

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)

SYSTEM:	ASI	FUNCTIONAL CRIT:	1
SUBSYSTEM:	ET Interface Hardware	PHASE(S):	b
REV & DATE:	J, 12-19-97	HAZARD REF:	S.11
DCN & DATE:			
ANALYSTS:	C. Rush/E. Howell		

FAILURE MODE: Structural Failure

FAILURE EFFECT: b) Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to collapse of interface system resulting in fire/explosion or debris source to orbiter.

TIME TO EFFECT: Immediate

FAILURE CAUSE(S):  
 A: Improper Manufacture  
 B: Failure of Attaching Hardware

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: Not Applicable

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION: Interface and structural load path between ET and adjustable bipod strut.

<u>FMEA ITEM CODE(S)</u>	<u>PART NO.</u>	<u>PART NAME</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>EFFECTIVITY</u>
4.5.44.1	80911009190-129 -509	Strut Assembly, Adjustable	1 1	LWT-54 thru 88 LWT-89 & Up

REMARKS:

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)  
CONTINUATION SHEET

SYSTEM: ASI  
SUBSYSTEM: ET Interface Hardware  
FMEA ITEM CODE(S): 4.5.44.1

REV & DATE: J, 12-19-97  
DCN & DATE:

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RATIONALE FOR RETENTION

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DESIGN:

- A, B: The strut end and adjusting collar are made from AMS-S663 PPT HT inconel bar. Materials are selected in accordance with MMC-ET-SE16 which assures repetitive conformance of composition and properties. Surface integrity is assured by penetrant inspection per STP2501. The strut assembly and attachment hardware are designed to the required ultimate safety factor of 1.4 (ET Stress Report 826-2188).
- B: Attaching hardware is selected from the Approved Standard Parts List (ASPL 826-3500), installed per STP2014 and torqued using values specified on Engineering drawings. Tensile installation loads are sufficient to provide screening for major flaws in individual fasteners.

TEST:

The Strut Assembly, Adjustable is certified. Reference HCS MMC-ET-TM08-L-S135 (LWT-54 thru 88) and HCS MMC-ET-TM08-L-S508 (LWT-89 & Up).

Vendor:

- B: Attaching fasteners are procured and tested to standard drawings 26L2 and 33L2.

INSPECTION:

Vendor Inspection - Lockheed Martin Surveillance:

- A, B: Verify materials selection and verification controls (MMC-ET-SE16, drawing 80911009187 and 80911009188 and standard drawings 26L2, 33L2).
- A: Inspect dimensional conformance (drawing 80911009187 and 80911009188).
- A: Penetrant inspect part (drawing 80911009188, 80911009187 and STP2501 Type 1 Method A).
- A: Inspect silver plating (80911009188).

MAF Quality Inspection:

- B: Inspect that attaching hardware is free from damage (drawing 80911009190 and STP2014).
- A, B: Verify fastener installation and witness torque (drawing 80911009190).

FAILURE HISTORY:

Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies and other failures experienced during ground processing activity can be found in the PRACA data base.