SAA09FY12-005

REV. B

MAR 1 1 1994

B/L: 389.00 SYS: 250-TON BRIDGE CRANE, VAB

Critical Item:

Relay, Auxiliary Hoist (2 Total, 1/Crane)

Find Number:

2HS

2

Criticality Category:

SAA No:

09FY12-005

System/Area:

250-Ton Bridge Crane

(#1 & #2)/VAB

NASA Part No:

NA

PMN/

K60-0533, K60-0534/

Name:

250-Ton Bridge Crane

(#1 & #2)/VAB

Mfg/

General Electric/

Drawing/

69-K-L-11388/

Part No:

CR120A06002AA

Sheet No:

17

Function: The relay energizes to open the normally closed (N.C.) contact which deenergizes relay 2FW to allow the hoist to operate in the high speed mode.

Critical Fallure Mode/Failure Mode No: N.C. contact fails open/09FY12-005.111

Fallure Cause: Corrosion

Failure Effect: The N.C. contact will open, deenergizing relay 2FW, which places resistors 2FWR and RESA in series with the DC motor field windings. The field will be weakened by the reduction of current through the windings. The hoist will be in the high speed mode configuration. The worst case scenario would be lowering a critical load (SRB forward assembly) in the coarse speed mode (maximum coarse speed is 25 ft/min), the failure occurring causing the hoist speed to increase to approximately three times the commanded speed, and the effect being the critical load descending and striking the VAB floor, transporter, work platforms, MLP, or Shuttle Stack resulting in possible damage to a vehicle system. Time to effect: seconds.

ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE

Design:

Contact Ratings

<u>Actual</u>

300 volts 10 amps 120 volts Testing required

Contact Material: Silver Cadmium Oxide, Self-cleaning.

 This relay was off-the-shelf hardware selected by the crane manufacturer for this application.

Attachment

X - 320.05

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Test:

- OMRSD File VI requires verification of proper performance of hoist operational test annually.
- OMI Q3008, Operating Instructions, requires all crane systems to be operated briefly in all speeds to verify satisfactory operation before lifting operations.

Inspection:

 OMI Q6003, Maintenance Instructions, requires annual inspection of contacts and contact members for burning, pitting, proper alignment, and discoloration caused by overheating; visual check of closing colls for deteriorated insulation and evidence of overheating or burning.

Failure History:

- The PRACA database was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.
- The GIDEP fallure data interchange system was researched and no fallure data was found on this component in the critical fallure mode.

Operational Use:

- Correcting Action:
 - The fallure can be recognized via the Selsyn (positions change) that is in view of both operators.
 - 2) When the failure indication is noticed, the operator can stop all crane operations by pressing the E-Stop button.
 - Operators are trained and certified to operate these cranes and know and understand what to do if a failure indication is present.
 - 4) During all critical tifts, there is at least one remote Emergency Stop (E-Stop) operator observing the load lift, and can stop the crane if a failure indication is noticed.
 - Operationally, the crane must be operated in the fine or float speed mode if a critical load is within 10 feet of any structure in the direction of travel.

Timeframe:

Estimated operator reaction time is 3 to 10 seconds.

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