

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - MAIN PROP. FMEA NO 05-6J -2206 -1 REV: 11/04/87

ASSEMBLY : APT PCA-4, 5, & 6 CRIT. FUNC: 1R
 P/N RI : JANTX1N1204RA CRIT. HDW: 3
 P/N VENDOR: VEHICLE 102 103 104
 QUANTITY : 1 EFFECTIVITY: X X X
 : THREE PHASE(S): PL X LO X OO DO LS
 : 1 PER PREVALVE 1, 2, & 3

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS
 PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY: APPROVED BY (NASA):
 DES J BROWN DES *[Signature]* EPDC SSM *[Signature]*
 REL F DEFENSOR REL *[Signature]* 12-5-87 EPDC REL *[Signature]*
 QE D MASAI QE *[Signature]* 11/5/87 MPS REL *[Signature]*

ITEM:
 DIODE, CROSSOVER (12 AMP), LH2 PREVALVE 1, 2 & 3 OPEN SOLENOID POWER

FUNCTION:
 PREVENTS INADVERTENT MDM COMMAND OR PREMATURE HDC I OUTPUT FROM ACTUATING OPEN SOLENOID PREMATURELY. DIODE ISOLATES REDUNDANT POWER WHICH ENERGIZES THE OPEN SOLENOID FOR THE LH2 PREVALVES. ISOLATES REDUNDANT POWER BETWEEN REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER OUTPUTS. 54V76A134A4CR28, 55V76A135A4CR28, 56V76A136A4CR28.

FAILURE MODE:
 OPENS, FAILS OPEN

CAUSE(S):
 PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS

EFFECT(S) ON:
 (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY

(A) LOSS OF COMMAND A POWER PATH TO COMMAND C HDC III. DEGRADATION OF REDUNDANCY TO POWER OPEN SOLENOID.

(B,C,D) NO EFFECT - FIRST FAILURE.

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(E) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER FOURTH FAILURE (SECOND FAILURE - LOSS OF OPEN COMMAND B RPC OR ITS OUTPUT DIODE, REDUNDANT POWER PATH MAINTAINS PREVALVE IN OPEN POSITION. THIRD FAILURE - LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER PATH RESULTS IN LOSS OF POWER TO OPEN SOLENOID, BISTABLE FEATURE MAINTAINS PREVALVE IN OPEN POSITION. FOURTH FAILURE - PREMATURE ACTUATION OF CLOSE SOLENOID) RESULTING IN PREMATURE LH2 PREVALVE CLOSURE WHILE ENGINE IS RUNNING. UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE DUE TO STARVATION CUTOFF. FAILS B SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANT POWER PATHS MASK FAILURE. NOTE - BISTABLE FEATURE NOT DEMONSTRATED BY TEST (CERTIFIED BY ANALYSIS). A FULL FLOW DETENT VERIFICATION TEST IS SCHEDULED FOR GFY 1988.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A-D) FOR DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE

REFER TO APPENDIX F, ITEM NO. 2 - DIODE, POWER-STUD MOUNTED.

(B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

MDM COMMAND REDUNDANCY, V41AEO.180F: 200F; 220F EVERY FLIGHT.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

NO CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.

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