

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - MAIN PROP. FMEA NO 05-6J -2393 -2 REV: 11/04/87

ASSEMBLY : AFT PCA-4, 5, 6 CRIT. FUNC: 1R
 P/N RI : JANTX1N1204RA CRIT. HDW: 3
 P/N VENDOR: VEHICLE 102 103 104
 QUANTITY : 3 EFFECTIVITY: X X X
 : THREE PHASE(S): PL X LO X OO DO LS
 : 1 PER LH2 PREVALVE 1, 2, 3

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------|------------|---------|--------------------|----------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| PREPARED BY: | DES | J BROWN | APPROVED BY: | DES | <i>[Signature]</i> | APPROVED BY (NASA): | EPDC SSM | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| REL | F DEFENSOR | REL | <i>[Signature]</i> | EPDC REL | <i>[Signature]</i> | MPS SSM | <i>[Signature]</i> | |
| QE | D MASAI | QE | <i>[Signature]</i> | MPS REL | <i>[Signature]</i> | QE | <i>[Signature]</i> | |

ITEM:

DIODE, BLOCKING (12 AMP), LH2 PREVALVE 1, 2, & 3, CLOSE COMMAND B RPC OUTPUT.

FUNCTION:

USED TO ISOLATE REDUNDANT MAIN BUS POWER TO A COMMON CLOSE SOLENOID. LOCATED AT RPC OUTPUT AHEAD OF CLOSE COMMAND C HDC. 54V76A134A4CR31, 55V76A135A4CR31, 56V76A136A4CR31.

FAILURE MODE:

SHORT, INTERNAL SHORT, CURRENT LEAKAGE

CAUSE(S):

PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION.

EFFECT(S) ON:

(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY

(A) LOSS OF BUS ISOLATION. NORMAL BUS IMBALANCE WILL CAUSE ONE RPC TO TRIP.

(B,C,D) NO EFFECT - FIRST FAILURE.

(E) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER THIRD FAILURE (SECOND FAILURE - LOSS OF SECOND POWER PATH TO CLOSE SOLENOID. THIRD FAILURE - SSME SHUTDOWN WITH UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE REQUIRING LH2 PROPELLANT SUPPLY ISOLATION) DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE LH2 PREVALVE. FAILURE IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT DUE TO SERIES/PARALLEL CIRCUIT CONFIGURATION.

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DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A-D) FOR DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE

REFER TO APPENDIX F, ITEM NO. 2 - DIODE, POWER-STUD MOUNTED.

(B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

MDM COMMAND REDUNDANCY, V41AEO.180G, 200G, 220G EVERY FLIGHT.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

FLIGHT - NO CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.

GROUND - IF A MAJOR LEAK IS DETECTED, CLOSE PREVALVES (PV4, 5, 6), LH2
17-INCH DISCONNECT (PD2), LH2 4-INCH RECIRC DISCONNECT (PD3), LH2
RECIRC VALVES (PV14-16); DRAIN MANIFOLD.