CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)

SYSTEM: SUBSYSTEM: ASI

Electrical Cable Trays

REV & DATE: DCN & DATE:

ANALYSTS:

FUNCTIONAL CRIT: PHASE(S): HAZARD REF:

J, 12-19-97

J. Hicks/E. Howell

FAILURE MODE:

Structural Failure

FAILURE EFFECT:

Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to LO2 tank structural failure or debris source

to Orbiter from gap closure.

TIME TO EFFECT:

Immediate

FAILURE CAUSE(S):

A: Improper Manufacture

Failure of Attaching Hardware В:

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

Not Applicable

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION: Provide environmental protection for lines and cables routed along the LO2 tank surface.

FMEA ITEM PART NO. PART NAME OTY **EFFECTIVITY** CODE(S) 4.3.6.1 80971048416-007 Gap Closure (LO2 Tray) 9 LWT-54 & Up

REMARKS:	

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) CONTINUATION SHEET

SYSTEM:

ASI

Electrical Cable Trays

REV & DATE: DCN & DATE: J, 12-19-97

FMEA ITEM CODE(S):

4.3.6.1

RATIONALE FOR RETENTION

DESIGN:

- A, B: The gap closure is machined out of 304 ANN-FI-CRES steel plate stock. Materials selected for this part number are in accordance with MMC-ET-SE16 which assures repetitive conformance of composition and properties.
- A: The gap closure is designed to the required yield (1.1) and ultimate (1.4) safety factors (ET Stress Report 826-2188).
- B: The attaching hardware is selected from the Approved Standard Parts List (ASPL 826-3500). The hardware is installed per STP2014 and torqued using values specified on Engineering drawings. Tensile installation loads are sufficient to provide screening for major flaws in individual fasteners.

TEST:

The Gap Closure (LO2 Tray) is certified. Reference HCS MMC-ET-TMO8-L-S164 (LWT-54 thru 88) and HCS MMC-ET-TMO8-L-S510 (LWT-89 & Up).

<u>Vendor:</u>

B: Attaching fasteners are procured and tested to standard drawings 26L17 and 34L1.

INSPECTION:

Vendor Inspection-Lockheed Martin Surveillance:

- A, B: Verify materials selection and verification controls (MMC-ET-SE16, drawing 80971048416 and standard drawings 26L17 and 34L1).
- A: Inspect dimensional conformance (drawing 80971048416).

MAF Quality Inspection:

- B: Inspect that attaching hardware is free from damage (drawing 80911041205 and STP2014).
- A, B: Verify installation and witness torque (drawing 80911041205).
- B: Verify locking feature (drawing 80911041205 and STP2014).

FAILURE HISTORY:

Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies and other failures experienced during ground processing activity can be found in the PRACA data base.