

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE

NUMBER: 03-1-0241 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

REVISION: 2 08/10/00

PART DATA

	PART NAME	PART NUMBER
	VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMBER
LRU	:GHE PNEUMATIC ISOLATION CHECK VALVE CIRCLE SEAL	ME284-0472-0024 P198-180

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

VALVE, CHECK, PNEUMATIC HELIUM ISOLATION, 0.50 INCH DIAMETER

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: CV8

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 1

FUNCTION:

THE CHECK VALVE ISOLATES AND RETAINS PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR SYSTEM HELIUM PRESSURE AT THE PROPELLANT CONTROL VALVES IN THE NON-ACCUMULATOR AND ACCUMULATOR LEGS IN THE EVENT OF AN UPSTREAM PRESSURE LOSS.

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SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

LRU: GHE PNEUMATIC ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CV8)

CRITICALITY OF THIS

ITEM NAME: GHE PNEUMATIC ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CV8)

FAILURE MODE: 1R2

FAILURE MODE:

FAILS TO OPEN/REMAIN OPEN

MISSION PHASE:

PL PRE-LAUNCH
LO LIFT-OFF

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102 COLUMBIA
103 DISCOVERY
104 ATLANTIS
105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

BINDING, CONTAMINATION

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

- A) PASS
- B) FAIL
- C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

FAILS B SCREEN DUE TO LACK OF POSITION INDICATION.

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. REDUNDANT HELIUM SUPPLY FROM LV10 AT MECO CAN PROVIDE PNEUMATIC ACTUATION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS.

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

SAME AS A.

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(C) MISSION:
NO EFFECT.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):
SAME AS C.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:
1R/2 2 SUCCESS PATHS. TIME FRAME - PRELAUNCH, ASCENT

- 1) CHECK VALVE (CV8) FAILS TO OPEN.
- 2) CROSSOVER VALVE (LV10) FAILS TO OPEN/REMAIN OPEN.

THE HELIUM REGULATOR AND ACCUMULATOR PRESSURES ARE MONITORED BY THE LCC PRIOR TO T MINUS 10 SECONDS. FAILURE SUBSEQUENT TO T MINUS 10 SECONDS WILL NOT PREVENT LAUNCH. THERE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT HELIUM REMAINING IN THE ACCUMULATOR LEG TO OPERATE THE LH2 PREVALVES PRIOR TO ENGINE START AND THEIR VALVE OPEN INDICATIONS WILL PASS THEIR LCC CHECKS AT T MINUS 7 SECONDS. ACTUATION OF VALVES PRIOR TO LIFT-OFF REDUCES THE PRESSURE OF THE GAS REMAINING IN THE ACCUMULATOR. AT MECO, IF LV10 DOES NOT REPLENISH THE ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE, THE REDUCED PRESSURE WILL NOT CLOSE THE LO2 PREVALVES WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED BY THE ENGINE (0.95 +/- 0.20 SECONDS) AND UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE MAY RESULT.

POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:

THE CHECK VALVE IS A POPPET TYPE, SPRING LOADED AND PRESSURE ASSISTED TO THE CLOSED POSITION. THE POPPET AND SPRING ARE CONTAINED IN A THREADED HOUSING AND END CAP. THE POPPET SEAL IS A SELF-CENTERING TEFLON O-RING. THE VALVE BODY PROVIDES A GUIDE FOR THE POPPET TRAVEL. THE VALVE BODY IS DESIGNED TO A FACTOR OF SAFETY OF 2.0 PROOF AND 4.0 BURST.

FAILURE OF THE CHECK VALVE TO OPEN WOULD REQUIRE BINDING BETWEEN THE POPPET GUIDE AND POPPET. THE MOVING PARTS HAVE LITTLE TENDENCY TO GALL DUE TO THE LIGHT SIDE LOADS RESULTING FROM THE SYMMETRICAL GEOMETRY. THE USE OF CRES 316 FOR THE POPPET AGAINST INCONEL 718 FOR THE END PIECE ALSO REDUCES THE GALLING TENDENCY.

CONTAMINATION IS MINIMIZED BY THE USE OF MULTI-FILTERED HELIUM. GROUND SUPPLIED HELIUM (EITHER THROUGH THE T-0 UMBILICAL OR THE TEST POINT COUPLINGS)

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IS FILTERED TO 25 MICRONS ABSOLUTE. VEHICLE FILTERS (25 MICRONS ABSOLUTE) ARE LOCATED UPSTREAM OF THE REGULATOR INLET.

