

April 19, 1996

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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1) CIL ITEM : F200-BW-01
2) FMEA CODE : F200-BW
3) COMPONENT : ENGINE DATA INTERFACE
4) PART NUMBER : RE1493
5) SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM : CONTROLLER/F200-KX
6) FAILURE MODE : DATA PATH FAILURE

7) PREPARED : SSME RELIABILITY
8) APPROVED :
9) DATE : 04-19-96
10) REVISION/CHANGE : -001/0
11) EFFECTIVITY : -05
12) HAZARD REFERENCE : SEE LISTINGS BELOW
13) CCBD # : MB-01-3285

PHASE	FAILURE DESCRIPTION/EFFECT	CRITICALITY
MC	<p>LOSS OF BOTH DATA PATHS FROM IN-CHARGE DCU RESULTS IN GPC ISSUING VDT SWITCHOVER COMMAND. FAILURE CAUSES LATE VEHICLE LON PREVALVE CLOSURE AND HPOTF OR LPOTF CAVITATION AND OVERSPEED, FIRE AND EXPLOSION. UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE. LOSS OF VEHICLE.</p> <p>REDUNDANCY SCREENS: CONTROLLER SYSTEM: LIKE REDUNDANCY</p> <p>A: PASS. REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEMS ARE CAPABLE OF CHECKOUT DURING NORMAL GROUND TURNAROUND. B: PASS. LOSS OF A REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEM IS DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT. C: PASS. LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEMS COULD NOT RESULT FROM A SINGLE CREDIBLE EVENT.</p>	<p>1R HAZARD REF: ME-C1A,C</p>

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CIL ITEM: F200-BN-01	DESIGN	DOCUMENT REF.
<p>ALL CAUSES: COMPUTER INTERFACE ELECTRONICS: VEHICLE RECORDER CHANNEL INTERFACE (1)</p> <p>THE VEHICLE RECORDER CHANNEL (VRC) INTERFACES ARE REDUNDANT (1). A FAILURE MUST OCCUR IN BOTH CONTROLLER CHANNELS (MULTIPLE FAILURE) TO CAUSE LOSS OF FUNCTION (2). VRC OPERATION IS VERIFIED BY THE VRC DUAL PORT MEMORY (DPM) READ/WRITE TEST, AND THE VCN OUTPUT TEST, DURING THE CONTROLLER CHECKOUT PORTION OF PREFLIGHT ENGINE CHECKOUT (2). DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS, THE VRC DPM SELF-TEST IS PERFORMED PRIOR TO EACH VRC TRANSMISSION (2). HOWEVER, NO SELF TEST IS PERFORMED ON THE TRANSMISSION OF DATA (2). THE OCU IN CONTRL LOADS THE VRC DATA AND INITIATES THE TRANSMISSION OF DATA TO THE ENGINE INTERFACE UNIT, UNLESS A SWITCH VRC COMMAND IS IN EFFECT (2).</p>	<p>(1) HONEYWELL BLOCK 11 FMEA VOL 118 C16-F25</p> <p>(1) DSH88977A1 (2) CP40680006 3.1.3:2 3.2.2:2 3.2.3:2 3.2.3:3 3.2.4</p>	
<p>ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL, AND ELECTROMECHANICAL PARTS FOR THE CIRCUITS INVOLVED IN THIS FUNCTION HAVE BEEN SELECTED FROM THE CLASS S OR EQUIVALENT APPROVED PARTS SELECTION LIST (1), QUALITY ASSURANCE AND SCREENING REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH RELIABILITY MICROCIRCUITS (2), AND THE SPECIFICATION CONTROL DRAWING FOR MICROCIRCUITS, MONOLITHIC SILICON, AND TRANSISTOR-TRANSISTOR LOGIC (TTL) FAMILY OF DEVICES (3). PRIOR TO INSTALLATION ON THE CARD ASSEMBLIES, COMPONENTS ARE SUBJECTED TO A BURN-IN PERIOD WHERE PARTS ARE EXERCISED AT TEMPERATURES IN EXCESS OF NORMAL CONTROLLER OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, BUT LESS THAN COMPONENT MAXIMUM SPECIFIED OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, TO SCREEN FOR INFANT MORTALITY (4). IN ADDITION TO THESE REQUIREMENTS, ALL COMPONENTS ARE DERATED FROM THE MAXIMUM RATING AT OPERATING EXTREMES (5). CLEANLINESS AND ALL PROCESSES USED DURING MANUFACTURE ARE CONTROLLED BY SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS (5).</p>	<p>(1) 85N03928, 85N03929 (2) 85N02704 (3) 85N03766 (4) 85N03876 (5) DSH88977A1</p>	
<p>THE CONTROLLER DESIGN MEETS ALL CEI FAIL-OPERATE/FAILSAFE REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS FAILURE MODE (1). REDUNDANT CONTROLLER CHANNEL FUNCTIONS ARE PHYSICALLY SEPARATED WITHIN THE CONTROLLER HOUSING (2). CIRCUITS ARE DESIGNED TO PREVENT BRIDGING (2), ALL EEE PARTS ARE REQUIRED TO HAVE CONFORMAL COATING, AND INTERNAL WIRING IS INSULATED TO PREVENT SHORT CIRCUITS FROM CONDUCTIVE CONTAMINATION (3). ALL ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS ARE CONTAINED WITHIN THE CASE STRUCTURE WHICH IS PRESSURIZED WITH A POSITIVE PRESSURE INERT GAS BACKFILL TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION (2). WHERE APPLICABLE, ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE SHIELDING IS PROVIDED AND CIRCUIT INTERCONNECTS USE TWISTED PAIR WIRING (2). ALL CIRCUIT CARDS ARE KEYED TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CONNECTION LOCATIONS TO PRECLUDE IMPROPER INSTALLATION (2). RAMP CLAMPS ARE UTILIZED TO PRECLUDE VIBRATION INDUCED CARD FAILURES (2). DESIGN OF CIRCUIT CARDS AND DETERMINATION OF COPPER PATH TRACE SPACING, WEIGHT, AND WIDTH IS CONTROLLED BY SPECIFICATION (2). EACH UNIT (PRODUCTION AND RECYCLE) IS REQUIRED TO PASS A FUNCTIONAL ACCEPTANCE TEST UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS BEYOND THOSE SEEN DURING NORMAL FIELD OPERATION WITHOUT DEGRADATION OF HARDWARE LIFE EXPECTANCY (2). A WORST CASE CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY NOMINAL OPERATION AT SPECIFICATION LIMITS (4). AN ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED BY HONEYWELL TO ASSURE NO SINGLE POINT COMPONENT FAILURES ARE INHERENT TO THE CONTROLLER DESIGN (5).</p>	<p>(1) CP320R00038 (2) DSH88977A1 (3) 85N03928 (4) ES24472-01 (5) HONEYWELL BLOCK 11 FMEA VOL 1</p>	

