SAA09FY12-005

REV. B

MAR 1 1 1994

B/L: 389.00

SYS: 250-TON BRIDGE CRANE, VAB

Critical Item:

Relay, Auxiliary Hoist (2 Total, 1/Crane)

Find Number:

2FW

Criticality Category:

SAA No:

09FY12-005

System/Area:

250-Ton Bridge Crane

(#1 & #2)/VAB

NASA

Part No:

NA

PMN/

K60-0533, K60-0534/

Name:

250-Ton Bridge Crane

(#1 & #2)/VAB

Mfg/

Westinghouse/

Drawing/

69-K-L-11388/

Part No:

cat. # 15825K2CNN,

Sheet No:

17, 18

mech style # 453D263G02

Function: The relay energizes when power is applied to the crane, closing the three normally open (N.O.) contacts. The two series arranged contacts bypass resistor 2FWR to allow an increase in current to the DC motor field windings to strengthen the field. The third enables, but does not energize relay 2SRX.

The relay is deenergized while in the high speed mode, which opens the contacts, to place resistors 2FWR and RESA in series with the field windings to reduce the current and weaken the field.

Critical Fallure Mode/Fallure Mode No:

- Falls deactivated (colf falls open)/09FY12-005.106
- b. N.O. contact fails open (1 of 3)/09FY12-005.107

Fallure Cause:

- a. Corrosion, fatigue
- b. Corrosion, binding mechanism.

Fallure Effect:

a. The N.O. contacts will be opened plus my resistors 2FWR and RESA in series with the DC motor field windings. The field will be weakened by the reduction of current through the windings. The hoist will be in the bute speed mode configuration. The worst case scenario would be lowering a critical load ISRB forward assembly) in the coarse speed mode (maximum coarse speed is 25 th min), the failure occurring causing the hoist speed to increase to approximately throughings the commanded speed, and the effect being the critical load descending and straking the VAB floor, transporter, work plat-

Attachment S050234CK Sheet 136 of 147 forms, MLP, or Shuttle Stack resulting in possible damage to a vehicle system. Time to effect: seconds.

b. The N.O. contacts (1 of 3) will be opened placing resistor 2FWR or RESA in series with the DC motor field windings. The field will be weakened by the reduction of current through the windings. The hoist will descend at a higher rate of speed than expected (speed will be approximately double of the commanded input). The worst case scenario would be lowering a critical load (SRB forward assembly) in the coarse speed mode (maximum coarse speed is 25 ft/min), the failure occurring causing the hoist speed to increase to approximately two times the commanded speed, and the effect being the critical load descending and striking the VAB floor, transporter, work platforms, MLP, or Shuttle Stack resulting in possible damage to a vehicle system. Time to effect: seconds.

ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE

Design:

Contact Ratings

Actual

600 volts

183 volts

50 amps

14 amps

Coil Ratings

Actual

550 volt-amps

Testing required

- · Contact material: silver.
- This relay was off-the-shelf hardware selected by the crane manufacturer for this application.

Test

- OMRSO file VI requires verification of proper performance of hoist operational test annually.
- OMI Q3008, Operating Instructions, requires all crane systems to be operated briefly in all speeds to verify satisfactory operation before lifting operations.

inspection:

OMI Q8003, Maintenance Instructions, requires annual inspection of contacts and contact
members for burning, pitting, proper absorbert, and discoloration caused by overheating;
visual check of closing coils for determined insulation and evidence of overheating or
burning.

Failure History:

- The PRACA database was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.
- The GIDEP failure data interchange system was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.

 Attachment

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Operational Use:

- Correcting Action:
 - The failure can be recognized via the Selsyn (positions change) that is in view of both operators.
 - When the failure indication is noticed, the operator can stop all crane operations by pressing the E-Stop button.
 - Operators are trained and certified to operate these cranes and know and understand what to do if a failure indication is present.
 - 4) During all critical lifts, there is at least one remote Emergency Stop (E-Stop) operator observing the load lift, and can stop the crane if a failure indication is noticed.
 - Operationally, the crane must be operated in the fine or float speed mode if a critical load is within 10 feet of any structure in the direction of travel.
- Timeframe:
 - Estimated operator reaction time is 3 to 10 seconds.

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