(B) TEST:

ATP

EXAMINATION OF PRODUCT

AMBIENT TESTS

BODY PROOF PRESSURE (1717 PSIG)
CLOSURE DEVICE PROOF PRESSURE (1717 PSIG)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (850 PSIG)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (5, 25, 100, 850 PSIG)
CRACKING AND RESEAT PRESSURE: 3 CYCLES
CRACKING PRESSURE 5 PSID MAX
RESEAT PRESSURE 2 PSID MIN

CYROGENIC TESTS (-300 DEG F)

INTERNAL LEAKAGE (5, 25, 100, 850 PSIG)

CERTIFICATION

FLOW TEST (0.202 LB/SEC GHE)
MAX INLET PRESSURE OF 130 PSIG
PRESSURE DROP (45 PSID MAX)

CHATTER TEST (850 TO 0 PSIG)
RECORD FLOW RATE WHEN CHATTER OCCURS

CRACKING AND RESEAT PRESSURE
CRYO (-300 DEG F): 3 CYCLES EACH
CRACKING PRESSURE 5 PSID MAX
RESEAT PRESSURE 2 PSID MIN

INTERNAL LEAKAGE
AMBIENT (0 TO 850 PSIG)
CRYO (-300 DEG F, 0 TO 850 PSIG)

EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (AMBIENT, 850 PSIG)

LIFE CYCLE TEST

ONE CYCLE CONSISTS OF PRESSURIZING THE INLET TO 130 PSIA, VENTING THE INLET TO AMBIENT, PRESSURIZING THE OUTLET TO 850 PSIG (AMBIENT) OR 130 PSIG (CRYO), AND VENTING THE OUTLET TO AMBIENT.

AMBIENT

42,000 CYCLES, FOLLOWED BY CRACKING, RESEATING, AND INTERNAL LEAKAGE TESTS

CRYO (-300 DEG F)

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18,000 CYCLES, FOLLOWED BY CRYO CRACKING, RESEATING, INTERNAL LEAKAGE TESTS

UPON COMPLETION OF BOTH AMBIENT AND CRYO TESTS PERFORM AMBIENT FLOW, PRESSURE DROP, AND EXTERNAL LEAKAGE TESTS.

VIBRATION (AMBIENT, 2 AXES)
QUALIFIED BY SIMILARITY TO TYPE V CHECK VALVE.
TYPE V VALVES ARE CERTIFIED BY THE FOLLOWING TESTS:

TRANSIENT
5 TO 35 HZ AT +/- 0.25 GS PEAK

RANDOM
13.3 HOURS FOR EACH OF 2 AXES

UPON COMPLETION OF VIBRATION TESTS PERFORM CRACK, RESEAT, AND INTERNAL LEAKAGE TEST.

BURST PRESSURE (3400 PSIG)

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST
ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

(C) INSPECTION:

RECEIVING INSPECTION
ALL RAW MATERIALS ARE VERIFIED FOR MATERIAL AND PROCESS CERTIFICATION.
RECEIVING INSPECTION VERIFIES CERTIFICATION OF SPRING HEAT TREATMENT AND PERFORMS LOAD TEST OF SPRINGS.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL
ALL PARTS AND ASSEMBLIES ARE MAINTAINED TO CLEANLINESS LEVEL OF 100A.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION
DIMENSIONS AND SURFACE FINISHES ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. REQUIRED TORQUES ARE VERIFIED PRIOR TO WELDING. INSPECTION POINTS ARE ESTABLISHED TO VERIFY ASSEMBLY PROCESS. WELDS ARE VISUALLY VERIFIED BY 10X MAGNIFICATION.

CRITICAL PROCESSES
ALL WELDING, ELECTROPOLISHING AND PARTS PASSIVATION ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. DRY FILM LUBRICANT COATED THREADS ARE VERIFIED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENT.

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION
HELIUM LEAKAGE DETECTION IS VERIFIED.

TESTING
ATP IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

HANDLING/PACKAGING
PACKAGING FOR SHIPMENT IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

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(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

GENERAL MPS SYSTEM CONTAMINATION HAS OCCURRED WHICH MAY LODGE ANYWHERE IN THE SYSTEM CAUSING THIS FAILURE MODE (REFERENCE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS).

CONTAMINATION FAILURES HAVE OCCURRED AT ALL PHASES OF MANUFACTURING AND PARTS REPLACEMENT. IN ALL CASES, STRICT ADHERENCE TO CLEANLINESS CONTROL PROCEDURES IS THE PRIMARY METHOD OF CONTAMINATION PREVENTION.

NUMEROUS LARGE PARTICLES OF BLACK RUBBER MATERIAL WERE FOUND DURING A POST FLIGHT EXAMINATION OF THE LH2 17 INCH DISCONNECT OF OV099 (FLIGHT 7, REFERENCE CAR AC9800). THE LO2 AND LH2 SYSTEMS OF ALL VEHICLES WERE EXAMINED. NO RUBBER WAS FOUND IN ANY OTHER VEHICLES. AFTER EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION THE ORIGIN WAS NOT DETERMINED.

