

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE

NUMBER: 03-1-0271 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

REVISION: 2 08/03/00

PART DATA

	PART NAME	PART NUMBER
	VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMBER
LRU	: LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID	MC284-0404-0032, -0042
	UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE - NSLD	13111-5, -6

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

VALVE, SOLENOID, NORMALLY CLOSED 3 WAY 1/4 INCH. LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE CONTROL (CLOSING).

VALVE WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AND MANUFACTURED BY WRIGHT COMPONENTS (NOW PERKIN ELMER) BUT IS NOW MANUFACTURED BY UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE-NSLD AS AN ALTERNATE PRODUCTION AGENCY.

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: LV33

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 1

FUNCTION:

CONTROLS PNEUMATIC PRESSURE TO CLOSE THE OUTBOARD LH2 FILL VALVE. THE VALVE MUST DEACTUATE TO ALLOW FILL VALVE ACTUATOR TO VENT WHEN FILL VALVE IS OPENED. OPENING SOLENOID (LV32) (REFERENCE FMEA/CIL 03-1-0270) MUST DEACTUATE TO ALLOW VALVE TO CLOSE.

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FAILURE MODE:

PREMATURE ACTUATION (F/D VALVE FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, REFERENCE FMEA/CIL 03-1-0302-06) CAUSING ACTUATOR CLOSING SIDE TO PRESSURIZE DURING PROPELLANT LOADING, DETANKING, AND DUMP.

MISSION PHASE: PL PRE-LAUNCH
LO LIFT-OFF

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY: 102 COLUMBIA
103 DISCOVERY
104 ATLANTIS
105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SEAT/SEAL DAMAGE

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN A) PASS
B) FAIL
C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

FAILS B SCREEN BECAUSE SOLENOID VALVES DO NOT HAVE POSITION INDICATORS. CLOSE SOLENOID VALVE IS OPERATIONALLY REDUNDANT TO THE OPEN SOLENOID VALVE.

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

FAILURE OF THE CLOSING SOLENOID RESULTS IN APPLICATION OF ACTUATOR CLOSING PRESSURE. VALVE IS BISTABLE AND WILL REMAIN IN THE LAST COMMANDED POSITION

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WITH BOTH OPENING AND CLOSING PRESSURE APPLIED. RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANCY ONLY. OPENING PRESSURE IS NOMINALLY APPLIED DURING LOADING.

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

SAME AS A.

(C) MISSION:

NO EFFECT. VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

SAME AS C.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

CASE 1:

1R/2 2 SUCCESS PATHS. TIME FRAME - PROPELLANT LOADING AND DETANKING

- 1) PREMATURE ACTUATION OF OUTBOARD F/D VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV33).
- 2) PREMATURE DEACTUATION OF OUTBOARD F/D VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV32).

CAUSES TERMINATION OF PROPELLANT LOADING OR DETANKING WHICH MAY CAUSE A PRESSURE SPIKE AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF ORBITER FILL LINE, FEED LINE, AND/OR GSE INTERFACE/FACILITY LINES. POSSIBLE AFT COMPARTMENT OVERPRESSURIZATION AND FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. POSSIBLE LOSS OF ADJACENT CRITICAL FUNCTIONS DUE TO CRYO EXPOSURE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

CASE 2:

1R/3 4 SUCCESS PATHS. TIME FRAME - LH2 DUMP.

- 1) PREMATURE ACTUATION OF OUTBOARD F/D VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV33).
- 2) PREMATURE DEACTUATION OF OUTBOARD F/D VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV32).
- 3) EITHER RTLS DUMP VALVE (PV17, 18) FAILS TO OPEN. RTLS DUMP VALVES ARE OPENED FOLLOWING MECO FOR 110 SECONDS, BUT CAN BE OPENED BY THE CREW IF MANIFOLD PRESSURE APPROACHES RELIEF PRESSURES. EFFECTIVE FOR OI-29 AND SUBS THE RTLS DUMP VALVES WILL BE USED FOR LH2 VACUUM INERTING.
- 4) MANIFOLD RELIEF SYSTEM FAILS TO RELIEVE.

