SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

FMEA NO 05-6KA-2216 -1 REV:11/03/87 SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - AFT-RCS

:AFT LCA 1,2,3 ASSEMBLY P/N RI

:MC477-0263-0002

P/N VENDOR: QUANTITY

:8 : EIGHT

VEHICLE EFFECTIVITY:

CRIT. HDW: 102 103 Х

104 X Х

FALLER STAGE

CRIT. FUNC:

PHASE(S): PL LO 60 X DO LS

PREPARED BY:

D SOVEREIGN

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-APPROVED BY: DES

SSM

Y (NASA): APPROVED BY

DES REL QE

J BEEKMAN

Met ... C Har 11-14-87 REL

REL AL

<u>/⟨~~"/~7/</u>~ QE **R**G ≤ EDDIC SON GARRELL SER. Faller

ITEM:

HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (HDC) TYPE III - LEFT AND RIGHT AFT RCS PRIMARY THRUSTER HEATER POWER CIRCUIT.

FUNCTION:

CONDUCTS (MANIFOLD 1 THROUGH 4) HEATER CIRCUIT CURRENT AND PROVIDES PROTECTION OF CIRCULTRY.

54V76A121AR (J11-H',I'). 55V76A122AR (J11-F',G'). 56V76A123AR (J11-F', G', H', X').

FAILURE MODE:

LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY OPENS.

CAUSE(S):

PIECE PART

FAILURE, MECHANICAL AND THERMAL SHOCK, VIERATION.

EFFECT(S) ON:

- (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE
- (A) LOSS OF CIRCUIT POWER TO AN AFFECTED HEATER GROUP.
- (B) PARTIAL LOSS OF INTERFACE REDUNDANCY. THE AFFECTED SYSTEM HEATER CIRCUIT CANNOT BE ENERGIZED.
- (C) PERIODIC HOT FIRING OF PRIMARY THRUSTERS WILL BE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE THRUSTER TEMPERATURES ABOVE THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENT. CORRECTIVE ACTION COULD DISRUPT MISSION OBJECTIVES. MICROGRAVITY EXPERIMENTS ARE AFFECTED BY HOT FIRES. INCREASED PROPELLANT USAGE IS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN TEMPERATURES.
- (D) NO EFFECT.

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SUBSYSTEM : EPOSC - AFT-RCS

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DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE:

- (A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE
- (A-D) FOR DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE, REFER TO APPENDIX B, ITEM NO. 1 HYBRID DRIVER.
- (B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST
 COMPONENT CHECKED OUT EVERY FLIGHT DURING GROUND TURNAROUND. THE TESTING
 CONSISTS OF CYCLING VALVE MANUAL SWITCHES AND/OR SENDING GPC (GENERAL
 PURPOSE COMPUTER) COMMANDS TO CYCLE VALVES OR HEATERS WHILE MONITORING
 VEHICLE INSTRUMENTATION TO DETERMINE IF COMPONENTS HAVE FAILED.
- (E) OPERATIONAL USE

 HOT FIRE JET AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THRUSTER TEMPERATURE IN ACCEPTABLE RANGE. SOME MISSION OBJECTIVES MAY NOT BE MET DUE TO HIGHER PROPELLANT CONSUMPTION CAUSED BY PERIODIC PRIMARY THRUSTER HOT FIRE. MICROGRAVITY EXPERIMENTS WILL BE DISRUPTED DUE TO HIGHER ACCELERATION RATE OF PRIMARY THRUSTERS.