METAL SHAVINGS HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED IN LINES AND COMPONENTS, WHICH WAS MOST LIKELY GENERATED WHEN THEY WERE CUT OUT AND/OR REPLACED (REFERENCE CARS AC9868, A9654, AC2210, AB1706; DR AD2226). METHODS HAVE BEEN REVISED TO MINIMIZE PARTICLE GENERATION WHEN INSTALLING/REPLACING COMPONENTS, LINES, AND FITTINGS REQUIRING WELDED OR BRAZED JOINTS (PRODUCT QUALITY IMPROVEMENT COUNCIL). PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN CAUTIONED. ROCKWELL PROBLEM ACTION CENTER WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR BRAZING/WELDING REWORK CONTAMINATION. PROCEDURES ARE BEING REVISED TO IMPROVE CLEANLINESS MAINTENANCE DURING COMPONENT BUILD UP AND REWORK (REFERENCE MCR 12512). SUPPLIER DOCUMENTS/PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND CLEANLINESS MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN IMPROVED.

A PIECE OF A BRAZING PREFORM LODGED IN A 2-WAY SOLENOID VALVE ON OV- 099 AT PALMDALE CAUSING A LEAKAGE FAILURE (REFERENCE CARS AC2111, AB2538). STEEL AND ALUMINUM PARTICLES CAUSED EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE ON THE 850 PSIG HELIUM RELIEF VALVE (REF CAR AC2229). FOR BOTH FAILURES CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TO ADD SPECIAL PURGE PORTS TO THE MPS HELIUM PANEL ASSEMBLIES TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF FINAL CLOSEOUT BRAZES.

SEVERAL FOREIGN MATERIALS WERE INTRODUCED INTO THE MPS SYSTEM DURING MANUFACTURE AND PARTS REPLACEMENT. EXAMPLES ARE: GLASS CLOTH IN LINE TO PREVENT TRAVEL OF CHIPS DOWN LINE; POLYSTYRENE OBJECT TO HOLD VALVE

POPPET OPEN WHILE PURGING; COTTON SWAB MATERIAL AND GLASS BEADS FROM CLEANING OPERATION; MISCELLANEOUS PLASTIC; FOAM; AND TAPE (REFERENCE CARS AB4751, AC2217, AC6768, AC9868, MPS3A0005, AC7912, AB0530). MATERIALS WERE REMOVED AND PERSONNEL WERE CAUTIONED. A HIGH FLOW DELTA P TEST AT PALMDALE WAS ADDED TO VERIFY THAT LINES WERE NOT PLUGGED. GRIT BLASTING (GLASS BEADS AND SAND USED TO CLEAN A LINE) IS NO LONGER PERFORMED. PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN REVISED TO IMPROVE CLEANLINESS MAINTENANCE DURING COMPONENT BUILD UP AND REWORK (REFERENCE MCR 12512). SUPPLIER DOCUMENTS/PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND CLEANLINESS MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN IMPROVED.

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ONE PIECE OF WIRE WAS FOUND IN THE INTERNAL RELIEF VALVE OF THE LO2 PREVALVE ON OV103 (REFERENCE CAR AC9101). THE SOURCE OF THE CONTAMINATION WAS NEVER FOUND, BUT IT WAS BELIEVED TO BE FROM THE ET. OTHER CONTAMINATION HAS BEEN FOUND ON THE FEEDLINE SCREENS, SUCH AS AN UNIDENTIFIED ROUND OBJECT AND VARIOUS METALLIC PARTICLES (REFERENCE CARS AB0529 AND AB0530). SOURCE OF CONTAMINATION WAS UNDETERMINED. BORESCOPE EXAMINATIONS ARE CONDUCTED ON ALL FEEDLINE SCREENS EVERY FIFTH FLIGHT TO VERIFY CLEANLINESS. CONTAMINATION WAS REMOVED WHEN POSSIBLE.

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURE, FLIGHT FAILURE, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATABASE.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

NO CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.

PNEUMATIC TANK, REGULATOR, AND ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE ARE ON S/M ALERT FDA SYSTEM AND THE BFS SYSTEM SUMMARY DISPLAY. THIS ALLOWS THE FLIGHT CREW TO RESPOND TO A PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM LEAK INDEPENDENT OF GROUND CONTROL.

- APPROVALS -

S&R ENGINEERING	: W.P. MUSTY	:/S/ W. P. MUSTY
S&R ENGINEERING ITM	: P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN	:/S/ P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN
DESIGN ENGINEERING	: MIKE FISCHER	:/S/ MIKE FISCHER
MPS SUBSYSTEM MGR.	: TIM REITH	:/S/ TIM REITH
MOD	: BILL LANE	:/S/ BILL LANE
USA SAM	: MIKE SNYDER	:/S/ MIKE SNYDER
USA ORBITER ELEMENT	: SUZANNE LITTLE	:/S/ SUZANNE LITTLE
NASA SR&QA	: ERICH BASS	:/S/ ERICH BASS