LH2 REMAINING IN MANIFOLD CANNOT BE RELIEVED. RESULTS IN OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF THE FEEDLINE MANIFOLD. RTLS DUMP VALVES ARE OPENED FOLLOWING MECO, BUT NOT LONG ENOUGH TO DUMP THE MAJORITY OF THE REMAINING LH2. AFT COMPARTMENT OVERPRESSURIZATION AND FIRE/EXPLOSIVE HAZARD. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CRITICAL ADJACENT COMPONENTS DUE TO CRYO EXPOSURE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

CASE 3:

1R/3,4 SUCCESS PATHS. TIME FRAME-DETANK.

- 1) PREMATURE ACTUATION OF OUTBOARD F/D VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV33).
- 2) PREMATURE DEACTUATION OF OUTBOARD F/D VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV32).
- 3) ET LH2 RELIEF VALVE FAILS TO RELIEVE.

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- 4) HIGH POINT BLEED VALVE (PV22) FAILS TO OPEN/REMAIN OPEN.

LH2 REMAINING IN MANIFOLD CANNOT BE RELIEVED. RESULTS IN OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF THE FEEDLINE MANIFOLD. AFT COMPARTMENT OVERPRESSURIZATION AND FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CRITICAL ADJACENT COMPONENTS DUE TO CRYO EXPOSURE. RTLS DUMP VALVES CAN BE OPENED BY GROUND ACTION, BUT THIS WOULD DUMP LH2 ONTO THE PAD SURFACE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:

VALVE IS DESIGNED FOR A PRESSURE FACTOR OF SAFETY OF 2.0 PROOF, 4.0 BURST. THE CLOSURE DEVICE IS A 430 CRES BALL ACTING UPON EITHER OF TWO VESPEL SEATS. THE VALVE FEATURES A BALANCED LOAD ON THE BALL BY APPLYING INLET PRESSURE (750 PSIG NOMINAL) DIRECTLY TO THE BALL AT THE INLET SEAT AND INDIRECTLY (VIA A BELLOWS) THROUGH THE VENT SEAT. THE BELLOWS IS ASSISTED BY A SPRING, THE FORCE OF WHICH INSURES THE BALL IS HELD SECURELY AGAINST THE INLET SEAT WHEN THE SOLENOID IS DEENERGIZED. UPON BEING ENERGIZED THE SOLENOID DEVELOPS THE FORCE TO OVERCOME THE SPRING LOAD AND SEATS THE BALL ONTO THE VENT SEAT TO ALLOW HELIUM FLOW. TOTAL POPPET MOVEMENT (STROKE) IS LESS THAN 0.040 INCH.

PREMATURE ACTUATION, FROM THE MECHANICAL VIEW, MEANS APPLICATION OF A DIFFERENTIAL FORCE TO THE VALVE BALL TO CAUSE IT TO MOVE FROM THE INLET SEAT TO THE VENT SEAT. ON THE SOLENOID SIDE OF THE BALL, NO MECHANICAL FAILURES WOULD CAUSE PREMATURE ACTUATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE CLOSING FORCE OF THE BELLOWS/SPRING WERE REMOVED, INLET PRESSURE AND FLOW ACTING ON THE BALL WOULD DRIVE IT TO THE VENT SEAT, CAUSING PREMATURE ACTUATION.

THE FORCE TO HOLD THE BALL TO THE INLET SEAT, WHEN THE SOLENOID IS DEENERGIZED, IS PROVIDED BY THE BELLOWS ASSEMBLY AND SPRING THROUGH THE VALVE POPPET. IF THE BELLOWS FAILS, OR LEAKS TO THE POINT OF REDUCING THE BELLOWS INTERNAL PRESSURE TO LESS THAN THE VALVE INLET PRESSURE, THE LOAD BALANCING FEATURE IS ELIMINATED AND THE BALL WOULD MOVE TO THE VENT SEAT. THE BELLOWS IS MADE OF NICKEL-COBALT-COPPER AND IS PROOF PRESSURE TESTED AT 1550 PSIG PRIOR TO ASSEMBLY INTO THE VALVE. IF THE SPRING BREAKS, THE PRESSURIZED BELLOWS WOULD EXERT SUFFICIENT FORCE TO RETURN THE BALL TO THE INLET SEAT; HOWEVER, SEAT LEAKAGE MAY RESULT. THE SPRING IS MADE FROM 17-7PH CRES (ELGILOY) WIRE AND IS HEAT TREATED FOLLOWING FORMING. IT HAS A SPRING RATE OF 13.5 POUNDS/INCH AND EXERTS A FORCE OF 7.54 POUNDS IN ITS INSTALLED CONDITION.

