FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE
NUMBER: 03-1-0651 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

REVISION: 2 11/07/00

PART DATA

	PART NAME / **VENDOR NAME**	**PART NUMBER** / **VENDOR NUMBER**
LRU	: LH2 INBOARD RTLS DUMP VALVE, TYPE 3 (PV17)	MC284-0395-0053
	VACCO INDUSTRIES	1440-511
LRU	: LH2 OUTBOARD RTLS DUMP VALVE, TYPE 4 (PV18)	MC284-0395-0054
	VACCO INDUSTRIES	1441-511

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:
VALVE, 1.5 INCH, RTLS DUMP, LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD, NORMALLY CLOSED, PNEUMATICALLY ACTUATED OPEN.

VALVE WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AND MANUFACTURED BY VACCO INDUSTRIES (EATON). THE UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE-NSLD IS A CERTIFIED REPAIR DEPOT BUT HAS NOT YET BEEN CERTIFIED AS AN ALTERNATE PRODUCTION AGENCY.

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: PV17
PV18

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 2

FUNCTION:
TWO SERIES REDUNDANT VALVES PROVIDE A PATH TO DUMP LH2 OVERBOARD FROM THE LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD. FOR NOMINAL, ATO AND AOA MISSIONS THE VALVES ARE SOFTWARE COMMANDED OPEN AT MECO+11 SECONDS AND CLOSED AT DUMP STOP. THE VALVES ARE THEN RE-OPENED FOR ENTRY TO PERFORM A FINAL VACUUM INERT PRIOR TO ENTRY. FOR RTLS AND TAL MISSIONS, THE VALVES ARE OPENED NOMINALLY AND THEN REMAIN OPEN UNTIL ENTRY AT VREL=5300 FT/SEC. THE RTLS INBOARD VALVE, PV17, PROVIDES A RELIEF FEATURE FOR LH2 TRAPPED BETWEEN THE INBOARD AND OUTBOARD, PV18, VALVES.

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEA -- NON-CIL FAILURE MODE

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SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION
LRU: LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVE, PV17, 18 **CRITICALITY OF THIS**
ITEM NAME: LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVE, PV17, 18 **FAILURE MODE:** 1R3

FAILURE MODE:
FAILS TO OPEN/FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN FOLLOWING MECO.

MISSION PHASE: LO LIFT-OFF

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:
102 COLUMBIA
103 DISCOVERY
104 ATLANTIS
105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:
FAILS TO OPEN: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BINDING, ACTUATOR LEAKAGE, ACTUATOR FILTER CLOGGING

FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, ACTUATOR LEAKAGE

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN
A) PASS
B) PASS
C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:
A)

B)
PASSES B SCREEN SINCE FAILURE OF EITHER RTLS DUMP VALVE TO OPEN IS DETECTABLE BY MONITORING LH2 MANIFOLD PRESSURE INCREASE.

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:
NO EFFECT FIRST FAILURE. LH2 MANIFOLD RELIEF SYSTEM WILL PREVENT OVERPRESSURIZATION OF LH2 MANIFOLD.

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(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):
SAME AS A.

(C) MISSION:
NO EFFECT.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):
SAME AS C.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:
1R/3 3 SUCCESS PATHS. TIME FRAME - POST MECO, PRE DUMP.
1) EITHER RTLS DUMP VALVE (PV17,18) FAILS TO OPEN/REMAIN OPEN.
2) LH2 MANIFOLD RELIEF SYSTEM FAILS TO RELIEVE.
3) LH2 MANIFOLD PRESSURE TRANSDUCER FAILS OR LH2 OUTBOARD FILL/DRAIN VALVE (PV11) FAILS CLOSED. DEFEATS VEHICLE SOFTWARE CHECK OF LH2 MANIFOLD PRESSURE EXCEEDING 60 PSIA AND INITIATION OF LH2 DUMP.

RESULTS IN LACK OF RELIEF CAPABILITY. POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF THE LH2 MANIFOLD CAUSING LH2 LEAKAGE INTO THE AFT COMPARTMENT, OVERPRESSURIZATION, AND FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CRITICAL ADJACENT COMPONENTS DUE TO CRYOGENIC EXPOSURE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:
THE VALVE ACTUATOR IS SPRING LOADED TO THE CLOSED POSITION AND IS DESIGNED TO OPEN WITH THE APPLICATION OF 500 TO 800 PSIG OF HELIUM PRESSURE TO THE VALVE ACTUATOR. THE ACTUATOR PISTON DRIVES A SPRING LOADED RACK WHICH, IN TURN, DRIVES A PINION GEAR SHAFT WHICH ROTATES THE BALL CLOSURE DEVICE. THE PISTON IS OF 304 CRES AND THE RACK AND PINION ARE OF INCONEL 718. THE PINION GEAR/SHAFT IS MACHINED FROM A SINGLE PIECE OF STOCK. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS INDICATES POSITIVE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR ALL CONDITIONS OF VALVE OPERATIONS. THE VALVE WAS CYCLED 2000 TIMES (1500 CYCLES AT AMBIENT TEMPERATURE AND 500 AT CRYOGENIC TEMPERATURE) DURING CERTIFICATION TESTING WITHOUT EVER FAILING TO OPEN.

