

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE**

NUMBER: 03-1-0219 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

REVISION: 2 08/07/00

**PART DATA**

	<b>PART NAME</b>	<b>PART NUMBER</b>
	<b>VENDOR NAME</b>	<b>VENDOR NUMBER</b>
LRU	:LOW PRESSURE THREE WAY SOLENOID VALVE, NC TYPE 1	MC284-0404-0041, -0051
	UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE - NSLD	13110-5, -6

**EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:**

VALVE, SOLENOID, NORMALLY CLOSED 3-WAY 3/8 INCH. LO2 FEED DISCONNECT CONTROL. OPENING SOLENOID.

VALVE WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AND MANUFACTURED BY WRIGHT COMPONENTS (NOW PERKIN ELMER) BUT IS NOW MANUFACTURED BY UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE-NSLD AS AN ALTERNATE PRODUCTION AGENCY.

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: LV46

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 1

**FUNCTION:**

CONTROLS PNEUMATIC PRESSURE TO OPEN THE 17" LO2 FEED DISCONNECT (PD1). THE SOLENOID MUST DEACTUATE TO ALLOW THE DISCONNECT ACTUATOR TO VENT WHEN THE DISCONNECT IS CLOSED. CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) (REFERENCE FMEA/CIL 03-1-0220) MUST DEACTUATE TO ALLOW VALVE TO OPEN.

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PREMATURE ACTUATION (VALVE FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, REFERENCE FMEA/CIL 03-1-0408-07) CAUSING OPENING PRESSURE TO BE APPLIED TO VALVE ACTUATOR. PRIOR TO ORBITER/ET UMBILICAL SEPARATION.

**MISSION PHASE:** PL PRE-LAUNCH  
LO LIFT-OFF

**VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:**

102	COLUMBIA
103	DISCOVERY
104	ATLANTIS
105	ENDEAVOUR

**CAUSE:**

PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SEAL/SEAT DAMAGE

**CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY?** NO

**REDUNDANCY SCREEN**

- A) PASS
- B) FAIL
- C) PASS

**PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:**

A)

B)

FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE SOLENOID VALVE DOES NOT HAVE POSITION INDICATORS.

C)

**- FAILURE EFFECTS -**

**(A) SUBSYSTEM:**

FAILURE OF THE OPENING SOLENOID RESULTS IN APPLICATION OF ACTUATOR OPENING PRESSURE. VALVE IS BISTABLE AND WILL REMAIN IN LAST COMMANDED POSITION WITH BOTH OPENING AND CLOSING PRESSURE APPLIED. RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANCY ONLY. CLOSING PRESSURE IS APPLIED DURING SEPARATION.

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**(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):**

SAME AS A.

**(C) MISSION:**

NO EFFECT. VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED.

**(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):**

SAME AS C.

**(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:**

CASE 1:

1R/3 3 SUCCESS PATHS. TIME FRAME - PRIOR TO ORB/ET UMBILICAL SEP AND FOLLOWING SUCCESSFUL CLOSURE OF DISCONNECT.

- 1) PREMATURE ACTUATION OF DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46).
- 2) PREMATURE DEACTUATION OF DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47).
- 3) FAILURE OF THE MECHANICAL BACKUP MODE.

RESULTS IN THE FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO CLOSE. VEHICLE SOFTWARE WILL INHIBIT ET STRUCTURAL SEPARATION SINCE BOTH DISCONNECT CLOSED SWITCHES WILL PROPERLY INDICATE ORBITER FLAPPER FAILURE TO CLOSE. FOR NOMINAL, ATO, AND AOA MISSIONS ET SEPARATION IS DELAYED FOR SIX MINUTES TO VENT RESIDUAL PROPELLANT THROUGH FAILED DISCONNECT. THIS IS TO PREVENT ORB/ET RECONTACT DUE TO PROPULSIVE VENTING AT SEPARATION. POSSIBLE TILE AND DOOR DAMAGE AT THE ORB/ET UMBILICAL AREA DUE TO CRYO EXPOSURE. FOR RTLS, TAL, AND MISSIONS WHERE OMS BURN CANNOT BE DELAYED ET STRUCTURAL SEPARATION IS NOT DELAYED AND ET/ORB RECONTACT IS LIKELY. ALSO RESULTS IN LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY DURING MANIFOLD REPRESS CAUSING POSSIBLE LOSS OF AFT COMPARTMENT PURGE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

CASE 2:

1R/3 3 SUCCESS PATHS. TIME FRAME - LOADING/PRELAUNCH.

