CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)

SYSTEM: SUBSYSTEM: ASI

Electrical Cable Trays

FUNCTIONAL CRIT:

1 b

REV & DATE: DCN & DATE: ANALYSTS: J, 12-19-97 004, 6-30-99 J. Hicks/E. Howell PHASE(\$): HAZARD REF:

s.11

FAILURE MODE:

Structural Failure

FAILURE EFFECT:

 Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to ET tank structural failure or debris source to Orbiter from cable tray assembly.

TIME TO EFFECT:

Immediate

FAILURE CAUSE(S):

A: Improper Manufacture

B: Failure of Attaching Hardware

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

Not Applicable _

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION: Tray assembly to protect cables routed aft of crossbeam to LH2 umbilical.

FMEA ITEM	PART_NO.	PART NAME	עַנַם	EFFECTIVITY
4.3.30.1	80911071802-009	Cable Tray Assembly, LH2 Umbilical	1	LWT-54 thru 84, 89 thru 96
	-010	MIDI (ICAL	1 .	LWT-85 thru 88, 97 & Up

REMARKS:

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) CONTINUATION SHEET

SYSTEM:

ASI

SUBSYSTEM: FMEA ITEM CODE(S): Electrical Cable Trays

4.3.30.1

REV & DATE: DCN & DATE: J, 12-19-97

RATIONALE FOR RETENTION

DESIGN:

- A, 8: The cable tray components are machined from aluminum alloy 2219-187 sheet, 2219-1851, 2219-187 plate, and 6061-16511 extrusion. Materials selected for this part number are in accordance with MMC-ET-SE16 which assures repetitive conformance of composition and properties. Surface integrity is assured by penetrant inspection per STP2501.
- A: The cable tray components are designed to the required yield (1.1) and ultimate (1.4) safety factors (ET Stress Report 826-2188).
- B: The attaching hardware is selected from the Approved Standard Parts List (ASPL 826-3500). The hardware is installed per STP2014 and torqued using values specified on Engineering drawings. Tensile installation loads are sufficient to provide screening for major flaws in individual fasteners.

TEST:

The Cable Tray Assembly, LHZ Umbilical is certified. Reference HCS MMC-ET-TM08-L-S022 (LWT-54 thru 88) and HCS MMC-ET-TM08-L-S516 (LWT-89 & Up).

Vendor:

B: Attaching fasteners are procured and tested to standard drawings 26L3 and 33L1.

INSPECTION:

Vendor Inspection-Lockheed Martin Surveillance:

- A, B: Verify materials selection and verification controls (MMC-ET-SE16, drawing 80911071801 and standard drawings 26L3 and 33L1).
- A: Inspect dimensional conformance (drawing 80911071801).
- A: Penetrant inspect parts (80911071801 and STP2501, Type 1 Method A).

MAF Quality Inspection:

- B: Inspect that hardware is free from damage (drawing 80911071809 and STP2014).
- A, B: Verify installation and witness torque (drawing 80911071809).

FAILURE HISTORY:

Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies and other failures experienced during ground processing activity can be found in the PRACA data base.