

FMEA
 FMEA FAILURE MODE, EFFECT ANALYSIS

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12/24/95 SUPERSEDES 12/24/92

ANALYST:

NAME P/N QTY	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	MISSION PHASE	FAILURE EFFECT	FAILURE DETECTION FLIGHT/GROUND	TIME TO EFFECT/ ACTIONS	CRIT	REMARKS/ HAZARD	REF
WRIST DISCONNECT, ITEM 103 (1) LEFT (1) RIGHT ----- A/L 9813-05/9814-05 (2)	Provides for attachment of restraint and bladder materials of the lower arm. Provides pressure retention and axial load link between glove and lower arm.	103FM22; Failure of one lock. CAUSE: Contamination or foreign matter in latch recess. Defective material; lock subassembly. Impact.	PREEVA EVA POSTEVA	END ITEM: One of the three independent locks is not engaged. GFE INTERFACE: None for single primary lock failure. There are three redundant locking mechanisms. MISSION: None for single or double lock failures. CREW/VEHICLE: None with failure of one primary lock. None with failure of the second primary lock. Loss of crewman with loss of all three locks.	FLIGHT: None. GROUND: Yes. FEMU-R-001, Para. 7.4.4.3.4 Glove Secondary Lock Inspection.	None. TIME AVAILABLE: M/A TIME REQUIRED: N/A	3/1R A-PASS B-N/A C-PASS	There are two independent primary locks in addition to the secondary lock/lock. Both would have to fail before inadvertent opening occurred. The standby redundant system is the two other independent locks and rotation.	FEMU-R-001 Para, 7.4.4.3.4.