- 1) LEAKAGE/FIRE REQUIRING ISOLATION OF THE EXTERNAL TANK BY CLOSING OF THE 17" DISCONNECT.
- 2) 17" DISCONNECT OPENING SOLENOID PREMATURE ACTUATION.
- 3) 17" DISCONNECT CLOSING SOLENOID PREMATURE DEACTUATION.

RESULTS IN FAILURE TO ISOLATE THE EXTERNAL TANK AND PROPELLANTS FROM FIRE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

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**-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-**

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**(A) DESIGN:**

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VALVE IS DESIGNED FOR A PRESSURE FACTOR OF SAFETY OF 2.0 PROOF, 4.0 BURST. THE CLOSURE DEVICE IS A 430 CRES BALL ACTING UPON EITHER OF TWO VESPEL SEATS. THE VALVE FEATURES A BALANCED LOAD ON THE BALL BY APPLYING INLET PRESSURE (750 PSIG NOMINAL) DIRECTLY TO THE BALL AT THE INLET SEAT AND INDIRECTLY (VIA A BELLOWS) THROUGH THE VENT SEAT. THE BELLOWS IS ASSISTED BY A SPRING, THE FORCE OF WHICH INSURES THE BALL IS HELD SECURELY AGAINST THE INLET SEAT WHEN THE SOLENOID IS DEENERGIZED. UPON BEING ENERGIZED THE SOLENOID DEVELOPS THE FORCE TO OVERCOME THE SPRING LOAD AND SEATS THE BALL ONTO THE VENT SEAT TO ALLOW HELIUM FLOW. TOTAL POPPET MOVEMENT (STROKE) IS LESS THAN 0.040 INCH.

PREMATURE ACTUATION, FROM THE MECHANICAL VIEW, MEANS APPLICATION OF A DIFFERENTIAL FORCE TO THE VALVE BALL TO CAUSE IT TO MOVE FROM THE INLET SEAT TO THE VENT SEAT. ON THE SOLENOID SIDE OF THE BALL, NO MECHANICAL FAILURES WOULD CAUSE PREMATURE ACTUATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE CLOSING FORCE OF THE BELLOWS/SPRING WERE REMOVED, INLET PRESSURE AND FLOW ACTING ON THE BALL WOULD DRIVE IT TO THE VENT SEAT, CAUSING PREMATURE ACTUATION.

THE FORCE TO HOLD THE BALL TO THE INLET SEAT, WHEN THE SOLENOID IS DEENERGIZED, IS PROVIDED BY THE BELLOWS ASSEMBLY AND SPRING THROUGH THE VALVE POPPET. IF THE BELLOWS FAILS, OR LEAKS TO THE POINT OF REDUCING THE BELLOWS INTERNAL PRESSURE TO LESS THAN THE VALVE INLET PRESSURE, THE LOAD BALANCING FEATURE IS ELIMINATED AND THE BALL WOULD MOVE TO THE VENT SEAT. THE BELLOWS IS MADE OF NICKEL-COBALT-COPPER AND IS PROOF PRESSURE TESTED AT 1550 PSIG PRIOR TO ASSEMBLY INTO THE VALVE. IF THE SPRING BREAKS, THE PRESSURIZED BELLOWS WOULD EXERT SUFFICIENT FORCE TO RETURN THE BALL TO THE INLET SEAT; HOWEVER, SEAT LEAKAGE MAY RESULT. THE SPRING IS MADE FROM 17-7PH CRES (ELGILOY) WIRE AND IS HEAT TREATED FOLLOWING FORMING. IT HAS A SPRING RATE OF 13.5 POUNDS/INCH AND EXERTS A FORCE OF 7.54 POUNDS IN ITS INSTALLED CONDITION.

