION SYSTEM. ALSO, TO INCREASE THE INLET FILTER'S EFFECTIVE SURFACE AREA THE FILTER IS OF A PLEATED DESIGN.

THE SOLENOID STRUCTURE IS CONSTRUCTED OF CRES AND IS EB WELDED. THE COIL IS VACUUM IMPREGNATED (POTTED). THE UNIT IS PRESSURE AND LEAK TESTED AT MAJOR ASSEMBLY POINTS.

THE -0041, -0051 CONFIGURATION SOLENOID VALVES ARE IDENTICAL TO THE -0021 CONFIGURATION WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ADDING THE FILTER (10 MICRON NOMINAL, 25 MICRON ABSOLUTE) IN THE VENT PORT OF THE SOLENOID VALVE AND REDESIGN OF THE VENT PORT CHECK VALVE. THIS FILTER WAS ADDED TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION AND METALLIC PARTICLES GENERATED DURING THE REMOVAL OF THE VENT PORT CHECK VALVE DURING OMRSD LEAKAGE MEASUREMENTS FROM ENTERING THE SOLENOID VALVE.

THE VENT PORT CHECK VALVE WAS REDESIGNED TO PREVENT THE POPPET FROM BEING EJECTED DUE TO SHEARING OF THE RETAINING NUT THREAD. A PIN WAS ADDED TO THE CHECK VALVE HOUSING, WHICH RETAINS THE POPPET WITHIN THE CHECK VALVE HOUSING. A NEW ALUMINUM NUT, WHICH PROVIDE A MINIMUM ENGAGEMENT OF THREE THREADS, WAS UTILIZED TO INCREASE RELIABILITY.

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0218-01**

(B) TEST:

ATP

AMBIENT TEMPERATURE TESTS:

PROOF PRESSURE (1560 PSIG); EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (850 PSIG); ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND RESPONSE; INTERNAL LEAKAGE (740 PSIG, ENERGIZED AND DEENERGIZED).

REDUCED TEMPERATURE TESTS (-160 DEG F):

ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND RESPONSE; INTERNAL LEAKAGE

ELECTRICAL BONDING TESTS

SOLENOID SUBASSEMBLY TESTS:

ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS; ENCLOSURE LEAKAGE (ONE ATMOSPHERE).

CERTIFICATION

TWO UNITS -

PORT AND FITTING TORQUE

SALT FOG EXPOSURE FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS

AMBIENT VIBRATION TESTS: TOTAL 13.1 HOURS BOTH AXES FOR TWO VIBRATION LEVELS PLUS TRANSIENT VIBRATION SWEEP - RUN WITH ONE SPECIMEN ENERGIZED AND ONE DEENERGIZED - FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND LEAKAGE CHECKS

HANDLING SHOCK TEST

ENERGIZED AND DEENERGIZED FLOW TESTS

FIFTY HOUR CONTINUOUS CURRENT TEST AT 130 DEG F

AMBIENT TEMPERATURE ENDURANCE (4500 CYCLES FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS); 130 DEG F ENDURANCE (500 CYCLES FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS); OPERATION CYCLES (REPEATED 20 TIMES); REPEAT OF AMBIENT TEMPERATURE ENDURANCE ; -160 DEG F ENDURANCE (500 CYCLES FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS)

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION

BURST PRESSURE (3400 PSIG)

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

(C) INSPECTION:

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0218-01**

RECEIVING INSPECTION

RAW MATERIALS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION FOR MATERIAL AND PROCESSES CERTIFICATION. BODY HOUSING BAR STOCK IS ULTRASONICALLY INSPECTED.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

CLEANLINESS LEVEL VERIFIED TO 100A. CORROSION PROTECTION IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

ALL PARTS ARE PROTECTED FROM DAMAGE AND CONTAMINATION. MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION OF ALL DETAIL PARTS IS MADE PRIOR TO ASSEMBLY. ALL SURFACES REQUIRING CORROSION PROTECTION ARE VERIFIED. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS ARE INCLUDED IN THE ASSEMBLY PROCEDURE. MECHANICAL SURFACE FINISH AT 125 RMS IS INSPECTED AND VERIFIED WITH A PROFILOMETER. SURFACE FINISHES SMOOTHER THAN 125 RMS ARE INSPECTED USING A COMPARATOR AT 10X MAGNIFICATION. ALL CRITICAL DIMENSIONS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CRITICAL PROCESS

HEAT TREATMENT AND PARTS PASSIVATION VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. POTTING OF SOLDER CUPS, ELECTRICAL WIRE STRIPPING, AND SOLDERING OF CONNECTORS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. DRY FILM LUBRICATION APPLIED TO THE PLUNGER IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION

WELDS VISUALLY EXAMINED & VERIFIED BY X -RAY, DYE PENETRANT, AND EDDY CURRENT. THE SOLENOID ASSEMBLY IS SUBJECTED TO LEAKAGE VERIFICATION USING RADIOACTIVE TRACER TECHNIQUES. THE VALVE BODY, PRIOR TO FINAL MACHINING, IS SUBJECTED TO ETCH AND DYE PENETRANT INSPECTION. BELLOWS ASSEMBLY IS PROOF PRESSURE TESTED AND LEAK CHECKED.

