SRB CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

SUBSYSTEM: ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTATION

ITEM NAME: SRB OF Watertight Reusable Cable X02W1R J1 and X02W2R J1 or SRB OF Throwaway Cable

X02W1 J1 and X02W2 J1 [APU A1 and B1 Start Commands; APU A and B Fuel Shutoff

(Secondary) Valve Commands; APU A and B Pulse Control Valve Commands }

PART NO.: 10400-0003, 10400-0653 FM CODE: A04

10400-0004, 10400-0654

ITEM CODE: 50-04-X02 REVISION: Basic

CRITICALITY CATEGORY: 1R REACTION TIME: Immediate

NO. REQUIRED: 1 each DATE: March 1, 1996

CRITICAL PHASES: Boost SUPERCEDES: March 1, 1995

FMEA PAGE NO.: D-630 ANALYST; R. Smith/A. Craft

SHEET 1 OF 2 APPROVED: P. Kalia

FAILURE MODE AND CAUSES: Loss of APU A1 and B1 Start commands, and/or APU A and B Fuel Shutoff Valve commands, and/or APU A and B Pulse Control Valve commands (short only) in both cables due to:

One pin or wire open caused by: open solder, open wire, broken/bent pin, corroded pin.

- One pin or wire short to ground caused by: bent pin, contamination in connector, insulation breakdown, frayed shielding, abraded or cut insulation.
- Loss of connector caused by: connector not fully mated, improperly safety wired, improperly torqued, defective threads, mechanical overstress.

FAILURE EFFECT SUMMARY: Loss of APU A1 and B1 Start commands, APU A and B Fuel Shutoff Valve commands and/or OI Bus A and B power (short only) results in a loss of both APUs causing loss of TVC and loss of separation leading to loss of mission, vehicle and crew. One success path remains after the first failure. Operation is not affected until both paths are lost.

REDUNDANCY SCREENS AND MEASUREMENTS:

- Pass All cables are system tested during ground turnaround sequence.
- Pass-Event measurements B46X1861X, B46X1863X, B46X1851X through B46X1854X; Voltage measurements B76V1600C and B76V1601C
- Pass No credible causes.

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DR Document: RA-21

FM Code: 50-04-X02-A11, A12

Pate: March 1, 1996

RATIONALE FOR RETENTION:

A. DESIGN Per Appendix A Section # I & III

B. TESTING

1) VENDOR RELATED Per Appendix B Section # IA & IB

1) VENDOR RELATED For Appendix B Section # IA & ID

2) KSC RELATED Per Appendix B Section # HA

SYSTEM/ UNIQUE FUNCTIONAL

Cables are tested during Assembly Checkout Operations (ACO) (HPU BITE interlock tests) per 10REQ-0021, para. 2.3.4.3. (Open, Short or Loss of Connector)

Cables are again tested during hotfire operations per 10REQ-0021, para. 2.3.16.

After transfer to SPC, Cables are tested per OMRSD File V, Vol. 1. requirement number B42AP0.050 (APU Resistance BITE Tests)(Open, Short, Loss of connector).

Last time cables are tested is per OMRSD File II, Vol. 1, requirement number S00FR0.070 (Start SRB HPU and verify) at T-28 sec. (open, Short, Loss of connector)

C. INSPECTION

- 1) VENDOR RELATED Per Appendix C Section # IA (Soldered Connector)
- 2) KSC RELATED Per Appendix C Section # IIA
- D. FAILURE HISTORY

Failure Histories may be obtained from the PRACA database.

E. OPERATIONAL USE

Not applicable to this failure mode.

Supercedes: March 1, 1995 DR Document: RA-21