

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)

No. 10-04-01-01R/01

| | | | |
|--------------------------|--|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|
| SYSTEM: | Space Shuttle RSRM 10 | CRITICALITY CATEGORY: | 1R |
| SUBSYSTEM: | Lightning Protection, ESD, and Instrumentation 10-04 | PART NAME: | Grounding Strip, Systems Tunnel (2) |
| ASSEMBLY: | Lightning and ESD Protection 10-04-01 | PART NO.: | (See Section 6.0) |
| FMEA ITEM NO.: | 10-04-01-01R Rev M | PHASE(S): | Prelaunch, Boost (PL, BT) |
| CIL REV NO.: | M | QUANTITY: | (See Section 6.0) |
| DATE: | 31 Jul 2000 | EFFECTIVITY: | (See Table 101-6) |
| SUPERSEDES PAGE: | 505-1ff. | HAZARD REF.: | BC-11 |
| DATED: | 30 Jul 1999 | | |
| CIL ANALYST: | D. F. Bartelt | | |
| APPROVED BY: | | DATE: | |
| RELIABILITY ENGINEERING: | <u>K. G. Sanofsky</u> | | <u>31 Jul 2000</u> |
| ENGINEERING: | <u>S. R. Graves</u> | | <u>31 Jul 2000</u> |

- 1.0 FAILURE CONDITION: Failure during operation (D)
- 2.0 FAILURE MODE: 2.0 Failure to provide grounding for a lightning strike or for a case static charge buildup
- 3.0 FAILURE EFFECT: Failure of the Systems Tunnel Grounding System to dissipate a lightning strike or Electro Static Discharge (ESD) could cause premature severance of the nozzle exit cone, premature ignition, and separation of the RSRM causing loss of RSRM, SRB, crew, and vehicle

4.0 FAILURE CAUSES (FC):

| FC NO. | DESCRIPTION | FAILURE CAUSE KEY |
|---------|--|-------------------|
| 2.1 | Open circuit due to: | |
| 2.1.1 | Bondline failure of grounding strip due to: | |
| 2.1.1.1 | Improperly installed due to contamination, improper mixing, cure, pot life, quantity, surface preparation, or shelf life | A |
| 2.1.1.2 | Nonconforming adhesive properties | B |
| 2.1.2 | Broken or damaged grounding strip | C |

5.0 REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

SCREEN A: Pass--Testing and inspection provide verification of the grounding system integrity.
 SCREEN B: Fail--No provision is made for failure detection by the crew.
 SCREEN C: Fail--Contamination of the electrically-conductive adhesive could result in a grounding failure.

6.0 ITEM DESCRIPTION:

1. The systems tunnel grounding strip provides a grounding path for Systems Tunnel to case segments; 23 grounding strips are required per RSRM (See Figures 1 and 2). Materials are listed in Table 1.

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TABLE 1. MATERIALS

| Drawing No. | Name | Material | Specification | Quantity |
|----------------|-----------------------------------|---|---------------|-------------|
| 10182-0391-001 | Grounding strip | Aluminum Alloy 1100-0 | QQ-A-250/1 | 23 ea/Motor |
| 1U77610 | Segment, Rocket Motor, Forward | Composite of Components | | 1 ea/Motor |
| 1U77620 | Segment, Rocket Motor, Fwd Center | Composite of Components | | 1 ea/Motor |
| 1U77630 | Segment, Rocket Motor, Aft Center | Composite of Components | | 1 ea/Motor |
| | Conductive Adhesive | Org Resin with Conductive Filler and a Curing Agent | STW4-2874 | A/R/Motor |
| 1U77640 | Segment, Rocket Motor, Aft | | | 1/motor |

6.1 CHARACTERISTICS:

1. Grounding strips provide grounding of the systems tunnel to the case segments. The strips provide electrical dissipation of voltage from a lightning strike down the case to the nozzle area for exit to the Mobile Launch Platform ground system during prelaunch, or to the plume (which acts as part of the grounding medium) during boost (Figures 1 and 2).
2. Lightning Environment is per NASA specification NSTS 07636. Currents in a lightning flash are separated into three categories: (a) Return stroke surges, (b) Intermediate currents, and (c) Continuing currents. Return stroke currents mainly produce explosive effects and indirect effects. Intermediate and Continuing currents are primarily responsible for damage such as hole burning. These three categories are represented by idealized waveforms described in NSTS 07636.

