

APR 10 1992

SAA08UP05-001

Ø/L: 043.06
SYS: UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM AT THE OPF HB-3

Critical Item: Uninterruptible Power Supply (1 Item Total)
Find Number: None
Criticality Category: 1S

SAA No: 08UP05-001 System/Area: UPS/OPF HB-3
NASA PMN/
Part No: None Name: K61-1570/UPS
Mfg/ Drawing/
Part No: System 80 Model 50 Sheet No: 80K53589

Function: Provides a source of uninterruptible 60 HZ power to the following critical loads: ODMS, Hazard Warning Lights, and Paging/Area Warning.

Critical Failure Mode/Failure Mode No: No output/08UP05-001.001

Failure Cause: Internal Piece Part Failure (Output Transformer Assembly and Switching Logic Circuits).

Failure Effect: Inability to provide uninterrupted power to critical loads during the existence of a hazardous condition could cause loss of life. Time to effect is immediate.

ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE

Design:

- Continuous duty, on-line, solid state construction
- Microprocessor controlled logic
- 50 KVA rated, 37 KVA estimated load
- Alarm/status indication for both primary and bypass power functions
- Independent primary and bypass inputs

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Test:

- OMRSD File VI will require verification of proper operation prior to each flow
- PMI UPS 01 to require:
 - 100% Load Check to be performed annually
 - Verification of Switching Logic's proper operation to be performed semi-annually
 - Battery Sustainance Check to be performed semi-annually
 - Insulation Resistance Check (Hi-Pot) of Output Transformer at initial installation and after suspected moisture contamination

Inspection: PMI UPS 01 to require inspections for liquid and/or dry contamination, corroded electrical contacts and improperly torqued mechanical fittings per manufacturer's specified intervals.

Failure History:

- The PRACA database was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.
- The GIDEP failure data interchange system database was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.

Operational Use:

- **Correcting Action:**

There is no action which can be taken to mitigate the failure effect.
- **Timeframe:**

Since no correcting action is available, timeframe does not apply.

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