FACTORS OF SAFETY: PROOF - 1.5 BODY, 2.0 ACTUATOR; BURST - 2.0 BODY, 4.0 ACTUATOR. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS INDICATES POSITIVE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR ALL CONDITIONS OF VALVE OPERATIONS; FRACTURE/FATIGUE ANALYSES SHOW THAT ALL CRITICAL PARTS ARE SATISFACTORY FOR FOUR TIMES EXPECTED LIFE.

TO PREVENT BINDING, THE ACTUATOR RACK IS GUIDED ON EACH END BY A FLUOROGOLD GUIDE RING. THE CHROME PLATED PISTON SLIDES THROUGH FLUOROGOLD RINGS. THE ACTUATOR AND VALVE BEARINGS ARE OF VESPEL AND FLUOROGOLD AND ARE DESIGNED

SO THAT THEY WILL TURN WITHIN THEIR HOUSING IN THE EVENT OF SHAFT/BEARING SEIZURE/BINDING.

FOR LEAKAGE CONTROL, THE ACTUATOR PISTON SEAL DESIGN USES A KEL-F STATIC LIP SEAL AGAINST THE MOVING, CHROME-PLATED PISTON. THE SEAL IS LOADED WITH A COPPER-BERYLLIUM SPRING AND THE ACTUATOR PRESSURE FURTHER ASSISTS IN MINIMIZING LEAKAGE. EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FROM THE ACTUATOR IS PREVENTED BY THE USE OF A CREAVEY-TYPE SEAL (TEFLON COVER OVER A STAINLESS STEEL SPRING).

(B) TEST:
ATP

EXAMINATION OF PRODUCT

AMBIENT PROOF:
VALVE BODY - 195 PSIG, VALVE OPEN AND CLOSED
ACTUATOR - 1700 PSIG

VALVE RESPONSE TIMES - AMBIENT AND CRYO (-300 DEG F AND -423 DEG F):
VALVE: 55 PSIG
ACTUATOR: 500 AND 740 PSIG
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - AMBIENT AND CRYO (-300 DEG F AND -423 DEG F):
VALVE BODY: 130 PSIG
ACTUATOR: 740 PSIG

INTERNAL LEAKAGE - AMBIENT AND CRYO (-300 DEG F AND -423 DEG F):
INLET-TO-OUTLET @ 55 PSIG
ACTUATOR: 740 PSIG

POSITION INDICATION: VERIFICATION OF OPERATION

ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS - CONTACT RESISTANCE; INSULATION RESISTANCE; AND DIELECTRIC STRENGTH.

RELIEF VALVE CRACK AND RESEAT (PV17 ONLY)
AMBIENT AND CRYO (-300 DEG F): 15-40 PSID

CERTIFICATION

LIFE -
CRYO - 500 CYCLES AT -400 DEG F
AMBIENT - 1500 CYCLES

RANDOM VIBRATION TESTS - IN ALL THREE AXES
13.3 HOURS IN EACH AXIS WHILE PRESSURIZED TO 105 PSIG AND AT -300 DEG F.

DESIGN SHOCK (ALL THREE AXES) - 18 SHOCKS OF 15G EACH, THREE IN EACH DIRECTION.

THERMAL CYCLE TESTS - PERFORMED THREE TIMES
70 DEG F TO -400 DEG F TO 70 DEG F TO 275 DEG F TO 150 DEG F

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ACTUATOR: 500 AND 740 PSIG

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ACTUATOR: 740 PSIG

ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS - CONTACT RESISTANCE; INSULATION RESISTANCE; AND DIELECTRIC STRENGTH.

