FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE NUMBER: 05-3-12125 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: DISPLAYS & CONTROLS

REVISION: 1

08/27/97

PART DATA

PART NAME
VENDOR NAME

PART NUMBER
VENDOR NUMBER

LRU

: D&C PANEL F6

V070-730403

LRU

: D&C PANEL F8

V070-730404

LRU

: ATTITUDE DIRECTOR INDICATOR

MC432-0235-000X

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

ATTITUDE DIRECTOR INDICATOR (ADI), 3 AXIS .

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS:

34V73A6A3

34V73A8A2

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 2

1 CMDR, 1 PILOT

FUNCTION:

PROVIDES DISPLAY OF THE ORBITER'S ROLL, PITCH AND YAW: (1) ATTITUDES VIA A GIMBALLED BALL, (2) ATTITUDE ERRORS VIA THREE METER POSITION NEEDLES. (3) ATTITUDE RATES VIA THREE METER POSITION POINTERS. ALSO PROVIDES VISUAL SELF CHECKS TO THE CREW, AND (4) PROVIDES GUIDANCE PREDICTOR AND NAVIGATION ERROR INFORMATION IN TAEM (MAJOR MODE 305) WHEN THE RATE SCALE IS SELECTED TO THE "MED" POSITION.

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FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEA - NON-CIL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: 05-3-12125-01

REVISION#: 1

08/27/97

SUBSYSTEM NAME: DISPLAYS & CONTROLS

LRU: D&C PANEL F6 & F8

CRITICALITY OF THIS

ITEM NAME: ATTITUDE DIRECTOR INDICATOR

FAILURE MODE: 1R3

FAILURE MODE:

LOSS OF ADI FUNCTIONS. NO BALL, NEEDLE AND POINTER MOVEMENTS.

MISSION PHASE:

PL PRE-LAUNCH LO LIFT-OFF

OO ON-ORBIT DO DE-ORBIT

LS LANDING/SAFING

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102 COLUMBIA

103 DISCOVERY **ATLANTIS** 104 **ENDEAVOUR** 105

LOSS OF INPUT POWER, LOSS OF SIGNAL INPUTS, SHOCK, VIBRATION, JAMMING, PIECE PART FAILURE.

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

A) PASS

B) PASS

C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

BI

G)

CORRECTING ACTION: AUTOMATED

CORRECTING ACTION DESCRIPTION:

THE FULLY AUTOMATIC FLIGHT MODE IS ALSO AVAILABLE AS A CONTINGENCY IF

REQUIRED.

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FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) - NON-CIL FAILURE MODE NUMBER: 05-3-12125- 01

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-	FAIL	.URE	EFFE	ECTS	

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

ADMIS LOST IN CMDR OR PILOT STATION.

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT.

(C) MISSION:

FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

THE FIRST FAILURE IS LOSS OF ATTITUDE DATA FROM ONE FORWARD STATION ADI. FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF BOTH FORWARD ADIS. THE ABSENCE OF ATTITUDE DATA REQUIRING CREW ACTION COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. HOWEVER, THIS WOULD REQUIRE AT LEAST ONE ADDITIONAL FAILURE. SUCCESS PATHS REMAINING AFTER THE FIRST FAILURE ARE THE REDUNDANT ADI AT THE OTHER FORWARD STATION AND, AFTER MAJOR MODE 305, THE TWO HUD'S ARE AVAILABLE TO THE CREW, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF YAW DATA.

· APPROVALS -

EDITORIALLY APPROVED

: BNA

EDITORIALLY APPROVED

: JSC

TECHNICAL APPROVAL : VIA APPROVAL FORM

1. Kemura 8/28/97 A. Searce 9-22-99

: 96-C/L-D24 Ø5-3