

USA Ground Operations CIL Sheet

Critical Item: OC-3 Circuit Pack

Criticality Category: 1

NASA Part No: None

Total Quantity: 28

Mfg/Part No: Lucent Technologies / LAA10

System: Synchronous Optical Network (SONET)

Find No.	Qty	Area	PMN	Baseline	Drawing / Sheet
2, located in slots 5A-7A	5	CD&SC	K61-5540	068.25	80K57608 / 5
2, located in slots 5A-7A	5	SSPF	K61-5541	068.25	80K58245 / 6
2, located in slots 5A-7A	5	VABR	K61-5542	068.25	80K57609 / 5
2, located in slots 5A-7A	5	OSB	K61-5543	068.25	80K58990 / 7
2, located in slots 8A & 8B	2	LCC	K61-5544	068.25	80K58033 / 6
2, located in slots 8A & 8B	2	PCC	K61-5545	068.25	80K59046 / 7
2, located in slots 8A & 8B	2	Pad B	K61-5546	068.25	80K58035 / 6
2, located in slots 8A & 8B	2	Pad A	K61-5547	068.25	80K58034 / 6

Function:

Provides a bi-directional low speed interface to convert STS-3 electrical signals to OC-3 optical signals and vice versa during flow processing and launch countdown.

Failure Mode No. Failure Mode	Failure Cause Failure Effect	Detection Method Time to Effect	Crit Cat
00030.003 Corruption of data	Electrical failure/product defect/software error Presentation of invalid data to critical user systems if corrupt packet is not detected during transmission. Making a critical decision based on invalid data could result in loss of life/vehicle.	None Seconds	1

ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE

Design:

- Equipment designed to industry standards.
- Underwriters Laboratory (UL) and Canadian Standards Association (CSA) listed.
- Multiple layers of error checking are employed to detect corrupt data packets.
- Dual ring network used where the signal integrity on each ring is monitored. Ring switch will occur on a poc signal indication (loss of signal or signal degradation).

Test:

- System was tested during installation.

Inspection:

- None.

Failure History:

- Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies, and other failures experienced during ground processing activities can be found in the PRACA database. The PRACA database was researched and no data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.

Operational Use:

Correcting Action	Timeframe
There is no action which can be taken to mitigate the failure effect.	Since no correcting action is available, timeframe does not apply.