PREMATURE ACTUATION DUE TO SEAT/SEAL DAMAGE IS VERY UNLIKELY. THIS PRESUMES FLOW PAST THE SEATED BALL AT A RATE SUFFICIENT TO PRESSURIZE THE ACTUATION PORT TO A PRESSURE OF 400 PSIA MINIMUM, WHILE THE VENT PORT IS OPEN. THE BALL IS OF 430 CRES AND THE SEAT IS OF VESPEL.

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THE -0022 CONFIGURATION WAS ADDED DUE TO A BELLOWS ASSEMBLY DESIGN CHANGE (P/N 24340 TO P/N 24340-1) TO ELIMINATE THE "SQUIRMED" CONDITION WHICH SOME OF THE ORIGINAL BELLOWS ASSEMBLIES EXPERIENCED DURING PROOF PRESSURE TESTING AT ATP. THE DESIGN CHANGE WAS MADE TO STRENGTHEN THE BELLOWS. BECAUSE THE DAMAGE OCCURRED DURING ATP, VALVES ALREADY IN THE FLEET (-0012 CONFIGURATION) WERE X-RAY TESTED AND ONLY VALVES WHICH HAD SQUIRMED BELLOWS WERE UPGRADED TO THE -0022 CONFIGURATION.

THE -0032 AND -0042 CONFIGURATION SOLENOID VALVES ARE IDENTICAL TO THE -0012 AND -0022 CONFIGURATION SOLENOID VALVES (RESPECTIVELY) WITH THE EXCEPTIONS OF ADDING THE FILTER (10 MICRON NOMINAL, 25 MICRON ABSOLUTE) IN THE VENT PORT OF THE SOLENOID VALVE AND REDESIGN OF THE VENT PORT CHECK VALVE. THIS FILTER WAS ADDED TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION AND METALLIC PARTICLES GENERATED DURING THE REMOVAL OF THE VENT PORT CHECK VALVE DURING OMRSD LEAKAGE MEASUREMENTS FROM ENTERING THE SOLENOID VALVE.

THE VENT PORT CHECK VALVE (P/N 11107-5) WAS REDESIGNED (P/N 11107-7) TO PREVENT THE POPPET FROM BEING EJECTED DUE TO SHEARING OF THE RETAINING NUT THREAD. A PIN WAS ADDED TO THE CHECK VALVE HOUSING, WHICH RETAINS THE POPPET WITHIN THE CHECK VALVE HOUSING. A NEW ALUMINUM NUT, WHICH PROVIDES A MINIMUM ENGAGEMENT OF THREE THREADS, WAS UTILIZED TO INCREASE RELIABILITY.

(B) TEST:
ATP

AMBIENT TEMPERATURE TESTS:
PROOF PRESSURE (1560 PSIG); EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (850 PSIG); ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND RESPONSE; INTERNAL LEAKAGE (740 PSIG, ENERGIZED AND DEENERGIZED).

REDUCED TEMPERATURE TESTS (-160 DEG F):
ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND RESPONSE; INTERNAL LEAKAGE

ELECTRICAL BONDING TESTS

SOLENOID SUBASSEMBLY TESTS:
ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS; ENCLOSURE LEAKAGE (ONE ATMOSPHERE).

CERTIFICATION

TWO SPECIMENS -

PORT AND FITTING TORQUE

SALT FOG EXPOSURE FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS

AMBIENT VIBRATION TESTS: TOTAL 13.1 HOURS BOTH AXES FOR TWO VIBRATION LEVELS PLUS TRANSIENT VIBRATION SWEEP - RUN WITH ONE SPECIMEN ENERGIZED AND ONE DEENERGIZED - FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND LEAKAGE CHECKS.

