

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE

NUMBER: 03-1-0454 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

REVISION: 1 08/08/00

PART DATA

	PART NAME	PART NUMBER
	VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMBER
LRU	:17" DISC ASSY, ORB, LH2/LO2	MC284-0389-1461 (LH2) MC284-0389-1561 (LO2)
	BOEING	
SRU	:17" DISC LATCH ASSY, LH2/LO2	5863431-101 (LH2) 5863431-102 (LO2)
	BOEING	
LRU	:17" DISCONNECT LATCH ACTUATOR, LH2/LO2	5863450-102 (LH2) 5863450-103 (LO2)
	BOEING	

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

VALVE LATCH ASSEMBLY, LH2/LO2 FEED DISCONNECT (PD1,PD2)
ORBITER HALF ONLY.

VALVE WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AND MANUFACTURED BY PARKER-HANNIFIN. BOEING IS A CERTIFIED ALTERNATE PRODUCTION AGENCY.

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: PD1
PD2

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 2
ONE EACH LO2, LH2

FUNCTION:

A PNEUMATICALLY ACTUATED LATCH MECHANISM IS PROVIDED TO PREVENT THE VALVE FLAPPERS FROM CLOSING DURING FLOW CONDITIONS. THE LATCH IS BISTABLE AND IS CONTROLLED BY A SEPARATE PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY WITH REDUNDANT LOCK AND UNLOCK (TWO EACH) POSITION SWITCHES. LATCH IS PLACED IN UNLOCKED POSITION FOR ALL FLAPPER OPEN OR CLOSE OPERATIONS. LATCH MECHANISM INCORPORATES A TOGGLE PIVOT WHICH ALLOWS FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING BACKUP MECHANICAL SEPARATION IF LATCH IS IN LOCKED POSITION. SEE DISCONNECT FMEA/CIL 0407/0408 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

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LRU: 17" DISC ASSY, ORB LH2, LO2

ITEM NAME: 17" DISC LATCH ASSY LH2, LO2

CRITICALITY OF THIS

FAILURE MODE: 1R2

FAILURE MODE:

LATCH TOGGLE FAILS TO PIVOT DURING BACKUP UMBILICAL MECHANICAL SEPARATION

MISSION PHASE: LO LIFT-OFF

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:	102	COLUMBIA
	103	DISCOVERY
	104	ATLANTIS
	105	ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

BINDING, CONTAMINATION

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

- A) PASS
- B) N/A
- C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

THIS FUNCTION IS STANDBY REDUNDANT SINCE IT IS NOT REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNTIL LATCH FAILS TO UNLOCK.

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

NO EFFECT. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY ONLY.

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

SAME AS A.

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(C) MISSION:
SAME AS A.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):
SAME AS A.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:
1R/2 2 SUCCESS PATHS. TIME FRAME - ET SEPARATION
1) LATCH TOGGLE FAILS TO ROTATE/PIVOT
2) LATCH FAILS TO UNLOCK.

POSSIBLE FAILURE TO CLOSE FLAPPERS DURING BACKUP MODE UMBILICAL SEPARATION DUE TO MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE BETWEEN ORBITER FLAPPER FORK AND ET ROLLER ARM ASSEMBLY. FAILURE TO SEPARATE ET FROM ORBITER. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:
THE LATCH TOGGLE IS A BACKUP DEVICE WHICH IS NOT REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNTIL THE LATCH ARM AND TOGGLE ASSEMBLY FAILS TO UNLOCK. THE LATCH PIN (INCONEL 718) ATTACHES THE TOGGLE TO THE LATCH ARM ASSEMBLY, AND ALSO ALLOWS THE TOGGLE TO PIVOT ON THE LATCH ARM ASSEMBLY. A SPRING IS PRELOADED TO RETURN THE TOGGLE TO THE LOCKED POSITION.

