

E01-SAA29PP129-001  
Sheet 8 of 8

~~SAA29PP129-001~~  
B/L: 72.06  
72.63  
SYS: Fuel Cell  
Deservicing  
MAY 19 1992

Critical Item: Check Valve (1 Item Total)

Find Number: A106627

Criticality Category: 15

SAA No: 29PP129-001

System/Area: Fuel Cell Detank &  
Safing SLS, SLF and CLS

NASA  
Part No: 220T-8BB

PWH/ 570-1225-02  
Name: LH2 Horiz. Drain Pnl

Mfg/ James, Pond and Clark  
Part No: 220T-8BB

Drawing/ 79K15491 - Pg 1-2  
Sheet No: 79K15493 - Pg 1-2

Function: Prevent reverse flow from the vent line into the GHe supply system.

Critical Failure Mode/Failure Mode No: Fail Closed/29PP129-001.007

Failure Causes: Contamination/Corrosion

Failure Effect: Possible loss of the LH2 vent stack purge. Loss of purge when flowing H2 could result in an explosive mixture in the vent line, causing a fire or explosion with loss of life and/or vehicle. There is no method to detect loss.

Time to Effect: Immediate

Acceptance Rationale

<u>Design:</u>	<u>Rated:</u>	<u>Actual:</u>
Operating Pressure	- 3000 PSI	275 PSI
Proof Pressure	- 4500 PSI	-
Burst Pressure	- 12000 PSI	-
Operating Temp	- 40°F to +250°F	Ambient
Body Material	- 300 Series SST	-
Spring Material	- 302 SST	-
Seal Material	- Buna N and Teflon	-

All material in this Check Valve is compatible for use with dry air, helium, hydrogen and nitrogen.

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A106627 (Continued)

This Check Valve is designed to allow flow to occur with a maximum cracking pressure of 8 PSI and to remain bubble tight in the reverse flow direction over the entire range of inlet and outlet pressures.

Test: The manufacturer performs the following tests:

- o Proof pressure test
- o 8 PSI max. cracking pressure test
- o Leakage test

Inspection:

- o OHS 79K16224, requires this Check Valve to be leak checked at component replacement.
- o File VI requires the vent stack purge flow to be verified audibly, prior to starting H2 drain operations.

Failure History:

- o The PRACA database was queried and no failures in the critical failure mode were found.
- o The GIDEP failure data interchange system has been researched and no failures of this component were found.

Operational Use:

- o Corrective Action:  
There is no action which can be taken to mitigate the failure effect.
- o Timeframe:  
Since no corrective action is available, timeframe does not apply.

WORKSHEET 5122-012  
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