

**USA Ground Operations CIL Sheet DEC 15 1999****Critical Item:** Fuse, 5 Amp**NASA Part No:** None**Mfg/Part No:** Amp Trap / ATDR 5**System:** FSS Electrical Passenger Elevators**Criticality Category:** 1S**Total Quantity:** 8

Find No.	Qty	Area	PMN	Baseline	Drawing / Sheet
F1	1	Pad-A	K60-0597-01	420.00	E835001E /
F1	1	Pad-A	K60-0597-02	420.00	E835001E /
F1	1	Pad-B	K60-0597-06	420.00	E828801D /
F1	1	Pad-B	K60-0597-07	420.00	E828801D /
F2	1	Pad-A	K60-0597-01	420.00	E835001E /
F2	1	Pad-A	K60-0597-02	420.00	E835001E /
F2	1	Pad-B	K60-0597-06	420.00	E828801D /
F2	1	Pad-B	K60-0597-07	420.00	E828801D /

**Function:**

Provide overcurrent protection to elevator control equipment.

Failure Mode No. Failure Mode	Failure Cause Failure Effect	Detection Method Time to Effect	Crit Cat
09FY018-001.272 Premature operation	Internal piece part failure.  Possible loss of car mobility and/or failure of door operation. Loss of elevator function would prevent / delay ingress of rescue personnel during Flight Crew /Red Crew/Close-Out Crew rescue operations. Possible entrapment of personnel during hazardous fuel spill or fire. Could result in loss of life during a hazardous condition.	Loss of car mobility.  Immediate	1S

**ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE****Design:**

- This fuse is typical equipment used in industry for the intended application.
- The design of the FSS elevator systems are consistent with ASME A17.1 (1994) Safety Code For Elevators And Escalators.

**Test:**

- The State of Florida requires bi-annual elevator inspection and certification.
- Annual testing and certification of elevators is performed per ANSI/ASME A17.1.
- OMRSD File VI requires that the FSS elevators are functionally tested (Ref. OMI S0007VL2) at T-8 hours.
- The Pad Close-out Crew performs additional functional check-out at T-25 Minutes.

**Inspection:**

- OMI Q3018 requires inspection and functional test after each launch.
- OMI Q6009 requires monthly inspection of Pad Electrical Passenger Elevators.

**Failure History:**

- Failures have been experienced with the elevator systems, however they have been attributed to burn-in type causes which do not represent current elevator operation. Critical failure modes identified are not represented in the burn-in type failures experienced.

- Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies, and other failures experienced during ground

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processing activities can be found in the PRACA database. The PRACA database was researched and no data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.

**Operational Use:**

<b>Correcting Action</b>	<b>Timeframe</b>
There is no action which can be taken to mitigate the failure effect.	Since no correcting action is available, timeframe does not apply.