

Component Group:

Igniters and Sensors

CIL Item:

J210-02

Camponent:

Fuel Injection Pressure Transducer (G7.2) RE2233/RE97001

Part Number: Falture Mode:

Leakage into sensor housing,

Prepared:

M. Oliver T. Nguyen 3/30/89

Approved:
Approval Date:
Change #:
Directive #:

CCBD ME3-01-4994

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Phase	Failure / Effect Description	Criticalily Hazard Reference
* SMC 4.1	Leakage results in housing failure. Overpressurization of aft compartment. Loss of vehicle.	
7	Redundancy Screens; SINGLE POINT FAILURE: N/A	ME-D3S,A,M,C
	·	

SSME EA/CIL DESIGN

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Component: Fuel Injection Pressure Transducer (G7.2)

Part Number: Fallure Mode: RE2233/RES7001

Leakage Into sensor housing.

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T. Nguyer 3/30/99

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Design / Document Reference

FAILURE CAUSE: ALL CAUSES

STATHAM:

THE PRESSURE CAVITY AND EXTERNAL CASE ARE MANUFACTURED FROM INCONEL 218. THIS MATERIAL WAS SELECTED FOR ITS STRENGTH, TENSION MODULUS, WELDABILITY, CORROSION RESISTANCE, AND RESISTANCE TO STRESS CORROSION CRACKING (1). THE DESIGN CRITERIA FOR THE PRESSURE CAVITY REQUIRES THE UNIT TO BE CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING 1.5 TIMES THE FULL SCALE PRESSURE, WITHOUT COMPONENT DAMAGE (2). DESIGN REQUIRES BURST PRESSURE TO BE 3 TIMES FULL SCALE PRESSURE (2).

EATON:

THE DIAPHRAGM AND A PORTION OF THE ISOLATOR ASSEMBLY ARE MANUFACTURED FROM A-288. STRENGTH, DUCTILITY, ELASTIC MODULUS, RESISTANCE TO CORROSION, AND RESISTANCE TO NYOROGEN ENVIRONMENT EFFECTS ARE THE PRIMARY REASONS FOR SELECTING A-286 (1). THE REMAINDER OF THE ISOLATOR ASSEMBLY, PRESSURE CAVITY, AND EXTERNAL CASE ARE MANUFACTURED FROM 364L CRES. THIS MATERIAL WAS SELECTED FOR ITS STRENGTH, WELDABILITY, CORROSION RESISTANCE, AND RESISTANCE TO STRESS CORROSION CRACKING (1). DESIGN CRITERIA FOR BURST AND PROOF PRESSURE REQUIREMENTS ARE IDENTICAL IN BOTH DESIGNS (2).

THE SENSORS ARE A VENDOR ITEM, DRAWING SPECIFICATIONS AND MANUFACTURING PROCESSES ARE CONTROLLED BY ROCKETOYNE (2), WELD CONTROLS INCLUDE WELD PREPARATION, CLEANLINESS, OPERATOR CERTIFICATION, AND WELD PARAMETERS (2). ALL SENSOR DESIGNS ARE SUBJECTED TO A CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW. ANY DESIGN CHANGES ARE RE-REVIEWED (2). THE SENSORS HAVE COMPLETED DESIGN VERIFICATION TESTING (3), INCLUDING VIBRATION TESTING (4). THE MINIMUM FACTORS OF SAFETY MEET CEI REQUIREMENTS (5). THE SENSORS WERE ANALYZED FOR HIGH CYCLE FATIGUE AND LOW CYCLE FATIGUE LIFE AND MEET CEI REQUIREMENTS (6). TABLE J210 LISTS ALL THE FMEA/CII, WELDS AND IDENTIFIES THOSE WELDS IN WHICH THE CRITICAL INITIAL FLAW SIZE (S NOT DETECTABLE, AND THOSE WELDS IN WHICH THE ROOT SIDE IS NOT ACCESSIBLE FOR INSPECTION. THESE WELDS HAVE BEEN ASSESSED AND DETERMINED TO HAVE IMPROVED ULTIMATE AND YIELD STRENGTHS, ENDURANCE LIMITS AND FRACTURE TOUGHNESS OVER THOSE WELDS LIST IN THE WELD ASSESSMENT (7). SENSORS FROM ENGINE 2010 (EATON) WERE RE-SUBJECTED TO ACCEPTANCE TESTING SENSORS FROM ENGINE 2014 (STATHAM) WERE RE-SUBJECTED TO ACCEPTANCE TESTING. ALL SENSORS MET ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.

