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EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/31/2001

Date: 4/24/2002

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			0, 00, 200		-,				Date: 4/24/2002
NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE	FOR ACCEPTAN	ICE			
		104FM24							
BRIEF ASSEMBLY, ITEM 104 0104-811071-04 (1)	2/1R	Loss of primary axial restraint webbing.	END ITEM: Loss of primary axial restraint.  GFE INTERFACE:	A. Design - The Brief Assembly axial restraints are fabricated from 3/4" wide Spectra 1000 webbing. Size "F" and "FF" polyester thread conforming to V-T-285D type II, class I is used to fabricate the primary axial restraints with type 301 lock stitching conforming to FED-STD-751A. Seams are terminated by backtack and searing of thread ends. Worn thread is precluded by design as a function of tabrasion protecton afforded the axial restraints by the TMG.				-T-285D type II, th type 301 lock by backtack and as a function of the	
		Material: Worn thread or webbing.		The Brief Restraints were pulled to destruction during design verification testing. Ultimate strength values and safety factors against limit loads are as shown below:					
			MISSION: None.	Brief Restraint Webbing	S/AD Pressure Load (lbs)	Ultimate Strength (lbs)	Ultimate Safety Factor	S/AD Safety Factor Req't	
			CREW/VEHICLE: None with single failure. Loss	Fore/Aft	4.4/677 5.5/758 8.8/761	1616	2.4 2.1 2.1	2.0 1.5 1.5	
			of crewman with loss of secondary restraint webbing.	Thigh Side	4.4/593 5.5/560 8.8/483	1574	2.7 2.8 3.3	2.0 1.5 1.5	
			TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: Minutes.	Thigh Inboard	4.4/483 5.5/485 8.8/393	2115	4.4 4.4 5.4	2.0 1.5 1.5	
			TIME AVAILABLE: Days.	B. Test - Acceptance: The primary and secondary axial restraints are subjected to the S/AD limit load, as referenced in the design section, during fabrication of each LTA restraint.					
			TIME REQUIRED: Hours.  REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A-PASS B-N/A C-PASS	PDA: The following test is conducted at the LTA level in accordance with ILC Document 0111-710112: Proof pressure test at 8.0 + 0.2 - 0.0 psig for a minimum of 5 minutes conducted with the TMG removed.  Certification:					
				The Brief axial restraints were successfully tested (manned) during SSA				during SSA	

The Brief axial restraints were successfully tested (manned) during SSA certification to duplicate 458 hours operational life (Ref. ILC Report 0111-711330). The following usage, reflecting requirements of significance to the brief restraints, was documented during certification:

Primary Axial	Restraint	
Requirement	S/AD	Actual
Hip Abd/Add	458	1200

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CIL EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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FAILURE

Hip Flex/Ext.	1524	3200
Waist Flex/Ext	1234	2800
Waist Rotations	2466	6000
Don/Doff Cycles	98	400
Pressure Hours	458	916
Walking Steps	4320	77760

Secondary Axial Requirement	Restraint S/AD	Actua
Hip Abd/Add	229	600
Hip Flex/Ext.	762	1600
Waist Flex/Ext.	617	1400

The restraints were successfully subjected to an ultimate pressure of 13.2 psid during SSA certification testing (Ref. ILC Report 0111-711330). This is 1.5 times maximum BTA operating pressure based on 8.8 psid.

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#### C. Inspection -

Components and material manufactured to ILC requirements at an approved supplier are documented from procurement through shipping by the supplier. ILC incoming receiving inspection verifies that the materials received are as identified in the procurement documents, that no damage has occurred during shipment and that supplier certifications have been received which provide traceability information.

The following MIPs are perfromed during the brief assembly manufacturing process to assure that the failure causes are precluded from the fabricated item:

1. Visual inspection upon completion of the restraint webbing pull test for signs of defective threads and material.

During PDA, the following inspection points are performed at the brief assembly level in accordance with ILC Document 0111-710112:

- 1. Visual inspection for material degradation.
- 2. Visual inspection for structural damage following proof pressure test.

### D. Failure History -

Non-Enhanced:

B-EMU-104-T013~(10/26/99) - During 40-hour reverification of the enhanced LTA, broken threads noted on the brief restraint assembly. Cause is contact against the brief restraint bracket. Procedure for installation of an abrasion patch provided to USA for repair of Class IIIW units.

B-EMU-104-A065 (12/10/99) - Snag and broken thread on right inside secondary F.A.R. restraint line. Most probable cause Is incidental tool tip to webbing contact when inner FAR mounting screws were backed out. ECO #991-0090-1 changes Maint. Manual to add more steps to remove or install brief thigh restraint webbings and pins.

#### E. Ground Turnaround -

None, for every component within its limited life requirement.

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NAME FAILURE

P/N MODE & QTY CRIT CAUSES FAILURE EFFECT RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE

Every 4 years or 229 hours of manned pressurized time the lower torso restraint and bladder assembly is removed from the LTA and subjected to complete visual inspection for material degradation or damage.

F. Operational Use - Crew Response -

Pre/post-EVA: If not detected, no response. If detected audibly or tactily, troubleshoot problem. If no success, use spare LTA if available or terminate EVA prep.

EVA : Single failure not detectable, no response.

Special Training -

No training specifically covers this failure mode.

Operational Considerations -

Not applicable.

# EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

## SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-104 LOWER TORSO ASSEMBLY (LTA)

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

Approved by:

M. Smylin HS - Reliability

VASArwiProgrami Manager