7.0 FAILURE HISTORY/RELATED EXPERIENCE:

1. Current data on test failures, flight failures, unexplained failures, and other failures during RSRM ground processing activity can be found in the PRACA database.

8.0 OPERATIONAL USE: N/A

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



Figure 1. Grounding Strip



A0110270

Figure 2. Grounding Strip Section

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9.0 RATIONALE FOR RETENTION:

9.1 DESIGN:

DCN FAILURE CAUSES

- | | | |
|-----|-----|---|
| A | 1. | Conductive adhesive has an extremely low electrical resistance bond when cured per engineering. |
| A | 2. | Conductive adhesive tensile shear strength when cured is per engineering. |
| A | 3. | A minimum amount of grounding strip is bonded to the steel case segment using conductive adhesive. |
| A | 4. | Mating surfaces of the grounding strip and steel case segment are cleaned to bare metal per engineering. |
| A | 5. | Adhesive cure time and temperature are per engineering. |
| A | 6. | Mixed adhesive is uniform in appearance and free from visible contamination per engineering. |
| A,B | 7. | The mix ratio of the components of the conductive adhesive is per engineering. |
| A | 8. | Storage life of conductive adhesive is per engineering. |
| A,B | 9. | Conductive adhesive physical and electrical properties are per engineering. |
| A | 10. | The design requirement for electrical bonding is to verify the grounding strips connected to the systems tunnel floor plates are bonded to the RSRM Case and the electrical bond-resistance test is acceptable. |
| C | 11. | The material, aluminum 1100-0, was selected for its malleable quality and ability to withstand high vibration, shock, and fatigue. |

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9.2 TEST AND INSPECTION:

| FAILURE CAUSES and | | | | |
|--------------------|-------|-----|---|--------------------------------|
| DCN | TESTS | (T) | | CIL CODE |
| | | | 1. For New Segment, Rocket Motor (Forward, Forward Center, Aft Center, and Aft), verify: | |
| A | | | a. Ground strap and case bonding surfaces are cleaned | AET004,AEU004,AGA004,AEW004 |
| A | | | b. Conductive adhesive for ground strap bonding did not exceed shelf life prior to use | AET006,AEU006,AEW006,AGA006 |
| A,B | | | c. Cure of conductive adhesive for ground strap bonding | AET009,AEU009,AEW009,AGA009 |
| A,B,C | (T) | | d. Electrical bond resistance of each ground strap | AET010,AEU010,AEW010,AGA010 |
| C | | | e. Grounding straps, for breaks and damage after installation | AEU020,AGA020,AET021,AEW021 |
| A | | | f. Required amount of grounding straps are bonded to the case segment | AEU021,AGA021,AET022,AEW022 |
| A | | | g. Weigh up and mixing of conductive adhesive for ground strap bonding | ALW032,ALW032A,ALW032B,ALW032C |
| | | | 2. For New Adhesive, Electrically-Conductive verify: | |
| B | (T) | | a. Base resin density | ALW005,ALW006 |
| B | (T) | | b. Consistency | ALW010,ALW011 |
| B | (T) | | c. Cured material density | ALW016,ALW017 |
| A,B | (T) | | d. Tensile shear strength | ALW024,ALW025 |
| B | (T) | | e. Volume resistivity | ALW029,ALW030 |
| B | | | f. Workmanship is uniform in appearance and free from visible contamination | ALW027 |
| B | (T) | | g. Work life | ALW034,ALW035 |
| | | | 3. For Retest Adhesive, Electrically-Conductive verify: | |
| B | (T) | | a. Base resin density | ALW004 |
| B | (T) | | b. Tensile shear strength | ALW023 |
| | | | 4. For New Ground Strip, Systems Tunnel verify: | |
| C | | | a. No shipping or handling damage | AAA000 |
| | | | 5. KSC verifies: | |
| A,B,C | (T) | | a. Systems tunnel floor plate-to-case segment grounding strap is bonded in place on each motor prior to stacking per OMRSD, File V, Vol I, B47SG0.560 | OMD113 |