THE LATCH ARM ASSEMBLY AND TOGGLE ARE OF INCONEL 718, HEAT TREATED AND LUBRICATED WITH MICROSEAL ON ALL SURFACES. THE SPRING COVER IS 316 SERIES CRES, PASSIVATED AND LUBRICATED WITH MICROSEAL ON ALL SURFACES. THE LATCH PIN IS OF INCONEL 718 WITH A 32 MICROINCH SURFACE FINISH AND LUBRICATED WITH MICROSEAL. LATCH SPRING IS OF 302 CRES. SPRING IS STABLE WITH RESPECT TO BUCKLING. SPRING COIL PITCH AT INSTALLED HEIGHT IS LESS THAN WIRE SIZE, SO IF IT FRACTURES, ONLY ONE EFFECTIVE COIL IS LOST.

(B) TEST:
ATP

LATCH ACTUATOR PROOF, AMBIENT 1275 PSIG

LATCH/SHAFT ASSEMBLY PROOF LOAD TEST:
- ORBITER FLAPPER/ET FLAPPER CLOSURE LOAD, 750 LBF
- ET FLAPPER CLOSURE LOAD, 596 LBF
- ET OVER TRAVEL RESTRAINT LOAD, 596 LBF

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OPERATIONAL CYCLE: AMBIENT: 400 PSIG, 1 CYCLE; 740 PSIG, 5 CYCLES

OPERATIONAL: LN2 TEMPERATURE, 450 PSIG, 5 CYCLES; 740 PSIG, 5 CYCLES

LATCH SHAFT SEAL LEAKAGE: AMBIENT AND LN2 TEMPERATURES, 10 AND 50 PSIG, 80 SCIM OF GHE

LATCH ACTUATOR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE: AMBIENT AND LN2 (BODY TEMPERATURES) 740 PSIG, STATIC SEAL, 150 SCIM OF GHE, PISTON SHAFT SEAL, 1000 SCIM OF GHE

LATCH ACTUATOR INTERNAL LEAKAGE: AMBIENT AND LN2 TEMPERATURES, 740 PSIG, 400 SCIM OF GHE

LH2 UNIT ADDITIONAL TESTS:

OPERATIONAL CYCLES: AMBIENT TEMPS, 10 CYCLES AT 740 PSIG AND 10 CYCLES AT 400 PSIG

OPERATIONAL CYCLES: LH2 TEMPS, 10 CYCLES AT 740 PSIG AND 10 CYCLES AT 450 PSIG

LATCH SHAFT SEAL LEAKAGE: LH2 TEMPS, 0 TO 50 PSIG, 80 SCIM OF GH2

LATCH ACTUATOR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE: LH2 TEMPS (BODY), 740 PSIG, STATIC SEAL, 150 SCIM OF GHE, PISTON SHAFT SEAL, 1000 SCIM OF GHE

LATCH ACTUATOR INTERNAL LEAKAGE: LH2 TEMPS (BODY), 740 PSIG, 400 SCIM OF GHE

ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS: INSULATION RESISTANCE, VOLTAGE DROP, AND DIELECTRIC STRENGTH

EXAMINATION OF PRODUCT:

VERIFY THE CLEARANCE BETWEEN TOE OF THE LATCH TO EDGE OF FLAPPER FAIRING DOME.

VERIFY THE DEMATED VALVE FLAPPER MOVEMENT PAST LATCH TOGGLE.

MEASURE EDGE CLEARANCE FROM FULL OVER TOGGLE TO THE FLAPPER.

TOGGLE SHALL MOVE FREELY AT AMBIENT AND CRYOGENIC CONDITIONS.

POSITION INDICATOR SWITCH REDUNDANCY SWITCH PICKUP WITHIN THE LIMITS BAND.

LATCH ACTUATOR SWITCH HOUSING VENT CHECK VALVE RELIEF SET PRESSURE.

MEASURE GAP BETWEEN BOTTOM OF LATCH AND TOP OF FLAPPER SEAL RETAINER RINGS.

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
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MEASURE OVERLAP BETWEEN END OF LATCH AND END OF ET FLAPPER SEAL
RETAINER RING.