ELECTRICAL BONDING - LESS THAN 100 MILLIOHMS

BURST - BY SIMILARITY TO THE TYPE V VALVE. 800 PSIG VALVE BODY, 3400 PSIG ACTUATOR

OMRSD
ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

(C) INSPECTION:
RECEIVING INSPECTION
RAW MATERIAL VERIFIED BY INSPECTION FOR MATERIAL AND PROCESS CERTIFICATION. TEST REPORTS REQUIRED ON CAST MATERIAL. COMPLETION OF HOT ISOSTATIC PRESSING (HIP) PROCESS IS VERIFIED. CAST HOUSING (ROUGH MACHINED) IS INSPECTED FOR POROSITY.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL
CONTAMINATION CONTROL PROCESS AND CORROSION PROTECTION PROVISIONS ARE VERIFIED. THE INTERNAL WETTED SURFACES ARE CLEANED TO LEVEL 400A AND VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION
ALL DETAIL PARTS ARE INSPECTED FOR CRITICAL DIMENSIONS, SURFACE FINISH, BURRS, DAMAGE, AND CORROSION. CRITICAL POPPET AND SLEEVE SURFACES ARE LAPPED AND INSPECTED WITH 40X MAGNIFICATION. TORQUES ARE VERIFIED TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. PRIOR TO INSTALLATION, SEALS ARE VISUALLY EXAMINED WITH 10X MAGNIFICATION FOR DAMAGE AND CLEANLINESS. ALL SPRINGS ARE LOT TRACEABLE AND LOAD TESTED AT THE PIECE PART LEVEL. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS ARE INCLUDED IN THE ASSEMBLY PROCEDURE.

CRITICAL PROCESSES
HEAT TREATMENT OF THE VALVE BALL AFTER MACHINING IS VERIFIED. PART PASSIVATION AND HARD ANODIZING ARE VERIFIED. CERTIFICATION OF WELDING, POTTING, AND SOLDERING IS VERIFIED. PAINTING (ON BODY), ELECTRICAL BONDING, AND DRY FILM

LUBRICANT ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. ALL CASTINGS ARE SUBJECTED TO A HIP PROCESS.

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION
PRIOR TO FINAL MACHINING, THE HOUSING IS X-RAYED, ETCH AND DYE PENETRANT INSPECTED, AND LEAK CHECKED AT PROOF PRESSURE. ALL WELDS ON THE ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR ARE DYE PENETRANT INSPECTED AND VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

TESTING
ATP VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

PACKAGING/HANDLING
HANDLING, PACKAGING, STORAGE, AND SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:
FAILS TO OPEN

A FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO CLOSE OCCURRED DURING QUALIFICATION TESTING (REFERENCE CAR AC1189). THE CAUSE WAS INTERFERENCE DUE TO THE OVERSIZED DIAMETER OF THE PISTON GUIDE RING GROOVE. THE DESIGN WAS CHANGED (THE GROOVE DIAMETER WAS REDUCED) TO ELIMINATE THE PROBLEM.

A FAILURE AT NSTL OF A VALVE TO ACTUATE WAS CAUSED BY BINDING OF THE ALUMINUM BRONZE BUSHING TO THE SHAFT. AN MCR AUTHORIZED DRAWING CHANGES TO TEFLON COAT AND POLISH THE SHAFT (REFERENCE CAR A7950).

FAILS TO OPEN/REMAIN OPEN (ACTUATOR LEAKAGE)

ATP

DURING ATP PROOF PRESSURE TEST, EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE PAST THE ACTUATOR SEAL WAS NOTED (REF CAR A9705). TEARDOWN REVEALED A SCRATCH ON THE PISTON SEAL. THE SEAL WAS REPLACED AND ACTUATOR MET LEAKAGE REQUIREMENTS. CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TO INCORPORATE A MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT OF THE SEALS PRIOR TO INSTALLATION.

QUALIFICATION

DURING QUALIFICATION TEST, ACTUATOR LEAKAGE WAS OBSERVED (REF CAR A9894). X-RAY OF THE ACTUATOR REVEALED A BROKEN RACK/PISTON SPRING. UPON TEARDOWN, A BROKEN STATIC SEAL WAS ALSO FOUND. FAILURE ANALYSIS OF THE SPRING DETERMINED THAT THE SPRING FAILED FROM IMPACT EMBRITTLEMENT. THE ACTUATOR SPRING MATERIAL WAS CHANGED FROM TITANIUM TO ELGILOY AND REDUNDANT ACTUATOR STATIC SEALS WERE ADDED. THE QUAL UNIT WAS REWORKED AND SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED.

DURING QUALIFICATION TEST AT CRYO TEMPERATURE, THE ACTUATOR SHAFT SEAL LEAKAGE WAS 400 SCIM, MAX ALLOWABLE IS 100 SCIM (REF CAR AC6963). THE CAUSE ATTRIBUTED TO NORMAL INTERNAL WEAR IN COMBINATION WITH MIGRATING LUBRICANT.

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THE SPECIFICATION FOR MAXIMUM ACTUATOR SHAFT SEAL LEAKAGE WAS REVISED TO 500 SCIM (TYPE II VALVES ONLY), TO BE MEASURED AFTER EXPOSURE TO QUALIFICATION VIBRATION TEST.

