

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - HYDRAULICS FMEA NO 05-5G -2087 -1 REV:02/19/88

ASSEMBLY : AFT LCA 1, 2, AND 3

P/N RI : JANTXVINS551

P/N VENDOR:

QUANTITY : 3

: THREE

:

VEHICLE	102	103	104
EFFECTIVITY:	X	X	X
PHASE(S):	PL LO	OO	DO X LS

CRIT. FUNC: 1R

CRIT. HDW: 3

PREPARED BY:

DES

REL

QE

J HERMAN

T KIMURA

J COURSEN

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS

APPROVED BY:

DES

REL

QE

APPROVED BY (NASA):

SSM

REL

QE

Handwritten notes:
 3/2/88
 3/4/88
 3/3/88
 3-4-88
 EPDC SSM WS [unclear]

ITEM:

DIODE, ISOLATION (3 AMPS), HYDRAULIC MAIN PUMP DEPRESS VALVE SOLENOID CIRCUIT

FUNCTION:

PROVIDES CONTROL BUS POWER ISOLATION TO RETURN DRIVERS.

54V76A121CR(J4-73), 55V76A122(J4-73), 56V76A123(J4-73)

FAILURE MODE:

FAILS OPEN

CAUSE(S):

VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK

EFFECT(S) ON:

(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY:

(A) LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER RETURN TO MAIN PUMP DEPRESS SOLENOID

(B) FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT. SECOND FAILURE - INABILITY TO ACTIVATE DEPRESS SOLENOID AFTER FIRST CYCLE (INABILITY TO RESTART APU ON AFFECTED SYSTEM). NOSEWHEEL STEERING AND HYDRAULIC LANDING GEAR DEPLOY CAPABILITY WOULD BE LOST IF HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1 IS LOST.

(C) FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT. SECOND FAILURE - POSSIBLE RETARGET OF LANDING SITE

(D) FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT

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(E) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE WITH THREE FAILURES (DIODE FAILS OPEN - LOSS OF FIRST POWER RETURN PATH, LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER RETURN PATH, LOSS OF SECOND HYDRAULIC SYSTEM).

B SCREEN FAILS BECAUSE THIS FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT UNTIL A SECOND FAILURE OCCURS (HDC TYPE 4 DRIVER IN REDUNDANT CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN).

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE:

(A-D) DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE

REFER TO APPENDIX F, ITEM NO. 4 - DIODE

(B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

V58AJ0.010, "MAIN PUMP EDV ELECTRICAL CHECK" (PERFORMED PRIOR TO EACH FLIGHT). VERIFY SOLENOID RESPONDS TO SWITCH COMMANDS IN CONJUNCTION WITH CONTROL BUS DROPS.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

NONE - HOWEVER, APU START MAY BE ATTEMPTED IN AUTO-SHUTDOWN INHIBIT.