PREMATURE ACTUATION DUE TO SEAT/SEAL DAMAGE IS VERY UNLIKELY. THIS PRESUMES FLOW PAST THE SEATED BALL AT A RATE SUFFICIENT TO PRESSURIZE THE ACTUATION PORT TO A PRESSURE OF 400 PSIA MINIMUM, WHILE THE VENT PORT IS OPEN. THE BALL IS OF 430 CRES AND THE SEAT IS OF VESPEL.

THE -0031 CONFIGURATION WAS ADDED DUE TO A BELLOWS ASSEMBLY DESIGN CHANGE (P/N 24340 TO P/N 24340-1) TO ELIMINATE THE "SQUIRMED" CONDITION WHICH SOME OF THE ORIGINAL BELLOWS ASSEMBLIES EXPERIENCED DURING PROOF PRESSURE TESTING AT ATP. THE DESIGN CHANGE WAS MADE TO STRENGTHEN THE BELLOWS. BECAUSE THE DAMAGE OCCURRED DURING ATP, VALVES ALREADY IN THE FLEET (-0021 CONFIGURATION) WERE X-RAY TESTED AND ONLY VALVES WHICH HAD SQUIRMED BELLOWS WERE UPGRADED TO THE -0031 CONFIGURATION.

THE -0041 AND -0051 CONFIGURATION SOLENOID VALVES ARE IDENTICAL TO THE -0021 AND -0031 CONFIGURATION SOLENOID VALVES (RESPECTIVELY) WITH THE EXCEPTIONS OF ADDING THE FILTER (10 MICRON NOMINAL, 25 MICRON ABSOLUTE) IN THE VENT PORT OF THE SOLENOID VALVE AND REDESIGN OF THE VENT PORT CHECK VALVE. THIS FILTER WAS ADDED TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION AND METALLIC PARTICLES GENERATED DURING THE REMOVAL OF THE VENT PORT CHECK VALVE DURING OMRSD LEAKAGE MEASUREMENTS FROM ENTERING THE SOLENOID VALVE.

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THE VENT PORT CHECK VALVE (P/N 11107-5) WAS REDESIGNED (P/N 11107-7) TO PREVENT THE POPPET FROM BEING EJECTED DUE TO SHEARING OF THE RETAINING NUT THREAD. A PIN WAS ADDED TO THE CHECK VALVE HOUSING, WHICH RETAINS THE POPPET WITHIN THE CHECK VALVE HOUSING. A NEW ALUMINUM NUT, WHICH PROVIDES A MINIMUM ENGAGEMENT OF THREE THREADS, WAS UTILIZED TO INCREASE RELIABILITY.

**(B) TEST:**

ATP

AMBIENT TEMPERATURE TESTS:

PROOF PRESSURE (1560 PSIG); EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (850 PSIG); ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND RESPONSE; INTERNAL LEAKAGE (740 PSIG, ENERGIZED AND DEENERGIZED).

REDUCED TEMPERATURE TESTS (-160 DEG F):

ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND RESPONSE; INTERNAL LEAKAGE

ELECTRICAL BONDING TESTS

SOLENOID SUBASSEMBLY TESTS:

ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS; ENCLOSURE LEAKAGE (ONE ATMOSPHERE).

