

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - MAIN PROP. FMEA NO 05-6J -2208 -2 REV: 11/04/87

ASSEMBLY : AFT PCA-4, 5, 6 CRIT. FUNC: 1R  
 P/N RI : JANTX1N1204RA CRIT. HDW: 3  
 P/N VENDOR: VEHICLE 102 103 104  
 QUANTITY : 3 EFFECTIVITY: X X X  
 : THREE PHASE(S): PL X LO X OO DO LS  
 : 1 PER PREVALVE 1, 2, 3

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS

PREPARED BY:	DES	J BROWN	APPROVED BY:	DES	<i>[Signature]</i>	APPROVED BY (NASA):	EPDC SSM	<i>[Signature]</i>
REL	F	DEFENSOR	REL		<i>[Signature]</i> 12-5-87	EPDC REL	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>
QE	D	MASAI	QE		<i>[Signature]</i> 11/5/87	MPS REL	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>

ITEM:

DIODE, CROSSOVER (12 AMP), LH2 PREVALVE 1, 2, & 3 CLOSE SOLENOID POWER.

FUNCTION:

PREVENTS INADVERTENT MDM COMMAND OR PREMATURE HDC I OUTPUT FROM ACTUATING CLOSE SOLENOID PREMATURELY. DIODE ISOLATES REDUNDANT POWER WHICH ENERGIZES THE CLOSE SOLENOID FOR THE LH2 PREVALVES. ISOLATES REDUNDANT POWER BETWEEN RPC OUTPUTS. 54V76A124A4CR27, 55V76A135A4CR27, 56V76A136A4CR27.

FAILURE MODE:

SHORT, INTERNAL SHORT, CURRENT LEAKAGE, FAILS TO CONDUCT.

CAUSE(S):

PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS

EFFECT(S) ON:

(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY

(A) DEGRADATION OF REDUNDANCY AGAINST INADVERTENT CLOSING OF LH2 PREVALVE.

(B,C,D) NO EFFECT - FIRST FAILURE.

05-6J-335

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - MAIN PROP. FMEA NO 05-6J -2208 -2 REV:11/04/87

(E) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER THIRD FAILURE (SECOND FAILURE - PREMATURE CLOSE-COMMAND B OR HDC I OUTPUT ACTUATING THE CLOSE SOLENOID, BISTABLE FEATURE MAINTAINS PREVALVE IN OPEN POSITION. THIRD FAILURE - PREMATURE DEACTUATION OF OPEN SOLENOID) RESULTING IN PREMATURE LH2 PREVALVE CLOSURE WHILE ENGINE IS RUNNING. UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE DUE TO STARVATION CUTOFF. FAILS B SCREEN BECAUSE NO INSTRUMENTATION IS AVAILABLE TO DETECT THIS FAILURE. NOTE - BISTABLE FEATURE NOT DEMONSTRATED BY TEST (CERTIFIED BY ANALYSIS). A FULL FLOW DETENT VERIFICATION TEST IS SCHEDULED FOR GFY 1988.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A-D) FOR DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE

REFER TO APPENDIX F, ITEM NO. 2 - DIODE, POWER-STUD MOUNTED.

(B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

MDM COMMAND REDUNDANCY, V41AEO.180I, 200I, 22CI EVERY FLIGHT

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

NO CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.

05-6J-336