

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE

NUMBER: 03-1-0301 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

REVISION: 4 08/04/00

PART DATA

	PART NAME	PART NUMBER
	VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMBER
LRU	: LH2 8" INBOARD FILL/DRAIN VALVE UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE - NSLD	MC284-0397-0031 74328000-159

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

FILL VALVE, INBOARD LH2, 8 INCH, PNEUMATICALLY OPERATED, INCLUDES A RELIEF VALVE.

VALVE WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AND MANUFACTURED BY FAIRCHILD CONTROLS BUT IS NOW MANUFACTURED BY UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE-NSLD AS AN ALTERNATE PRODUCTION AGENCY.

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: PV12

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 1

FUNCTION:

PROVIDES A MEANS OF LOADING AND DRAINING THE ET THROUGH THE PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM. THE VALVE, ALONG WITH LH2 TOPPING VALVE (PV13) AND THE OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV11), PROVIDES A REDUNDANT MEANS OF CONTAINING PROPELLANT IN THE FEED SYSTEM. THE VALVE IS MOUNTED ON THE FEED LINE MANIFOLD TO ISOLATE THE FILL LINE FROM THE FEED SYSTEM. IT IS REQUIRED TO BE CLOSED FOR PROPELLANT TOPPING/REPLENISHMENT OPERATIONS. BOTH THE INBOARD AND OUTBOARD VALVES REMAIN CLOSED DURING ENGINE OPERATION. POST MECO, THE INBOARD & OUTBOARD FILL VALVES ARE SOFTWARE COMMANDED OPEN FOR DUMP OF RESIDUAL LH2. FOR A NOMINAL MISSION THE INBOARD VALVE REMAINS OPEN AFTER INERTING THROUGH REENTRY AND LANDING. FOR AN RTLS/TAL THE INBOARD VALVE IS COMMANDED CLOSED AFTER 20 SECONDS (OI-23). VALVE INCORPORATES AN ANTI-SLAM MECHANISM TO PREVENT VALVE SLAMMING DAMAGE DURING IMPROPER VALVE OPEN/CLOSE OPERATIONS. THE VALVE ALSO INCORPORATES A RELIEF VALVE, RELIEVING FROM THE FILL LINE INTO THE MANIFOLD; AND A PORT FOR INSTALLATION OF LH2 RELIEF SHUTOFF ISOLATION VALVE (PV8).

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEA -- CIL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: 03-1-0301-10

REVISION#: 2 08/04/00

SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

LRU: LH2 INBOARD 8" FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV12)

CRITICALITY OF THIS

ITEM NAME: LH2 INBOARD 8" FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV12)

FAILURE MODE: 1/1

FAILURE MODE:

RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF VALVE BODY DURING LOADING, ASCENT, AND DUMP

MISSION PHASE:

PL PRE-LAUNCH
LO LIFT-OFF

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102 COLUMBIA
103 DISCOVERY
104 ATLANTIS
105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

MATERIAL DEFECT, FATIGUE, DAMAGED/DEFECTIVE VALVE JOINT SEALS

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

A) N/A
B) N/A
C) N/A

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

LH2 LEAKAGE INTO THE AFT COMPARTMENT. GN2 PURGE OF THE AFT COMPARTMENT MAY LOWER THE GH2 CONCENTRATION, BUT THE FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD IS STILL PRESENT. LEAKAGE DETECTABLE ON GROUND USING HAZARDOUS GAS DETECTION SYSTEM (HGDS). POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE AFT COMPARTMENT AND FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. POSSIBLE LOSS OF ADJACENT CRITICAL FUNCTIONS DUE TO CRYO EXPOSURE.

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0301-10**

ALSO RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY DURING MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION CAUSING LOSS OF AFT COMPARTMENT PURGE (RTL5 AND TAL ABORT CRITICAL).

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):
SAME AS A.

(C) MISSION:
ON GROUND, VIOLATION OF HGDS LCC WILL RESULT IN LAUNCH SCRUB.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:
NONE.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:
FACTORS OF SAFETY ARE: PROOF = 1.3; BURST = 1.5. VALVE IS DESIGNED FOR 5000 LIFE CYCLES AND WAS TESTED THROUGH 5625 CYCLES (OVER 100 MISSIONS) UNDER BOTH CRYOGENIC AND AMBIENT TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS AND AT BOTH NORMAL AND ACCELERATED (SLAM) CYCLE TIMES. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE VALVE WAS BURST PRESSURE TESTED TO 165 PSIG (MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE IS 105 PSIG) WITHOUT RUPTURE OR DEFORMATION.

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS, PERFORMED BY THE VALVE SUPPLIER, INDICATES POSITIVE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR ALL CONDITIONS OF VALVE OPERATION, AND FRACTURE ANALYSES SHOW THAT ALL CRITICAL PARTS ARE SATISFACTORY FOR FOUR TIMES THE ORBITER LIFE OF 100 MISSIONS.