CIL ITEM: F200-BM-01	DESIGN	DOCUMENT REF.
DESIGN QUALIFICATION TESTING OF THE CONTROLLER ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN PERFORMED INCLUDING: FAULT INSERTION TESTING (1), ASSEMBLY THERMAL CYCLING (2), CASE AND ASSEMBLY VIBRATION TESTING (3), ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TESTING (4), ACOUSTICAL NOISE TESTING (5), CASE ULTIMATE PRESSURE TESTING (6), AND ASSEMBLY BREAK OPEN INSPECTION (7).		(1) TR34079282 TR34080202 TR34088258 TR34088259 (2) TR34080203 TR34080207 (3) TR34080204 TR34080205 TR34080206 TR34087499 (4) TR34080209 (5) TR34080210 (6) TR34085021 (7) TR34085022

CIL ITEM: F200-BM-01				INSPECTION AND TEST			
POSSIBLE CAUSES	SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS	INSPECTION(S)/TEST(S)		DOCUMENT REF.			
ALL CAUSES:	RE1493 - CONTROLLER	CLEANLINESS REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION DURING MANUFACTURING OF THE CONTROLLER ASSEMBLY.		RE1493			
	ASSEMBLY INTEGRITY	ENVIRONMENT CONTROLS (TEMPERATURE, HUMIDITY) ARE ENFORCED DURING ASSEMBLY AND TESTING PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.		RC1493			
		TO PREVENT COMPONENT DAMAGE, STATIC ELECTRICAL DISCHARGE POTENTIAL IS CONTROLLED DURING MANUFACTURING PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.		DSHG8977A1			
	MATERIAL INTEGRITY	MATERIAL INTEGRITY IS VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.		DSHG8977A1			
				RC1493			

C/L ITEM: F200-BW-01		INSPECTION AND TEST	
POSSIBLE CAUSES	SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS	INSPECTION(S)/TEST(S)	DOCUMENT REF.
		PROTECTIVE FINISHES AND MATERIAL SELECTION TO PREVENT DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS FROM ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE, STRESS CORROSION, AND ELECTROLYTIC CORROSION ARE VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RC1493 MSFC-SPEC-250
		FLAMMABILITY REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RC1493
	INTEGRITY OF ELECTRONICS	THE FOLLOWING PROCESSES ARE VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION DURING MANUFACTURING OF THE CARD ASSEMBLIES: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CONSTRUCTION OF PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS. - INSTALLATION OF TERMINALS. - PLASTICS AND ELASTOMERS FOR ELECTRONIC ENCAPSULATION. - SOLDERED ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS. - POST-SOLDERING INSPECTION FREE OF SPLATTER AND CONTAMINATION. - ELECTRICAL BONDING. - COMPONENT LEAD AND INTERCONNECTION MATERIAL SELECTION. - FREE OF CONTAMINATION AFTER CONFORMAL COATING. 	RL10005 RL10007 RL10008 RL10009 RL10009 RC1493 85M03928 RC1493
	WELD INTEGRITY	ALL WELDS ARE VERIFIED TO DRAWING AND SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RL10011
	PRE-CLOSEOUT TESTING AND INSPECTION	THE FOLLOWING TESTS ARE PERFORMED AT THE CARD/COMPONENT LEVEL DURING MANUFACTURING: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PARTIAL IMPACT NOISE DETECTION (PIND) TEST ON HYBRID MICROCIRCUITS AND CAVITY TYPE DEVICES. - ULTRASONIC SCAN TEST FOR DELAMINATION CERAMIC ON CAPACITORS (CKN05 AND CKR06). - BURN-IN PERIOD FOR ELECTRICAL PARTS. - INSULATION RESISTANCE AND CONTINUITY TEST. - DIELECTRIC WITHSTANDING VOLTAGE. - FUNCTIONAL TEST. - X-RAY OF CONTROLLER INTERNAL CABLES AND WIRES. 	DSHG8977A1 DSHG8977A1 85M03928 DSHG8977A1 DSHG8977A1 DSHG8977A1 DSHG8977A1

