

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) - CIL HARDWARE
NUMBER: 05-5-B03-6 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM (DPS)

REVISION: 9

01/10/94

PART DATA

	PART NAME	PART NUMBER
	VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMBER
LRU	: MULTIPLEXER-DEMULPLEXER HONEYWELL	MC615-0004-5300 4020534-913
LRU	: MULTIPLEXER-DEMULPLEXER HONEYWELL	MC615-0004-5310 4020534-943
LRU	: MULTIPLEXER-DEMULPLEXER HONEYWELL	MC615-0004-5500 4020534-915
LRU	: MULTIPLEXER-DEMULPLEXER HONEYWELL	MC615-0004-5510 4020534-964
LRU	: MULTIPLEXER-DEMULPLEXER HONEYWELL	MC615-0004-5310 4020534-983
LRU	: MULTIPLEXER-DEMULPLEXER HONEYWELL	MC615-0004-5510 4020534-965

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:
 OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION FORWARD MDM: "OF1", "OF2", "OF3" AND "OF4".

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: 81V75A10
 82V75A11
 83V75A12
 30V75A9

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 4
 FOUR

FUNCTION:
 UPON REQUEST, PROVIDES DIGITIZED AND FORMATTED DATA TO THE PULSE CODE MODULATION (PCM) MASTER UNIT FOR OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION WHERE IT IS INTERLEAVED WITH ALL OTHER DATA INTO ONE SERIAL PCM STREAM. PROVIDES DELTA SUB STACK VOLTAGE MEASUREMENTS ON THE FUEL CELLS DETECTING HYDROGEN/OXYGEN CROSS OVER TO PREVENT DETONATION. "OF3" MDM PROVIDES CURRENT MEASUREMENTS FOR ALL THREE FUEL CELLS. "OF4" PROVIDES APU DRAIN LINE PRESSURE MONITORING FOR DETECTION.

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEA - CIL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: 05-5-803-4-02

REVISION#: 10 03/29/96

SUBSYSTEM NAME: DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM (DPS)

LRU: MULTIPLEXER-DEMUTIPLEXER

ITEM NAME: MULTIPLEXER-DEMUTIPLEXER

CRITICALITY OF THIS

FAILURE MODE: 1R2

FAILURE MODE:
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

MISSION PHASE:

PL	PRE-LAUNCH
LO	LIFT-OFF
OO	ON-ORBIT
DO	DE-ORBIT
LS	LANDING/SAFING

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102	COLUMBIA
103	DISCOVERY
104	ATLANTIS
105	ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:
PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, CHEMICAL REACTION, ADDRESS CHECK FAILURE, DATA ERROR TO MDM/MODULE, MDM MODULE/ CHANNEL SELECT FAILURE, OR ANALOG/DIGITAL (A/D) CONVERTER FAILURE.

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

A) PASS
B) FAIL
C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE SOURCE OF ERRONEOUS OUTPUT CAN NOT BE IDENTIFIED AND MAY BE ACCEPTED AS A VALID DATA.

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) - CIL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: 06-6-B03-6-02

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

IMPROPER CARD OR CHANNEL SELECTION (MIS-MAPPING), OR ALTERATION OF DATA TRANSMITTED TO GPC'S AND PCMMU'S. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT APPEARS TO BE VALID.

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

CORRUPTION OF ANY OF THREE CPM SUBSTACK DELTA VOLTAGE MEASUREMENTS SUCH THAT THEY APPEAR TO BE NOMINAL.

(C) MISSION:

NO EFFECT.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

NO EFFECT FIRST FAILURE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER SECOND FAILURE.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

CRITICALITY 1R2 BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A SINGLE UNDETECTED "OF1", "OF2", OR "OF4" MDM FAILURE IN COMBINATION WITH A SUBSEQUENT UNDETECTED FAILURE IN A FUEL CELL STACK DUE TO HYDROGEN/OXYGEN CROSSOVER CAN RESULT IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. PRIMARY METHOD TO DETERMINE CROSSOVER IS CPM DELTA VOLTAGES. BACKUP METHOD (BUS TIE) IS NOT USED WHEN ERRONEOUS OUTPUT OF CPM DATA IS NOT DETECTED.

PRE-LAUNCH

1) OF1 MDM FAILS GIVING ERRONEOUS OUTPUT VALUES FOR THE MPS HELIUM PRESSURE LCC LIMITS.

2) ASSOCIATED REGULATOR FAILS OPEN AFTER TERMINATION OF AFT COMPARTMENT HELIUM HGDS (HAZARDOUS GAS DETECTION SYSTEM) LCC (T-9 MINUTES) AND HELIUM SUPPLY PRESSURE LCC (T-13 SECONDS); THE FAILURE IS NOT REFLECTED IN THE FAILED MDM OUTPUT TO TLM/GROUND. REGULATOR OUTLET PRESSURE LCC LIMITS CONTINUES UNTIL T-10 SECONDS. THE HELIUM OUTPUT PRESSURE MEASUREMENTS (MPS E1-REG A, MPS E2-REG B, MPS E3-REG A) ARE CHANNELIZED THROUGH OF1. THE FAILED MDM WILL NOT REFLECT THE FAILED OPEN REGULATOR CONDITION. IF AN OF1 CHANNELIZED HELIUM REGULATOR FAILS OPEN AFTER T-13 SECONDS AND THE MDM HAS FAILED SUCH THAT REGULATORS PRESSURE ARE MASKED, THE RESULTS ARE AN LCC DECEPTION AND LIFT OFF WITH FAILED OPEN REGULATOR. FLIGHT WITH THIS CONDITION MAY RESULT IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE AFT COMPARTMENT (REF. D3-1CB-0743-01)