THERE ARE FIVE POTENTIAL LEAK PATHS. THERE ARE FOUR STATIC JOINTS AT INTERFACES BETWEEN THE RELIEF VALVE ASSEMBLY AND THE VALVE HOUSING, THE VALVE HOUSING AND THE MECHANISM HOUSING, THE MECHANISM HOUSING AND THE ACTUATOR, AND THE LOWER SHAFT SUPPORT CAP AND THE VALVE HOUSING. THE STATIC JOINTS ARE SEALED USING TEFLON JACKETED METALLIC RACO TYPE SEALS. THE METALLIC "V" SPRING IS OF 301 CRES.

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0301-10**

THERE ARE REDUNDANT DYNAMIC SHAFT SEALS ON THE VALVE TO ACTUATOR SHAFT. SHAFT SEAL LEAKAGE WILL VENT TO THE EXTERIOR FROM THE VALVE SWITCH CAVITY THROUGH THE ACTUATOR SWITCH CAVITY VENT PORT CHECK VALVE. THE SHAFT SEALS ARE A SPRING LOADED FLANGED TYPE DESIGN. THE SEAL MATERIAL IS A GLASS FILLED TEFLON AND THE SPRING IS OF 301 CRES.

(B) TEST:

ATP

ANTI-SLAM VALVES (BEFORE ASSEMBLY INTO THE ACTUATOR) - EXAMINATION OF PRODUCT; AMBIENT PROOF (1275 PSIG); AMBIENT AND CRYO FLOW; AMBIENT AND CRYO CRACKING PRESSURE; POST TEST EXAMINATION.

ACTUATOR (BEFORE ASSEMBLY ONTO THE FILL AND DRAIN VALVE) - EXAMINATION OF PRODUCT; POSITION INDICATION; AMBIENT PROOF (1275); ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS; AMBIENT EXTERNAL LEAKAGE.

RELIEF VALVE ASSEMBLY (BEFORE INSTALLATION INTO THE FILL AND DRAIN VALVE) - EXAMINATION OF THE PRODUCT; AMBIENT PROOF (340 PSIG); AMBIENT AND CRYO CRACK/RESEAT (15-50 PSID) AND INTERNAL LEAKAGE; POST TEST EXAMINATION.

FILL AND DRAIN VALVE ASSEMBLY -

EXAMINATION OF PRODUCT

ELECTRICAL BONDING

AMBIENT AND CRYO PROOF WITH VALVE OPEN AND CLOSED - 143 PSIG

AMBIENT AND CRYO EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF VALVE BODY (110 PSIG)

CRYO EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF ACTUATOR (740 PSIG)

AMBIENT AND CRYO RESPONSE TIME (NORMAL AT 400 AND 740 PSIG ACTUATOR PRESSURE, AND SLAM AT 740 PSIG)

AMBIENT AND CRYO ACTUATOR LEAKAGE FROM PORT TO PORT

AMBIENT AND CRYO VALVE SHAFT SEAL (PRIMARY AND SECONDARY) LEAKAGE WITH 110 PSID ACROSS THE SEAL

AMBIENT AND CRYO VALVE INTERNAL LEAKAGE (INLET-TO-OUTLET WITH 15 PSID, OUTLET-TO-INLET WITH 110 PSID)

AMBIENT AND CRYO RELIEF VALVE CRACK AND RESEAT (15 TO 50 PSID)

POST TEST EXAMINATION

CERTIFICATION

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0301-10**

STRUCTURAL LOAD AT CRYO TEMPS (-400 DEG F) (AXIAL, SHEAR, TORSION, BENDING) WITH THE VALVE IN TENSION, PERFORM VALVE RESPONSE TIME (NOMINAL AND SLAM) ACTUATOR INTERNAL LEAKAGE, PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SHAFT SEAL LEAKAGE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE (OUTLET-TO-INLET AND INLET-TO-OUTLET), CRACK AND RESEAT, AND, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (BODY AND ACTUATOR) TESTS. REPEAT WITH THE VALVE IN COMPRESSION.

VALVE LIFE CYCLING:

2400 AMBIENT TEMPERATURE CYCLES WITH 5 PSIG INTERNAL PRESSURE (525 NORMAL CYCLES AND 1875 SLAM CYCLES)

100 AMBIENT CYCLES (50 NORMAL AND 50 SLAM CYCLES) WITH VALVE INLET VENTED TO ATMOSPHERE AND VALVE OUTLET CONNECTED TO A 4 CUBIC FOOT VOLUME PRESSURIZED TO 110 PSIG WITH GN2.

2400 CRYO TEMPERATURE (-400 DEG F) CYCLES WITH 50 - 60 PSIG INTERNAL PRESSURE (1775 NORMAL CYCLES AND 625 SLAM CYCLES)

100 NORMAL CRYO CYCLES WITH THE VALVE INLET VENTED TO ATMOSPHERE AND THE OUTLET PRESSURIZED TO 110 PSIG.

FOR THE FOREGOING LIFE TEST, PRIOR TO AND EVERY 100 CYCLES THEREAFTER, ACTUATOR INTERNAL LEAKAGE, PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SHAFT SEAL LEAKAGE, AND VALVE INTERNAL LEAKAGE (OUTLET-TO-INLET) TESTS WERE PERFORMED.

