
CIL EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST 5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/31/2001

NAME FAILURE

NAME FAILURE
P/N MODE &
OTY CRIT CAUSES

FAILURE EFFECT RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE

102FM15

0102-82437-27 (RUCOTHANE) (1)

0102-82437-28 (HELASTIC) Restricted gas flow, return vent duct.

Contamination or foreign material entrained in the return vent tube, missing or loose screws.

END ITEM:
Partially
blocked vent
flow return
duct.

GFE INTERFACE:
Reduced flow
rate.

MISSION: Terminate EVA. Loss of use of one EMU.

CREW/VEHICLE: None for first failure. Loss of crewman if SOP or Item 121 vent flow sensor fails.

TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: Seconds. Actuate purge valve, return to airlock.

TIME AVAILABLE: Minutes.

TIME REQUIRED: Seconds.

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A-PASS B-PASS C-PASS

A. Design -

Vent system design flow measured across PLSS inlet and outlet ports may not exceed 0.43 inches of water at 8.9 pph of 02 at 4.3 psia.

This indicates that some blockage could occur without exceeding pressure drop limits. The duct cross-section is approx. 1 x 3/8 inch and is unlikely to be completely blocked by normal debris generated during one flight. Screens located at the end of the arm and leg vent ducts will keep some foreign material from entering the vent system.

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B. Test -

Acceptance:

Vendor certification and lot acceptance testing is required for all materials prior to manufacture of each item.

PDA:

HUT vent system pressure drop is measured per ILC Document 0111-70028J (Pivoted HUT) or 0111-710112 (Planar HUT) during PDA.

Certification:

Helastic:

Bench testing to S/AD requirements of 461 hours pressurized time was performed at ILC Dover. Ref. Cert Test Report for the SSA, ILC Document 0111-70027. Pressure drop testing for vent lines monitored during cert testing of bladder flocking and showed no significant flock accumulation over the six year life of the bladders. Ref. ILC EM 85-1034. The vent tube assembly on the cert HUT has been in use for approximately 2400 hours without failure.

Rucothane:

The Rucothane HUT Vent Duct was certified by similarity to the Helastic HUT Vent Duct. Ref. ILC Cert Test Report 0111-711669.

C. Inspection -

During PDA, in accordance with ILC Document 0111-70028J (Pivoted HUT) or 0111-710112 (Planar HUT), the following MIP's are performed.

- 1. Verify quality of workmanship and cleanliness.
- 2. Verify no structural damage after proof pressure test.

D. Failure History -

Helastic:

B-EMU-102-A020 (6/28/92) - The Water Line Vent Tube Assembly was not firmly attached to the HUT flange due to two out of four improperly torqued screws. The Maintenance Manual installation and torquing procedures for the four screws at the WLVTA/HUT interface has been split into two steps, one for the two forward pan head screws and one for the two aft socket head screws.

Rucothane:

None.

E. Ground Turnaround -

Tested for non-EET processing per FEMU-R-001, Fan/Pump/Separator/Vent Flow Sensor Performance. None for EET processing. Additionally, every 229 hours of manned pressurized time the Planar HUT is demated from the DCM and PLSS and

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subjected to HUT level gas and structural and leakage tests and gas Delta "P" tests. Additionally, every 56 hours of manned pressurized time the Pivoted HUT is demated from the DCM and PLSS and subjected to HUT level gas and structural and leakage tests and gas Delta "P" tests. Additionally, every 229 hours of manned pressurized time the Planar HUT is demated from the DCM and PLSS and subjected to HUT level gas and water structural and leakage tests and gas delta "P" tests.

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F. Operational Use -

Crew Response -

Pre EVA; Trouble-shoot problem, if no success, consider EMU 3 if available. EMU no go for EVA.

EVA: When CWS data detects loss of ventilation flow, open helmet purge valve to anti-fog helmet and clear CO2 if required.

Training -

Crewmembers are trained to recognize the symptoms of high CO2.

Operational Considerations -

Flight rules define go/no go criteria related to EMU ventilation flow. Flight rules require termination of EVA upon activation of SOP unscheduled EVA. EVA checklist and FDF procedures verify hardware integrity and system operational status prior to EVA. Real Time Data System allows ground monitoring of EMU systems.

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-102 HARD UPPER TORSO (HUT)

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

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