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-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:

ALL PARTS SELECTED FROM MF0004-400 ORBITER PROJECT PARTS LIST (OPPL) WHICH CALLS FOR JANITXV LEVEL PARTS, OR HAVE ADEQUATE DERATING FACTORS OF 25-50% ON HYBRIDS AND TRANSISTORS, 25-30% ON RESISTORS, CAPACITORS AND OTHER COMPONENTS. PARTS THAT DID NOT MEET ORBITER PROJECT PARTS LIST REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALIFICATION, TRACEABILITY SCREENING OR BURN-IN WERE REVIEWED AND WERE FOUND ACCEPTABLE FOR THEIR GIVEN FUNCTIONS.

DESIGN ALSO INCORPORATES RELIABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY, ENVIRONMENTAL AND TRANSPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS AND OTHER DESIGNS AND CONSTRUCTION PER SPECIFICATION MC615-0004.

(B) TEST:

EACH UNIT SUBJECTED TO ACCEPTANCE TEST PROCEDURE (ATP) TEST (T4025545) AT HONEYWELL INCLUDING CONTINUITY, FULL FUNCTIONAL, ACCEPTANCE VIBRATIONAL TEST (AVT), ACCEPTANCE THERMAL TEST (ATT), EXAMINATION OF PRODUCT, INSULATION RESISTANCE TEST, DIELECTRIC STRENGTH TEST, PERFORMANCE, AND POWER VARIATION TEST.

QUALIFICATION TEST (T4025763) COMPLETED AT HONEYWELL INCLUDING FULL FUNCTIONAL, POWER, ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMC), HUMIDITY, THERMAL, VIBRATION, THERMAL VACUUM, LIGHTNING, SHOCK, SALT/FOG, 1000 ON/OFF CYCLE LIFE TEST, ACCELERATION, AND EXPLOSIVE/CORROSIVE ATMOSPHERE.

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST: ALL TURNAROUND CHECKOUT TESTING IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

(C) INSPECTION:

RECEIVING INSPECTION

CERTIFICATIONS AND SOURCE INSPECTION TEST REPORTS ARE ON FILE. CASES AND FLATPACKS ARE ENVIRONMENTALLY SCREENED, INCLUDING LOOSE PARTICLE DETECTION IN RECEIVING INSPECTION. ALL HYBRID COMPONENTS ARE LOT SAMPLED IN RECEIVING INSPECTION.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

CLEANLINESS TO CLASS 100,000 LEVEL IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

VISUAL INSPECTION IS PERFORMED AT KIT RELEASE. PRINTED WIRING BOARD MICROSECTION ANALYSIS IS PERFORMED AND MONITORED BY INSPECTION. QUALITY CONTROL VERIFIES AND WITNESSES TORQUE OPERATIONS. QUALITY CONTROL VERIFIES SOLDERED CONNECTIONS AND ASSEMBLY OF PARTS. TOOL CERTIFICATION AND TENSILE TESTS ARE MAINTAINED. QUALITY CONTROL PERFORMS PRE-CAP VISUAL INSPECTION FOR CLEANLINESS. QUALITY CONTROL VERIFIES CONVEYOR FURNACE PROFILE/TEMPERATURE EVERY 90 DAYS. QUALITY CONTROL VERIFIES ALL

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FLATNESS AND SURFACE ROUGHNESS FOR PROPER HEAT TRANSFER. THERMAL PROTECTION CONTROLS EXIST FOR ALL SOLDERED CONNECTIONS.

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION
RADIOGRAPHIC INSPECTION OF SELECTED COMPONENTS, I.E., TANTALUM CAPACITORS, IS PERFORMED.

CRITICAL PROCESSES
INSPECTION VERIFIES CRIMPING OPERATIONS AND CERTIFICATION. SOLDERING REQUIREMENTS PER NHB5300.4(3A) ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

TESTING
ATP IS OBSERVED AND VERIFIED BY QUALITY CONTROL INCLUDING AVT AND ATT.

HANDLING/PACKAGING
PROPER GROUNDING OF ELECTRICALLY STATIC SENSITIVE DEVICES WHEN HANDLING IS PERFORMED. PACKAGING AND PROTECTION VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURES, FLIGHT FAILURES, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATABASE

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

NONE IF FAILURE UNDETECTABLE. IF DETECTABLE: BUSES WILL BE TIED BETWEEN AFFECTED FUEL CELL AND A NON-AFFECTED FUEL CELL TO MONITOR FUEL CELL LOAD SHARING FOR POSSIBLE FUEL CELL DEGRADATION. REFERENCE ORBITER MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE COMM SRR-10, -11, -13, AND FLIGHT RULE 9-519.

PORT MODING TO RECOVER MDM FUNCTIONALITY IS AVAILABLE DURING ALL MISSION PHASES.

- APPROVALS -

EDITORIALLY APPROVED
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TECHNICAL APPROVAL

: RI
: JSC
: VIA APPROVAL FORM

: *J. A. Austin*
: *John Deacy 5.1.96*
: 96-CIL-013_05-5