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HANDLING SHOCK TEST

ENERGIZED AND DEENERGIZED FLOW TESTS

FIFTY HOUR CONTINUOUS CURRENT TEST AT 130 DEG F

AMBIENT TEMPERATURE ENDURANCE (4500 CYCLES FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS); 130 DEG F ENDURANCE (500 CYCLES FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS); OPERATION CYCLES (REPEATED 20 TIMES); REPEAT OF AMBIENT TEMPERATURE ENDURANCE ; -160 DEG F ENDURANCE (500 CYCLES FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS).

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION

BURST PRESSURE (3400 PSIG)

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

(C) INSPECTION:

RECEIVING INSPECTION

RAW MATERIALS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION FOR MATERIAL AND PROCESSES CERTIFICATION. BODY HOUSING BAR STOCK IS ULTRASONICALLY INSPECTED.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

CLEANLINESS LEVEL VERIFIED TO 100A. CORROSION PROTECTION IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

ALL PARTS ARE PROTECTED FROM DAMAGE AND CONTAMINATION. MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION OF ALL DETAIL PARTS IS MADE PRIOR TO ASSEMBLY. ALL SURFACES REQUIRING CORROSION PROTECTION ARE VERIFIED. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS ARE INCLUDED IN THE ASSEMBLY PROCEDURE. MECHANICAL SURFACE FINISH AT 125 RMS IS INSPECTED AND VERIFIED WITH A PROFILOMETER. SURFACE FINISHES SMOOTHER THAN 125 RMS ARE INSPECTED USING A COMPARATOR AT 10X MAGNIFICATION. ALL CRITICAL DIMENSIONS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CRITICAL PROCESS

HEAT TREATMENT AND PARTS PASSIVATION VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. POTTING OF SOLDER CUPS, ELECTRICAL WIRE STRIPPING, AND SOLDERING OF CONNECTORS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. DRY FILM LUBRICATION APPLIED TO THE PLUNGER IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION

WELDS VISUALLY EXAMINED & VERIFIED BY X-RAY, DYE PENETRANT, AND EDDY CURRENT. THE SOLENOID ASSEMBLY IS SUBJECTED TO LEAKAGE VERIFICATION USING RADIOACTIVE TRACER TECHNIQUES. THE VALVE BODY, PRIOR TO FINAL MACHINING, IS SUBJECTED TO ETCH AND DYE PENETRANT INSPECTION. BELLOWS ASSEMBLY IS PROOF PRESSURE TESTED AND LEAK CHECKED.

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TESTING
ATP VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

HANDLING/PACKAGING
PACKAGING FOR SHIPMENT VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

LEAKAGE RESULTING FROM SEAL/SEAT DAMAGE (OR CONTAMINATION) HAS OCCURRED BUT HAS NOT BEEN OF SUFFICIENT MAGNITUDE TO CAUSE PREMATURE ACTUATION (REFERENCE FMEA/CIL 0291-1, SOLENOID EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH VENT PORT).

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURE, FLIGHT FAILURE, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATABASE.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

FLIGHT: FOR POST MECO DUMP OPERATIONS, THE CREW WILL OPEN THE LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES (PV17,18) WHEN THE LH2 MANIFOLD PRESSURE EXCEEDS CAUTION AND WARNING LIMITS.

GROUND: GROUND OPERATIONS SAFING PROCEDURES CONTAIN SAFING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR MAJOR LEAKS IN THE HYDROGEN SYSTEM.

- APPROVALS -

S&R ENGINEERING	: W.P. MUSTY	:/S/ W. P. MUSTY
S&R ENGINEERING ITM	: P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN	:/S/ P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN_
DESIGN ENGINEERING	: DAVE NEARY	:/S/ DAVE NEARY
MPS SUBSYSTEM MGR.	: TIM REITH	:/S/ TIM REITH
MOD	: BILL LANE	:/S/ BILL LANE
USA SAM	: MIKE SNYDER	:/S/ MIKE SNYDER
USA ORBITER ELEMENT	: SUZANNE LITTLE	:/S/ SUZANNE LITTLE
NASA SR&QA	: ERICH BASS	:/S/ ERICH BASS