CLEANLINESS: MOISTURE FREE AND CLEANED TO LEVEL 400A OF MA 0110-301

CERTIFICATION

COMPONENT QUALIFICATION

THERMAL CYCLE; 3 CYCLES, AMBIENT TO -400 DEG F TO AMBIENT

VIBRATION: RANDOM 20 TO 2000 HZ
 5.0 GRMS FOR Z-AXIS
 5.2 GRMS FOR X AND Y-AXIS
 48 MINUTES PER AXIS

CONDITIONS: MATED, NO FLOW, FLAPPERS OPEN, LATCH LOCKED, PRESSURIZED
 TO 10 PSIG, AND FILLED WITH LN2 (DONE PRIOR TO LH2 LEAKAGE
 TEST). DURING THE LAST TWO MINUTES OF RANDOM VIBRATION IN
 EACH AXIS, LATCH ACTUATOR PNEUMATIC SUPPLY PRESSURE IS
 RELIEVED.

ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS: INSULATION RESISTANCE AND VOLTAGE DROP

BONDING; ELECTRICAL BONDING PER MIL-B-5087

ULTIMATE LOADS; LATCH ASSEMBLY, TOGGLE LOAD, ET SIDE AND FLAPPER OVER TRAVEL
RESTRAINT, ET SIDE

ACTUATOR BURST PRESSURE: 1700 PSIG

SEQUENCE ERROR/RIGGING ERROR:

DOWNSTRIKE IMPACT: 8 CYCLES, FLAPPERS CLOSED, ACTUATE LATCH TO LOCKED
 POSITION, ACTUATE FLAPPERS OPEN, THEN CLOSE
FLAPPERS CLOSED AGAINST LATCH: 8 CYCLES, FLAPPER OPEN AND LATCHED,
 COMMAND FLAPPER CLOSED, THEN OPEN
MISRIGGING: 4 CYCLES, ACTUATE FLAPPERS OPEN, COMMAND LATCH TO
 ENGAGED POSITION, COMMAND LATCH TO DISENGAGE

ORBITER ANGLE LOW:
ORB: 1.46 DEG
ET: 4.5 DEG

ET ANGLE LOW:
ORB: 3.0 DEG
ET: 2.85 DEG

ET ANGLE HIGH:
ORB: 3.0 DEG
ET: 8.16 DEG

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MECHANICAL CLOSURE (LO2, ORBITER, DEMATED): MANUALLY OPEN FLAPPER, ENGAGE LATCH, MANUALLY CLOSE FLAPPER. AT POINT WHERE LATCH BEGINS TO RELEASE FLAPPER, HOLD FLAPPER IN PLACE WHILE ROTATING TOGGLE TO EXTREME POSITION. MEASURE TOGGLE/FLAPPER CLEARANCE AT POINT OF RELEASE.

LIFE CYCLE,
AMBIENT: 2400 CYCLES (UNLOCK TO LOCK TO UNLOCK)
CRYOGENIC: 1000 CYCLES, -400 DEG F BODY TEMPERATURE

ACTUATOR AND LATCH SHAFT SEAL LEAKAGE: AMBIENT AND CRYO (LN2 AND LH2)

UMBILICAL SEPARATION TEST: (WITH LATCH)

FLAPPER PNEUMATICS/LATCH PNEUMATICS/PYROS/RETRACTOR HYDRAULICS

- (1) PNEUMATIC CLOSURE (NORMAL) - 4 CYCLES
- (2) MECHANICAL CLOSURE (BACKUP) - 5 CYCLES

BOTH PERFORMED AT AMBIENT, LN2 AND LH2 CONDITIONS.

LATCH WATER FLOW TESTS: (LH2 CONFIGURATION)

ELEVEN (11) EXPLORATORY TEST SERIES (FLOW 4000 TO 14800 GPM)

CERTIFICATION TEST RUN AT NOMINAL PRODUCTION SETTING (FLOW RANGE TO 109% POWER LEVEL).

TWO PROOF TESTS - 15650 GPM AND 15850 GPM

LATCH WATER FLOW TESTS: (LO2 CONFIGURATION)

TWENTY-FOUR (24) EXPLORATORY TEST SERIES (FLOW 4000 TO 22100 GPM)

CERTIFICATION TEST RUN AT MINIMUM PRODUCTION SETTING (FLOW RANGE TO 109% POWER LEVEL).