TESTING

ATP VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

HANDLING/PACKAGING

PACKAGING FOR SHIPMENT VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

A NUMBER OF ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS WERE BROKEN AT NSTL DUE TO EXCESSIVE PHYSICAL FORCE APPLIED TO THE CONNECTOR BY TECHNICIANS WORKING IN THE CONFINED AREA (CAR'S AB1813, AB1613, AND AB1208). CORRECTIVE ACTION RESULTED IN THE INSTALLATION OF PROTECTIVE COVERS TO PREVENT CONNECTOR DAMAGE IN HIGH TRAFFIC AREA. ALSO, CONNECTORS WERE WELDED TO THE VALVE BODY IN LIEU OF SOLDERING.

THE SOLENOID VALVE EXPERIENCED ERRATIC BUT ACCEPTABLE PERFORMANCE AT KSC DUE TO EXCESSIVE SLIDING FRICTION CAUSED BY BURRS, AND SHARP EDGES ON THE ARMATURE (CAR AC1181). THE CONTROLLED PNEUMATIC VALVE OPERATION WAS ACCEPTABLE. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION RESULTED IN THE REDESIGN OF THE VALVE TO ELIMINATE THE BURRS AND SHARP EDGES. INSPECTION WAS IMPROVED AND AN OMRSD REQUIREMENT FOR CURRENT SIGNATURE TRACE WAS IMPOSED.

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0218-01**

DURING QUALIFICATION TESTING AT THE SUPPLIER (CAR AC3193), AND SUBSEQUENTLY AT KSC (CAR AC8975 AND AD0352), THE VALVES FAILED TO CYCLE (ACTUATE OR DEACTUATE) WHICH OCCASIONALLY PREVENTED PROPER OPERATION OF THE CONTROLLED PNEUMATIC VALVE. FAILURE INVESTIGATION DISCLOSED FRETTING ON THE PLUNGER AND IN THE BORE AREA. THIS GENERATED SMALL PARTICLES LEADING TO BINDING OF THE VALVES. THE FRETTING WAS THE RESULT OF A LACK OF REQUIRED LUBRICANT. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS THE APPLICATION OF MICROSEAL (DRY FILM LUBRICANT) ON ALL NEW PARTS AND THE REPLACEMENT OF PLUNGERS WITH MICROSEAL WHEN VALVES WERE RETURNED TO THE SUPPLIER FOR REWORK.

AN ELECTRICAL SHORT DUE TO INCORRECT ALIGNMENT OF SOLDER CUPS (PINS "A" AND "C") WAS DETECTED AT THE PALMDALE FACILITY (CAR AC2687). THE CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN WAS THE ADDITION OF HEAT SHRINK TUBING TO ISOLATE THE SOLDER CUPS AND THE ADDITION OF AN INSPECTION POINT AFTER POTTING.

FOUR SOLENOID VALVES FAILED TO ACTUATE PROPERLY DURING ATP. TWO FAILED TO ACTUATE DUE TO BINDING (CARS AC0737, ACO894) AND THE OTHER TWO FAILED DUE TO INCORRECT STROKE OF THE PLUNGER (CARS ACO739, AC1469). DETAIL PARTS WERE INCORRECTLY FABRICATED/ASSEMBLED. THESE VALVE DEFECTS WERE REPAIRED AND ARE ATP SCREENABLE.

AFTER THE ACTUATION SIGNAL WAS REMOVED, TWO VALVES AT NSTL VENTED CONTINUOUSLY (CAR A7662) DUE TO BINDING OF THE PLUNGER CAUSED BY BURRS AND GALLING. DETAIL PARTS WERE INCORRECTLY FABRICATED/ASSEMBLED. THESE VALVE DEFECTS WERE REPAIRED.

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURE, FLIGHT FAILURE, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATABASE.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

NO CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED (FIRST FAILURE).

- APPROVALS -

S&R ENGINEERING	: W.P. MUSTY	:/S/ W. P. MUSTY
S&R ENGINEERING ITM	: P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN	:/S/ P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN
DESIGN ENGINEERING	: DAVE NEARY	:/S/ DAVE NEARY
MPS SUBSYSTEM MGR.	: TIM REITH	:/S/ TIM REITH
MOD	: BILL LANE	:/S/ BILL LANE
USA SAM	: MIKE SNYDER	:/S/ MIK SNYDER
USA ORBITER ELEMENT	: SUZANNE LITTLE	:/S/ SUZANNE LITTLE
NASA SR&QA	: ERICH BASS	:/S/ ERICH BASS