

U.S. Gov't

SAA09FTAB31-001

OCT 13 1993

B/L: 252.00
 SYS: PAYLOAD
 GROUND HAN-
 DLING MECH-
 ANISM

Critical Item: ROLLER CHAIN (8 Items Total)
Find Number: 178, 104
Criticality Category: 2

SAA No: 09FTAB31-001

System/Area: UPPER/LOWER FLOATING
 BEAM ASSEMBLY / PADS A &
 B

NASA**Part No:** NONE**PMN/**

Name: H70-0534
 PAYLOAD GROUND HANDLING
 MECHANISM

Mfg/ ACME CHAIN
Part No: ANSI STD, No. 40

Drawing/ 79K22693, 79K22694
Sheet No: 1 TO 5

Function:

Transmits torque from the manual Zo drive wheel to the 10 Ton actuator for moving and holding the payload.

Critical Failure Mode/Failure Mode No:

Chain Disengages/09FTAB31-001.003

Failure Cause:

Structural Failure of chain, sprocket keys or chain slips from sprocket.

Failure Effect:

Loss of holding torque could cause the manually driven 10 ton actuator to backdrive resulting in a shift of the payload. This could cause loss (damage) to a vehicle system. Detection Method : Visual. Time to Effect : Seconds

ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE**Design:**

- The chain is an off-the-shelf item manufactured by Acme Chain Co. Inc.

- With a 71,000 lb. load on the front end consisting of a 65,000 lb payload and 6,000 lbs. of support equipment, the chain safety factor based on the manufacturers maximum loading is greater than 59:1 (ultimate) and the sprocket key 34:1 (ultimate).
- Chain material is AISI 1040 carbon steel (Side Plates) and AISI 1024 carburized and hardened carbon steel (Pins).
- Design is based on ANSI B29.10M.

Test:

The Upper/Lower manual Zo actuators are operationally checked (without a load) monthly per OMI V6F09 except during a payload flow.

Inspection:

OMRSD File VI requires the drive chains and sprockets to be inspected annually for the following.

- The chain is inspected for corrosion, tightness, sprocket/chain alignment, and the master link for security.
- The sprocket key setscrew on the handwheel and actuator is inspected for security.

Failure History:

- The PRACA database was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.
- The GIDEP failure data interchange system was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.

Operational Use:

- Correcting Action:


There is no action which can be taken to mitigate the failure effect.

- Timeframe:

Since no correcting action is available, timeframe does not apply.

SAA09FTAB31-001

OCT 13 1993



UPPER CROSSHEAD
ASSEMBLY ACTUATORS

PAYLOAD GROUND HANDLING MECHANISM

Attachment
5050234BK
Sheet 18 of 25

U.S. Gov't

SAA09FTAB31-001

OCT 13 1993




FIGURE 19. BALL SCREW ACTUATOR (ROTATING SCREW TYPE), UPPER CROSSHEAD - 53

*Attachment
5050234BK
Sheet 19 of 25*