RELIEF VALVE LIFE CYCLING:

2500 CYCLES AT CRYO (-400 DEG F) TEMP, 2500 CYCLES AT AMBIENT.

FOLLOWING EACH 500 CYCLES PERFORM FILL AND DRAIN VALVE INTERNAL LEAKAGE (OUTLET-TO-INLET AND INLET-TO-OUTLET), AND CRACK/RESEAT TESTS. POST CYCLE EXAMINATION.

VIBRATION:

PRE-VIBRATION TESTS - VALVE RESPONSE TIME (NORMAL AND SLAM), ACTUATOR INTERNAL LEAKAGE, PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SHAFT SEAL LEAKAGE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE (OUTLET-TO-INLET AND INLET-TO-OUTLET), CRACK AND RESEAT, AND EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (BODY AND ACTUATOR).

TRANSIENT SINUSOIDAL VIBRATION -
(AT 110 PSIG AND -250 DEG F) IN EACH AXIS

RANDOM VIBRATION TESTS -

13.3 HRS IN EACH OF THREE AXES WITH VALVE CLOSED AND AT -250 DEG F MAXIMUM. HALF OF THE TIME THE VALVE INTERNAL PRESSURE IS 110 PSIG; THE OTHER HALF AT 5 PSIG. ONCE EACH HOUR, CLOSING PRESSURE IS REMOVED FROM THE ACTUATOR. ALSO BOTH CLOSING AND OPENING PRESSURES ARE APPLIED CONCURRENTLY TO THE ACTUATOR. IN BOTH CASES THE VALVE REMAINS CLOSED.

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0301-10**

DESIGN SHOCK: 18 SHOCKS OF 15G EACH - THREE IN EACH DIRECTION ALONG EACH OF THREE AXES, ALL WITH VALVE OPEN AND ACTUATOR VENTED.

DESIGN SHOCK POST TEST:

AMBIENT - VALVE RESPONSE, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LEAKAGES. CRYO - VALVE RESPONSE, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LEAKAGES. ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS; POSITION INDICATION.

BURST: 165 PSIG VALVE OPEN 165 PSIG ON OUTLET OF CLOSED VALVE, 1700 PSIG ACTUATOR

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

(C) INSPECTION:

RECEIVING INSPECTION

RAW MATERIALS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION FOR MATERIAL AND PROCESS CERTIFICATION. BODY HOUSING FORGING IS ULTRASONICALLY AND PENETRANT INSPECTED.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

PARTS ARE VERIFIED CLEAN TO LEVEL 400. THE ACTUATOR IS CLEANED TO 400A.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

ALL PARTS ARE PROTECTED FROM DAMAGE AND CONTAMINATION. LOG OF CLEAN ROOM AND TOOL CALIBRATION ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. ALL SURFACES REQUIRING CORROSION PROTECTION ARE VERIFIED. VISUAL (3X TO 7X) AND DIMENSIONAL INSPECTION OF VALVE BODY AND COMPONENTS ARE VERIFIED DURING ASSEMBLY. THREADED FASTENER TORQUES ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS ARE INCLUDED IN THE ASSEMBLY PROCEDURE.

CRITICAL PROCESSES

HEAT TREATMENT AND DRY FILM LUBE APPLICATION ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NON DESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION

VALVE BODY, PRIOR TO FINAL MACHINING, IS SUBJECTED TO DYE PENETRANT INSPECTION. REQUIREMENTS FOR DETAIL PARTS PENETRANT INSPECTION ARE BASED UPON CONFIGURATION, MATERIAL, AND MANUFACTURING PROCESSES.

TESTING

ACCEPTANCE TEST VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

HANDLING/PACKAGING

PACKAGING FOR SHIPMENT VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0301-10**

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

VALVE BODY LEAKAGE DUE TO SHAFT SEAL LEAKAGES HAVE OCCURRED AT THE SUPPLIER. THESE WERE CORRECTED BY RUNNING IN THE SHAFT SEALS DURING INSTALLATION (CAR A7398, A7313, AB9186, A5210, A7880, AB3295).

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURE, FLIGHT FAILURE, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATABASE.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

FLIGHT: NO CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.

GROUND: GROUND OPERATIONS SAFING PROCEDURES CONTAIN SAFING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR MAJOR LEAKS IN THE HYDROGEN SYSTEM.

- APPROVALS -

S&R ENGINEERING	: W.P. MUSTY	: /S/ W. P. MUSTY
S&R ENGINEERING ITM	: P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN	: /S/ P. A. STENGER
DESIGN ENGINEERING	: STUART KOBATA	: /S/ STUART KOBATA
MPS SUBSYSTEM MGR.	: TIM REITH	: /S/ TIM REITH
MOD	: WILLIAM LANE	: /S/ WILLIAM LANE
USA SAM	: MICHAEL SNYDER	: /S/ MICHAEL SNYDER
USA ORBITER ELEMENT	: SUZANNE LITTLE	: /S/ SUZANNE LITTLE
NASA SR&QA	: ERICH BASS	: /S/ ERICH BASS