## CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)

SYSTEM: SUBSYSTEM: ASI

Electrical Cable Trays

FUNCTIONAL CRIT: PHASE(S):

1

REV & DATE: DCN & DATE:

J, 12-19-97

HAZARD REF:

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ANALYSTS:

J. Hicks/E. Howell

FAILURE MODE:

Structural Failure

FAILURE EFFECT:

Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to ET structural failure or debris source to

Orbiter from support.

TIME TO EFFECT:

Immediate

FAILURE CAUSE(S):

Improper Manufacture

в:

Failure of Attaching Hardware

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

Not Applicable

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION: Supports for fairing between LH SRB and LH vertical strut trays.

4.3.99.1 80911031898-018 Fairing Support 1 LWT-54 & Up 4.3.100.1 80911031898-017 Fairing Support 1 LWT-54 & Up 4.3.101.1 80911031898-024 Fairing Support 1 LWT-54 & Up 4.3.102.1 80911031898-056 Splice Angle 1 LWT-54 & Up	FMEA ITEM	PART NO.	PART NAME	QTY	EFFECTIVITY
4.3.101.1 80911031898-024 Fairing Support 1 LWT-54 & Up	4.3.99.1	80911031898-018	Fairing Support	1	LWT-54 & Up
The state of the s	4.3.100.1	80911031898-017	fairing Support	1	LWT-54 & Up
4.3.102.1 80911031898-056 Splice Angle 1 LUT-54 & Up	4.3.101.1	80911031898-024	Fairing Support	1	LWT-54 & Up
	4.3.102.1	80911031898-056	Splice Angle	1	LUT-54 & Up

The supports are grouped as the failure mode, causes and effects are the same. REMARKS:

# CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) CONTINUATION SHEET

SYSTEM:

ASI

Electrical Cable Trays

REV & DATE: DCN & DATE: J, 12-19-97

SUBSYSTEM: FMEA ITEM CODE(S):

4.3.99.1, 4.3.100.1, 4.3.101.1, 4.3.102.1

## RATIONALE FOR RETENTION

#### DESIGN:

- A, B: The supports are machined from aluminum alloy 2219-T62 sheet and 2219-T87 plate stock. Materials selected for this part number are in accordance with MMC-ET-SE16 which assures repetitive conformance of composition and properties. Surface integrity is assured by penetrant inspection per STP2501.
- A: The supports are designed to the required yield (1.1) and ultimate (1.4) safety factors (ET Stress Report 826-2188).
- B: The attaching hardware is selected from the Approved Standard Parts List (ASPL 826-3500). The hardware is installed per STP2014 and torqued using values specified on Engineering drawings. Tensile installation loads are sufficient to provide screening for major flaws in individual fasteners.

## TEST:

The Fairing Supports and Splice Angle are certified. Reference HCS MMC-ET-TMO8-L-S058 (LWT-54 thru 88) and HCS MMC-ET-TMO8-L-S517 (LWT-89 & Up).

## Vendor:

B: Attaching fasteners are procured and tested to standard drawings 26L2, 33L2, 26L3 and 33L3.

## INSPECTION:

## Vendor Inspection-Lockheed Martin Surveillance:

- A, 8: Verify materials selection and verification controls (MMC-ET-SE16, drawing 80911031898 and standard drawings 26L2, 33L2, 26L3 and 33L3).
- A: Inspect dimensional conformance (drawing 80911031898).
- A: Penetrant inspect part (drawing 80911031898 and STP2501 Type 1, Method A).

# MAF Quality Inspection:

- 8: Inspect that attaching hardware is free from damage (drawing 80911031849 and STP2014).
- A, B: Verify installation and witness torque (drawing 80911031849 and STP2014).

## FAILURE HISTORY:

Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies and other failures experienced during ground processing activity can be found in the PRACA data base.