CERTIFICATION

TWO SPECIMENS -

PORT AND FITTING TORQUE

SALT FOG EXPOSURE FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS

AMBIENT VIBRATION TESTS: TOTAL 13.1 HOURS BOTH AXES FOR TWO VIBRATION LEVELS PLUS TRANSIENT VIBRATION SWEEP - RUN WITH ONE UNIT ENERGIZED AND ONE DEENERGIZED - FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND LEAKAGE CHECKS

HANDLING SHOCK TEST

ENERGIZED AND DEENERGIZED FLOW TESTS

FIFTY HOUR CONTINUOUS CURRENT TEST AT 130 DEG F

AMBIENT TEMPERATURE ENDURANCE (4500 CYCLES FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS); 130 DEG F ENDURANCE (500 CYCLES FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS); OPERATION CYCLES (REPEATED 20 TIMES); REPEAT OF AMBIENT TEMPERATURE ENDURANCE ; -160 DEG F ENDURANCE ( 500 CYCLES FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS)

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION

BURST PRESSURE (3400 PSIG)

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GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

**(C) INSPECTION:**

RECEIVING INSPECTION

RAW MATERIALS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION FOR MATERIAL AND PROCESSES CERTIFICATION. BODY HOUSING BAR STOCK IS ULTRASONICALLY INSPECTED.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

CLEANLINESS LEVEL VERIFIED TO 100A. CORROSION PROTECTION IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

ALL PARTS ARE PROTECTED FROM DAMAGE AND CONTAMINATION. MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION OF ALL DETAIL PARTS IS MADE PRIOR TO ASSEMBLY. ALL SURFACES REQUIRING CORROSION PROTECTION ARE VERIFIED. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS ARE INCLUDED IN THE ASSEMBLY PROCEDURE. MECHANICAL SURFACE FINISH AT 125 RMS IS INSPECTED AND VERIFIED WITH A PROFILOMETER. SURFACE FINISHES SMOOTHER THAN 125 RMS ARE INSPECTED USING A COMPARATOR AT 10X MAGNIFICATION. ALL CRITICAL DIMENSIONS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CRITICAL PROCESS

HEAT TREATMENT AND PARTS PASSIVATION VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. POTTING OF SOLDER CUPS, ELECTRICAL WIRE STRIPPING, AND SOLDERING OF CONNECTORS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. DRY FILM LUBRICATION APPLIED TO THE PLUNGER IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION

WELDS VISUALLY EXAMINED & VERIFIED BY X -RAY, DYE PENETRANT, AND EDDY CURRENT. THE SOLENOID ASSEMBLY IS SUBJECTED TO LEAKAGE VERIFICATION USING RADIOACTIVE TRACER TECHNIQUES. THE VALVE BODY, PRIOR TO FINAL MACHINING, IS SUBJECTED TO ETCH AND DYE PENETRANT INSPECTION. BELLOWS ASSEMBLY IS PROOF PRESSURE TESTED AND LEAK CHECKED.

TESTING

ATP VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

HANDLING/PACKAGING

PACKAGING FOR SHIPMENT VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

**(D) FAILURE HISTORY:**

LEAKAGE RESULTING FROM SEAL/SEAT DAMAGE (OR CONTAMINATION) HAS OCCURRED BUT HAS NOT BEEN OF SUFFICIENT MAGNITUDE TO CAUSE PREMATURE ACTUATION (REFERENCE FMEA/CIL 03-1-0291-01, SOLENOID EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH VENT PORT).

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURE, FLIGHT FAILURE, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATABASE.

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**(E) OPERATIONAL USE:**  
NO CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED (FIRST FAILURE).

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**- APPROVALS -**

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S&R ENGINEERING	: W.P. MUSTY	:/S/ W. P. MUSTY
S&R ENGINEERING ITM	: P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN	:/S/ P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN
DESIGN ENGINEERING	: DAVE NEARY	:/S/ DAVE NEARY
MPS SUBSYSTEM MGR.	: TIM REITH	:/S/ TIM REITH
MOD	: JEFF MUSLER	:/S/ JEFF MUSLER
USA SAM	: MIKE SNYDER	:/S/ MIKE SNYDER
USA ORBITER ELEMENT	: SUZANNE LITTLE	:/S/ SUZANNE LITTLE
NASA SR&QA	: ERICH BASS	:/S/ ERICH BASS