(1) RSS-8582; (2) RC7001; (3) DVS-SSME-203, RSS-8660; (4) RSS-203-13, RSS-203-14; (5) RSS-8546, CP320R00038; (6) RL00632, CP320R0003B, (7) VRS-0550





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Component:

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Part Number:

RE2233/RES7001

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Fallure Causes	Significant Characteristics		1 of 1
LL CAUSES		Inspection(s) / Test(s)	Document Reference
ILL LAUSES	SINGLE PICKUP, DUAL OUTPUT, PRESSURE TRANSDUCER		RE2233 / RES7001
	MATERIAL INTEGRITY	MATERIAL INTEGRITY IS VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	
	WELDINTEGRITY	ALL WELDS ARE INSPECTED TO DRAWING AND SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS PER WELD CLASS. INSPECTIONS INCLUDE: VISUAL, DIMENSIONAL, PENETRANT, RADIOGRAPHIC, ULTRASONIC, AND FILLER MATERIAL, AS APPLICABLE.	RC7001
	ASSEMBLY INTEGRITY	TRANSDUCERS ARE PROOF PRESSURE TESTED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	
		VACUUM CASE IS LEAK CHECKED TO VERIFY SEAL PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	
		AFTER THE CASE IS WELDED, HELIUM LEAK TESTS ARE PERFORMED TO VERIFY HERMETIC SEAL.	
		ALL VENDOR INSPECTION AND TEST CRITERIA IS UNDER ROCKETDYNE APPROVAL AND CONTROL	
	HOT FIRE ACCEPTANCE TESTING (GREEN RUN)	SENSOR OPERATION IS VERIFIED THROUGH HOT FIRE ACCEPTANCE TESTING.	RL00461
·····	DATA REVIEW	ALL CONTROLLER DATA FROM THE PREVIOUS FLIGHT OR HOT FIRE IS REVIEWED. ANY ANOMALOUS CONDITION NOTED REQUIRES FURTHER TESTING OR HARDWARE REPLACEMENT PRIOR TO THE NEXT FLIGHT.	MSFC PLN 1228
	PRE-FLIGHT CHECKOUT	SENSORS ARE VISUALLY INSPECTED.	
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	SENSOR OPERATION IS VERIFIED EVERY MISSION FLOW BY SUGGESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE CONTROLLER SENSOR ELECTRICAL CHECKOUT (LAST TEST).	OMR\$D V418D0.03 OMR\$D V41AQ0.01 OMR\$D \$00FA0.21

Failure History;

Comprehensive (alture history data is maintained in the Problem Reporting database (PRAMS/PRACA)

Roference: NASA letter \$A21/88/308 and Rocketdyne letter 88RC08761.

Operational Use: Not Applicable.





Component Group:

Ignitors and Sensors

flem Name: Hem Number: Fuel Injection Pressure Transducer (G7.2)

J210

Part Number:

RE2233/RE57001

Prepared:

M. Oliver T. Nguyan 3/30/99


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Dase Line Rationale	Variance		Tof 1
J210 - These welds have been		Change Rationale .	Variani Dash Number
assessed and determined to have improved ultimate and yield strengths, endurance limits and tracture loughness over those walds listed in the welf assessment (VRS-D550).	Welds we're assessed as acceptable for tilght by risk assessment (RSS-8756).	New design eliminates one weld and increases overall component strength. USE AS IS RATIONALE: Welded assemblies mae! all CEI requirements (RSS-8758). /	RES7001-214,234 RE9233-051
J210 - New design improves productivity inspectability and reliability of the transducer. Now design reduces the risk of the introduction of conductive contemination.	An internal vacuum case is used for zero pressure reference point.	New design eliminates internel vacuum case and reduces potential for conductive contamination. USE AS IS rationale. Functionality of zero pressure reference is maintained.	RES700(-214, - 234 RE2233-051



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Igniters and Sensors J210 Fuel Injection Pressure Transducer (G7.2) RE2233/RE\$7001

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Commonant		,			Roal Side Not	Flaw 5	il Initial Size Not ctable	
Component	Basic Part Number	Weld Number	Weld Type	Class	Access	HCF	LCF	Comments
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER	RE2233/RES7001							Dominierus
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER	JKR1900	CCC-7	EBW	II	x	х	x	
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER	JLD 1900	CCC-2	EBW	ı.	x	x	x	
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER	JVA1900	CCC-5	EBW	N	x	^	^	
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER	67456	5-2	GTAW	ii	x	x		
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER	64458	S-3	EBW	11	x	^		
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER	64458	S-4	EBW	ü	x			
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER	67453	S-5	EBW	ii	x			
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER	57463	S-6	EBW))	×			