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CIL ITEM: F200-8W-01

INSPECTION AND TEST

POSSIBLE CAUSES	SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS	INSPECTION(S)/TEST(S)	DOCUMENT REF.
		<p>THE FOLLOWING INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED ON THE COMPLETED ASSEMBLY PRIOR TO FINAL CLOSURE:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CLEANLINESS. - CARD DIMENSIONS ARE VERIFIED AT CARD ASSEMBLY. - CHASSIS CAVITY INSPECTION FOR CONTAMINATION. - ELECTRICAL INTERFACE CONNECTORS. - CARD INSTALLATION AND CONFIGURATION AUDIT. - CONFORMAL COATING OF EEE PARTS. 	<p>RC1493 DSNG8977A1 RC1493 RC1493 DSNG8977A1 DSNG3928</p>
	ACCEPTANCE TESTS	<p>THE FOLLOWING TESTS ARE PERFORMED BY HONEYWELL DURING ACCEPTANCE TESTING:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - HERMETIC SEAL AND PRESSURIZATION PORT LEAK TEST. - FUNCTIONAL TEST INCLUDING: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - OUTPUT INTERFACE, - CHECKOUT, - OPERATION, - CONTROLLER CHECKOUT. - HIGH TEMPERATURE OPERATION. - LOW TEMPERATURE OPERATION. - VIBRATION TESTING. - FINAL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 	<p>RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493</p>
	NOT FIRE ACCEPTANCE TESTING (GREEN RUN)	CONTROLLER OPERATION IS VERIFIED THROUGH ENGINE HOT FIRE ACCEPTANCE TESTING.	RL00461
	HERMETIC SEAL INTEGRITY	INTERNAL PRESSURE IS MONITORED DURING CONTROLLER OPERATION.	OMRSD V41AND.040
	FLIGHT FLOW TESTING	<p>THE FOLLOWING TESTS ARE PERFORMED DURING FLIGHT FLOW VEHICLE PROCESSING AND AFTER ANY MAINTENANCE OR REPLACEMENT:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CONTROLLER CHECKOUT. - SENSOR CHECKOUT. - FLIGHT READINESS TEST. - SELF-TEST. 	<p>OMRSD V41AND.035 OMRSD V41AG0.010 OMRSD V41AS0.030-A CP406R0008</p>

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CIL ITEM: F200-BN-01		INSPECTION AND TEST	
POSSIBLE CAUSES	SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS	INSPECTION(S)/TEST(S)	DOCUMENT REF.
	PRE-FLIGHT CHECKOUT	<p>THE FOLLOWING TESTS ARE PERFORMED DURING LAUNCH COUNTDOWN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PRE-CRYO LOADING CHECKOUT INCLUDING CONTROLLER AND SENSORS. - SELF-TEST. <p>CONTROLLER OPERATION IS VERIFIED BY THE GROUND LAUNCH SEQUENCER PRIOR TO ENGINE START BY ACCEPTANCE OF COMMANDS PURGE SEQUENCE 4, POWER LEVEL, AND START ENABLE.</p>	<p>OMRSD SDOFAO.213 CP406R0008</p> <p>LAUNCH COMMIT CRITERIA 86E-4-1126</p>
	CONTINUOUS SELF-TEST	BITE TEST IS PERFORMED EVERY MAJOR CYCLE TO VERIFY HARDWARE INTEGRITY. (LAST TEST)	CP406R0008
<p>FAILURE HISTORY: COMPREHENSIVE FAILURE HISTORY DATA IS MAINTAINED IN THE PROBLEM REPORTING DATABASE (PRAMS/PRACA). REFERENCE: NASA LETTER SA21/88/308 AND ROCKETDYNE LETTER 88RCD9761.</p>			

OPERATIONAL USE: NOT APPLICABLE.