

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - FWD-RCS

FMEA NO 05-6KF-2083 -1

REV: 11/03/87

ASSEMBLY : FWD MCA 3
 P/N RI : RWR80S1211FR
 P/N VENDOR:
 QUANTITY : 3
 : THREE
 :

| | | | |
|--------------|------|------|------|
| VEHICLE | 102 | 103 | 104 |
| EFFECTIVITY: | X | X | X |
| PHASE(S): | PL X | LO X | OO X |
| | DO X | LS X | |

CRIT. FUNC: 1R
 CRIT. HDW: 3

PREPARED BY:

DES D SOVEREIGN
 REL J BECKMAN
 QE

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-FAIL B-FAIL C-PASS
 APPROVED BY:
 DES D.S. R. B...
 REL MELAN C. L. HOWE 11-10-87
 QE [Signature]

APPROVED BY (NASA)
 SSM [Signature]
 REL [Signature]
 QE [Signature]
 2221 554

ITEM:

CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR (1.2 KILO OHM, 2 WATT) - FORWARD RCS FUEL AND OXIDIZER TANK ISOLATION VALVES 1/2, LOGIC AND MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT POWER.

FUNCTION:

THE THREE PARALLEL RESISTORS CONDUCT CIRCUIT POWER AND PROVIDE CURRENT LIMITING TO THE FUEL AND OXIDIZER TANK ISOLATION VALVES 1/2, POSITION SWITCHES FOR INHIBIT LOGIC AND MEASUREMENTS.
 83V76A113A1R3, 11, 12.

FAILURE MODE:

FAILS OPEN, ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE.

CAUSE(S):

STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION AND MECHANICAL SHOCK.

EFFECT(S) ON:

(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE

(A) DEGRADATION OF REDUNDANCY.

(B, C, D) NO EFFECT.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECT - POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO VALVE CONTINUOUS POWER IN CONJUNCTION WITH A BELLOWS LEAK LEADING TO VALVE RUPTURE AND PROPELLANT RELEASE. REQUIRES 3 OTHER FAILURES (RESISTOR, RESISTOR, BELLOWS LEAK) BEFORE EFFECT IS MANIFESTED. A BELLOWS LEAK IS UNDETECTABLE EXCEPT BY PERFORMING A SNIFF CHECK OF THE VALVE'S ACTUATOR ON THE GROUND.

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DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A-D) FOR DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE, REFER TO APPENDIX E, ITEM NO. 3 - RESISTOR, WIRE WOUND.

(B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

CANNOT CHECK OUT ON THE GROUND WITHOUT DESTRUCTIVE TESTING. BENCH LEVEL TEST IS REQUIRED.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

NO ACTION FOR FIRST FAILURE - NOT DETECTABLE. IF CONTINUOUS POWER SITUATION EXISTS, REMOVE POWER FROM RELAY BY PLACING MANUAL SWITCH IN GPC (GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER) POSITION.