TWO TEST SERIES IN FILL DIRECTION (FLOW 4000 TO 6400 GPM), LATCH PNEUMATIC PRESSURE VENTED (BISTABILITY)

PROOF TEST - 23200 GPM

LATCH CRYO FLOW TESTS: (LH2 VALVE QUALIFIED BY SIMILARITY TO LO2)

SIXTEEN (16) TESTS WITH LN2/LO2 (FLOWS VARY FROM ONE ENGINE AT 65% TO THREE AT 109%).

DISCONNECT FLAPPER STABILITY/LOADS

CAVITATION

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FRICION PRESSURE LOSS

ENGINE CUTOFF SENSOR RESPONSE

STEADY STATE TEST: LN2 (65% AND 109% OF RATED POWER LEVEL),
LATCH ENGAGED. LO2 (100%, 104% AND 109% OF RATED POWER LEVEL),
LATCH ENGAGED AND NOT ENGAGED.

TERMINAL DRAIN: (SATURATED LO2) (65% AND 109%) LATCH ENGAGED AND
NOT ENGAGED.

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

(C) INSPECTION:

RECEIVING INSPECTION

ALL HARDWARE 100% DIMENSIONALLY INSPECTED.

INSPECTION VERIFIES CERTIFICATIONS OF RAW MATERIAL ARE PART PROTECTION,
COATING, AND PLATING REQUIREMENTS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

INSPECTION VERIFIES CLEANLINESS TO LEVEL 400A.

INSPECTION VERIFIES THE CONTAMINATION CONTROL PLAN.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

MANUFACTURING PROCESSES, INSTALLATION, AND ASSEMBLY OPERATIONS VERIFIED BY
INSPECTION, INCLUDING PARTS PROTECTION.

INSPECTION VERIFIES FASTENERS ARE TORQUED TO REQUIREMENTS.

INSPECTION VERIFIES IMPLEMENTATION OF CORROSION PROTECTION PROVISIONS.

INSPECTION VERIFIES SURFACE FINISHES TO DRAWING REQUIREMENTS.

INSPECTION VERIFIES SEAL INSTALLATION WHICH INCLUDES:

SEAL MATING PART (MATERIAL, SURFACE FINISH, 100% DIMENSIONAL INSPECTION)
ASSEMBLY (COMPONENT INTEGRITY, SEALS AND SURFACE LUBRICATED,
ASSEMBLY TECHNIQUE, SEAL INSTALLATION IN CLEANROOM)

QUALIFIED AND CERTIFIED PERSONNEL AND SPECIAL DESIGNATED TOOLS UTILIZED

SEAL PHOTOS (BLIND INSTALLATION, SINGLE BACKUP RINGS, AND "L" SEALS) AND
CORRECT SEAL IDENTIFICATION (PART NO., LOT NO., MATERIAL CONDITION, AGE,
CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS).

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CRITICAL PROCESSES

INSPECTION VERIFIES PARTS PASSIVATION AND HEAT TREATMENT

INSPECTION VERIFIES SOLDERING MEETS REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION

100% DYE PENETRANT AND X-RAY INSPECTION IS PERFORMED ON ANY PARTS DESIGNATED FRACTURE CRITICAL.

TESTING

INSPECTION VERIFIES ATP REQUIREMENTS (NOTE PRIMARY VERIFICATIONS AND WITNESSING).

HANDLING/PACKAGING

INSPECTION VERIFIES IMPLEMENTATION OF HANDLING, PACKAGING, AND STORAGE REQUIREMENTS.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURE, FLIGHT FAILURE, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATABASE.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

NO CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.

- APPROVALS -

S&R ENGINEERING	: W. P. MUSTY	:/S/ W. P. MUSTY
S&R ENGINEERING ITM	: P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN	:/S/ P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN
DESIGN ENGINEERING	: KOUROSH ANVARI	:/S/ KOUROSH ANVARI
MPS SUBSYSTEM MGR.	: TIM REITH	:/S/ TIM REITH
MOD	: BILL LANE	:/S/ BILL LANE
USA SAM	: MIKE SNYDER	:/S/ MIKE SNYDER
USA ORBITER ELEMENT	: SUZANNE LITTLE	:/S/ SUZANNE LITTLE
NASA SR&QA	: ERICH BASS	:/S/ ERICH BASS