DURING CRYOGENIC QUAL TESTING, ACTUATOR PISTON SEAL LEAKAGE OF 130 SCIM WAS NOTED. MAX ALLOWABLE IS 100 SCIM (REFERENCE CAR AB1806). THE LEAKAGE WAS DUE TO METALLIC PARTICLE GENERATION DURING ASSEMBLY FROM IMPROPERLY CLEANED PARTS CAUSING GALLING DURING ASSEMBLY. SUPPLIER ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY PROCEDURE PS-352M WAS CHANGED TO ADD CAUTION AND INSPECTION NOTE.

DURING QUALIFICATION TESTING, ACTUATOR PISTON SEAL LEAKAGE OF 200 SCIM WAS DETECTED. MAX ALLOWABLE IS 100 SCIM. LEAKAGE WAS DUE TO METALLIC PARTICLES GENERATED DURING ASSEMBLY WITH AN INADEQUATE ASSEMBLY TOOL. REDESIGNED TOOL ELIMINATED THE PROBLEM (REFERENCE CAR AB0197).

DURING QUALIFICATION TESTING, LEAKAGE AT THE ACTUATOR PISTON SEAL RETAINER INTERFACE WAS 560 SCIM. MAX ALLOWABLE IS 100 SCIM (REFERENCE ARE AB0088). LEAKAGE WAS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SEAL RETAINER TORQUE OF 70 FT-LBS. ASSEMBLY TORQUE WAS INCREASED TO 95 - 100 FT-LBS WITH REPEAT APPLICATIONS AT 5 MINUTE INTERVALS UNTIL SUB-ASSEMBLY STOPS MOVING. IMPLEMENTED OV-102 AND SUBS.

FIELD

DURING MPTA CHECKOUT, HELIUM WAS LEAKING THROUGH THE VENT PORT OF THE ACTUATOR CAUSING THE VALVE TO FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN (REF CAR A9630). DURING DISASSEMBLY, IT WAS FOUND THAT THE STATIC SEAL WAS PROTRUDING OUTSIDE ITS RETAINER AREA AND THAT THE SEAL RETAINER TORQUE WAS LOW. IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THE ACTUATOR STATIC SEAL RETAINER TORQUE RELAXES EITHER FROM SEAL MATERIAL COLD FLOW OR RETAINER BACKING OFF. THE VALVE WAS REDESIGNED TO ADD REDUNDANT ACTUATOR SEALS AND LOCKTITE IS APPLIED TO THE RETAINER TO PREVENT TORQUE RELAXATION AND A SERIES OF RETORQUING TO MINIMIZE COLD FLOW. THE VALVE WAS REWORKED AND PASSED SUBSEQUENT LEAKAGE TESTS.

AT PALMDALE ACTUATOR LEAKAGE OCCURRED FROM UNDER THE ENDCAP OF THE ACTUATOR (REFERENCE CAR AD2446). THE ORIGIN OF THE LEAK WAS DUE TO TWO DAMAGED GASKETS P/N 1397-60 AND A SEAL P/N 1397-29-2. THE FAILURE WAS DUE TO A FAILURE TO BACK UP THE END CAP ON THE ACTUATOR WHILE TURNING A LINE FITTING DURING THE INSTALLATION OF THE VALVE. GASKETS AND SEAL REPLACED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED.

DURING CHECKOUT AT PALMDALE ON OV-O99, THE ACTUATOR END CAP LEAKED EXCESSIVELY (REFERENCE CAR AC2152). NEW SEALS AND END CAP WERE INSTALLED ON THE VEHICLE BY THE SUPPLIER AND PASSED SUBSEQUENT LEAK TEST. CAUSE FOR LEAKAGE WAS NOT DETERMINED.

FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN

THERE HAVE BEEN NO ACCEPTANCE TEST, QUALIFICATION TEST, FIELD OR FLIGHT FAILURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE VALVE FAILING TO REMAIN OPEN EXCEPT FOR ACTUATOR LEAKAGE (NOTED ABOVE).

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CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURE, FLIGHT FAILURE, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATABASE.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:
NO ADDITIONAL CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.

- APPROVALS -

S&R ENGINEERING	: W.P. MUSTY	: /S/ W. P. MUSTY
S&R ENGINEERING ITM	: P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN	: /S/ P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN
DESIGN ENGINEERING	: EARL HIRAKAWA	: /S/ EARL HIRAKAWA
MPS SUBSYSTEM MGR.	: TIM REITH	: /S/ TIM REITH
MOD	: BILL LANE	: /S/ BILL LANE
USA SAM	: MIKE SNYDER	: /S/ MIKE SNYDER
USA ORBITER ELEMENT	: SUZANNE LITTLE	: /S/ SUZANNE LITTLE
NASA SR&QA	: ERICH BASS	: /S/ ERICH BASS